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Chapter 1
M igration — A General 
Introduction
1.1 M igration and Research
The term (human) migration denotes the movement of human individuals between ge­
ographical regions. International migration, the main concern of this research, refers 
to such movements across national borders.1 Research efforts of social scientists con­
centrate mainly on two aspects of migration: the causes of such movements, and the 
consequences for host- and source countries.2
Migration has too many aspects to make it a subject that is easy to deal with. 
The main reason for this is simple: the single migrant is a human being, and as such he 
is a rather complex system. He is the owner of labor which he may or may not supply 
to labor markets. He possesses a certain stock of human capital, which was built up in 
the home country. The decision whether, in which form and for how long he supplies 
labor to the foreign labor market is, like the migration decision itself, the result of 
a complex decision problem. The migrant is further a social being with preferences 
and a cultural identity, being usually formed in another society than the one of the 
host country. While the labor the migrant may sell to the foreign labor market is not 
distinguishable from the labor of native workers with the same level of qualification, the 
migrant himself is usually identifiable as a foreigner. This is a main reason for social 
reactions to, and political actions against migration. Migrants live and consume in the
1In what follows, the term migration will denote human, international migration.
2In the following chapters, the country of emigration will be referred to as home country or source 
country or simply emigration country and the country of immigration as host country, target country 
or immigration country.
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host country. They create their own social context and they are directly confronted 
with the native population. Migrants are usually expected to integrate into the new 
society, but they often prefer to maintain their cultural identity and their different life 
style.
Different sciences are interested in different aspects of migration. When sociolo­
gists talk about migration, they usually have in mind the process of social adoption of 
migrants in the societies of host countries and the social consequences of migration for 
the source countries. Laywers may think about different legislations and regulations, 
and how they apply to different types of migrants and migration situations. When 
economists use the term migration, they usually think of the movement of the factor 
labor which goes with the migrant. The simplest economic explanation why migra­
tion occurs, namely wage differentials, relates only to the component labor, which is 
inherent to the migrant. When analyzed in a simple neoclassical framework, where 
migration is treated symmetrically with international capital mobility, consequences of 
migration are then nothing else than reactions of an economic system to changes in 
the supply of labor.
1.1.1 Migration and Economics
In the last two decades, numerous contributions have appeared in the economics lit­
erature that analyze the consequences of migration for both home and host countries 
under various perspectives. The model most frequently used is the conventional static 
two-sector, two-factor model of production. This model was first applied by Meade 
(1955) in the field of international trade theory. In this framework, the economy is 
assumed to consist of two perfectly competitive industries, producing two goods with 
linearly homogeneous production technologies. The two factors of production, typical­
ly labor and capital, are assumed to be perfectly mobile between sectors, always fully 
employed and fixed in supply. The production of the two goods is characterized by 
different factor intensities over the whole range of production possibilities, with factor 
reversals excluded.3 On the demand side, individuals are usually assumed to exhibit 
identical and homothetic preferences.
Using this model as a theoretical basis, a variety of publications have analyzed 
the consequences of migration for both the source- and the host country, under different 
aspects and various assumptions.4 It was for example shown that the consequences of
3This model is often referred to  as the Heckschtr-Ohhn model or, since Samuelson plays an impor­
tan t role in its development, the Heckschcr-Ohlin-Samuelson model (Takayama, 1982).
4see, for instance, Kenen (1971), Bhagwati and Rodriguez (1976), Krauss (1976), Bhagwati and
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migration depend on whether, and which of, the goods produced in the economy under 
consideration are traded, whether the flow of labor from one country to another is 
accompanied by a flow of capital, whether migrants re-transfer a part of their earnings 
to their home countries (remittances) and whether the economy is able to influence 
world price levels. The basic model was likewise extended to allow for three factors of 
production (usually skilled and unskilled labor and capital),5 or to consider a different 
treatment of migrant and native labor in the host country’s labor market.6 Recently, 
some contributions explore the implications of migration in dynamic models. These 
models are generally based on neoclassical growth theory or overlapping generations 
models.7
1.1.2 Some Critical Remarks
Although all these approaches provide valuable insights into the effects of migration 
under the respective framework of assumptions, results are often far too general to 
apply to any specific migration situation. An analysis that is based on too general or 
simplifying assumptions may not give answers on important questions which arise with 
a particular migration situation. Furthermore, analysts impose sometimes strong be­
havioral assumptions on what they call migrants. These assumptions, although crucial 
for the analysis, are often counter intuitive and not justified by any evidence. Results 
of these studies are then misleading. It occasionally seems that the term migration is 
used by analysts to justify their sometimes technically very sophisticated and involved 
analytical exercises by actual relevance. In order to approach the important problem 
of migration in an appropriate way, one should try to analyze and to give answers on 
questions that are raised by specific and observed migration situations, rather than 
defining hypothetical migration scenarios to which specific models could apply.
The consequences of a specific type of migration for the economies of host- and 
home country depend crucially on the behavior of the single migrant worker. This 
behavior is not simply induced by rentability considerations concerning the factor labor,
Brecher (1980), Rivera-Batiz (1982), Thompson (1984), Rivera-Batiz (1984), Djajic (1986), Ethier 
(1986), G upta (1988), Quibria (1988), Quibria (1989), Rivera-Batiz (1989), Quibria and Rivera-Batiz 
(1989), Rahman and Caples (1991).
5see, e.g., Clark and Thompson (1990), Jones and Easton (1990).
6For instance, Ethier (1985).
7Galor and Stark (1991) investigate the impact of technological differences on international labor 
migration in an overlapping generation framework. The impact of immigration on the income position 
of the native population has been addressed by Barry and Soligo (1969), Steinmann (1991) and Meier 
and Wenig (1992).
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but it is the outcome of a complex decision process. A better insight into which factors 
are relevant determinants in this process is an important step for a proper evaluation 
of the consequences of migration. An understanding of the determinants of migrants 
behavior will help to explain the reasons for the consequences of a specific migration 
situation.
The next section will provide a rough description of different features of migration 
and migration situations. The classification of the type of migration to be analyzed is 
an important presupposition not only to define the right questions to be asked, but also 
to choose the appropriate tools of analysis. Section 1.3 will then characterize the type 
of migration that is the main concern of this study, namely temporary migration or, 
more specifically, return migration. Finally section 1.4 will provide a general outline 
of the remaining chapters.
1.2 C lassification and A nalysis
Migration is a very heterogeneous phenomenon. One type of migration is often not 
comparable with another type of migration, neither in causes nor in consequences. 
Different countries face different migration situations. For instance, causes and conse­
quences of guest worker migration are likely to differ quite considerably from causes 
and consequences of politically induced migration. Seasonal migration between Spain 
and Southern France or Poland and Germany has different aspects and different eco­
nomic consequences than permanent migration from Western Europe to the United 
States or Australia.
The main questions and problems that arise are different for distinct migration 
situations. The tools of analysis should therefore correspond to a specific situation of 
interest. They should further be appropriate to provide answers on the most relevant 
questions that arise from this situation. For this purpose, it is as a first step useful to 
classify and to describe the type of migration to be analyzed. A proper classification of 
a specific migration situation may then help to set up the theoretical model in a way 
that it captures the most relevant characteristics, and that it is able to give answers on 
the most relevant questions. The next section presents some features that may help to 
identify and to classify migration situations. The following explanations are far from 
complete and they are only meant to provide a rough idea of different aspects of the 
phenomenon migration.
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1.2.1 Features of Migration
Migration may be classified according to the skill level of the migrant population upon 
arrival in the host country. Migration of unskilled labor affects the economy, and 
different sectors of the economy, in another way than migration of highly skilled labor. 
This is true for both the host- and the source country. If migrant workers are highly 
skilled, the emigration country may loose considerable investments into the human 
capital of these workers. The extensive literature on the ” Brain Drain” emphasizes the 
serious economic disadvantages of an outflow of highly qualified labor for the economy 
of the source country.8 Restrictions of such outflows were the rule until recently in all 
countries of the former Warsaw Pact and are still enforced in many other countries.9 
On the other side, the economy of the host country may gain by an inflow of highly 
skilled labor because it saves the costs of education.10
The question whether the migrant population is skilled or unskilled is crucial for 
the evaluation of political and economical reactions in the host- as well as in the source 
country. A differentiation between skilled and unskilled labor inflow is necessary to 
study in an appropriate way the distributional aspects of migration.11 Distributional 
consequences of migration are partly responsible for the phenomenon that only some 
groups of the host country’s society oppose certain types of immigration.12
Accordingly, when a country exhibits heavy immigration of skilled or unskilled 
labor, and one is interested in the most relevant consequences of this movement for the 
economy of the host country, an analysis along the lines of a simple two-factor model
8See, for example, Bhagwati and Rodriguez (1976), Vas-Zoltan (1976).
9The outflow of human capital mirrors the dilemma of many LDC’s: The development of their 
economies depends crucially on the factor human capital. They therefore are forced to invest into the 
education of their people, either by sending them abroad or by developing appropriate educational 
structures in their own country. However, since their economies are less productive than those of 
"developed” countries, the rental rate paid on human capital is usually lower. Consequently, being 
appropriately educated on the expenses of the home country, these people often migrate to countries 
where they receives a higher return on their human capital.
10For a benefit-cost analysis of educational savings in case of guest-worker migration to West- 
Germany, see Blitz (1971).
11Some recent empirical contributions investigate the skill level of immigrants upon arrival as well 
as the impact of an inflow of unskilled workers on earnings of the incumbent population (see, for 
example, Borjas (1991), Butcher and Card (1991)).
12For instance, immigration of mainly unskilled labor to West Germany was strongly opposed from 
the mid-seventies onward by interest groups who represented mainly unskilled labor. Social groups 
whose members were mostly working in the skilled segment of the labor market were in favor or at 
least indifferent towards such immigration.
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with labor being homogeneous will not provide too much insight. The extension to three 
factors of production (skilled labor, unskilled labor, capital) allows for a wider range 
of issues one may look at -  for instance distributional aspects, interactions between 
skilled and unskilled labor and both types of labor and capital etc. In terms of a 
model structure, who gains and who looses from migration depends on who owns which 
factors of production. If the society consists of different classes with different tastes (for 
example, the owners of capital consume mainly capital goods while the owners of labor 
consume mainly consumption goods), the distributional effects will additionally depend 
on changes of relative product prices which are induced by migration. The analysis of 
individual effects of migration on classes which differ in their endowments of factors 
of production as well as in their demand functions requires a theoretical framework 
which deviates from a simple one-class economy and from identical preferences among 
consumers.
Migrants may further have different reasons for emigration. Economic motives 
are likely to always play some role for migration decisions. Differences in wages for 
the same labor market activity are the classical economic explanation for migration.13 
Such differences, however, were recognized to be often outweighed by what is called in 
the literature psychic costs: costs that are arising as a result of changes in the social 
and cultural environment, by loosing social contacts and often the social status as well.
However, economic motives are not the only reason for migration. One could well 
think of migration situations where economic motives play a minor role, or where a 
relatively unfavorable economic situation in the host country is overcompensated by 
other aspects, like a preference to live in the host country. This preference could be 
induced by political or ethnical persecution in the home country. In addition, relying on 
simple wage differentials as the motor of migration decisions does not allow to explain 
return migration, unless in the case of a drastic change in the economic situation of 
the home country relative to the host country.
Very important is further the institutional context. For example, labor markets 
in Western economies are strongly institutionalized. An inflow of labor will not, at 
least in the medium run, reduce wages sufficiently so that an new equilibrium situation 
can be achieved. This may occur in the long run, but the social and economic short
13Hicks (1932, p.76) stated tha t "...differences in net economic advantages, chiefly differences in 
wages, are the main causes of migration” . Sjaastad (1962) considers earnings and costs of residence in 
the immigration- and emigration location over the life cycle of the potential migrant. An individual 
is then likely to  migrate when the present value of this decision is positive. It will further migrate to 
that destination for which the present value becomes largest. Based on this motive, Berninghaus and 
Seifert-Vogt (1987, 1988) model the m igrant’s decision problem under incomplete information.
run consequences may be such that the long run implications become irrelevant. Espe­
cially the short run consequences of migration are often of utmost interest and political 
relevance. In the short run, heavy immigration may, or may not create unemployment. 
To become unemployed is the most threatening aspect of labor migration for the work 
force of the immigration country. This fear is it what makes the native work force very 
sensitive to ideological and racist arguments. That an inflow of migrants generates 
unemployment is often used as a political argument to reduce or to stop migration by 
legal regulations. Whether, and to which extend migration really creates unemploy­
ment is one important question to be answered by the economist. For the analysis 
of these short run consequences of migration, a conventional neoclassical equilibrium 
model with perfectly flexible factor prices as a tool of analysis does not give too much 
insight into what are the short run consequences. An appropriate economic model 
should therefore explicitly consider the labor market and allow for wage rigidities.
Furthermore, one should always consider the legal context. Legal regulations 
do often restrict the choice set of a migrant worker. Especially when working with 
empirical data, the analyst should be aware of the restrictions under which the data 
was generated. The legal context further defines which migration is legal and which 
migration is illegal.14 The consequences of illegal migration are often considerably 
different from those of legal migration. Illegal migrants can usually not claim any 
benefit support, they do not have any labor market rights and they can not demand 
minimum wages. They are consequently a very cheap and flexible source of labor. Their 
own situation in the host country is by far more risky than that of legal migrants. Their 
economic behavior in the host country is therefore likely to be different from that of 
legal migrants.
The above features of migration are timeless. However, migration has also a time 
dimension. The dynamic aspect of migration is extremely important for the analysis 
of the consequences of migration, and it is an issue of major interest in the following 
chapters. Migration may simply be classified according to whether it is temporary or 
permanent. Temporary migration may again be distinguished between a variety of sub 
categories.
A rough classification is provided in figure 1. Three main groups of migration 
are categorized: temporary migration, permanent migration and political migration,15
^Illegal Immigration and the consequences for the host country are treated by Ethier (1986) and 
Chiswick (1988).
15The term temporary is used here from the perspective of the host country: a migrant is a temporary 
migrant, even if he leaves the home country permanently, as long as he remains only temporarily in 
a given host country.
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Migration
Temporary Migration Permanent Migrationw
Motives: Economic Motives: Economic 
Preference for Host 
Country
A
Political Migration
Motives: Preference for 
Host Country 
Economic
B \  A “  \ B
-^Return 
' Migration
(Permanent Returners) 
Examples:
• Europe: 50's - 70's
• Southern - 
Northern Italy
• Asia - Middle East
• India - Britain
Transient 
Migration
Examples:
• Italy - France 
Germany
• Africa - 
Southern Europe 
Northern Europe
Circulatory 
Migration
(Seasonal Migration)
Examples:
• M exico - 
Southern USA
• Asia - 
Middle East
• Spain - 
Southern France
Figure 1.1
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The motives for temporary migration are primarily of economic nature. Permanent 
migrants have usually likewise economic motives, but also a preference to live in the 
host country. Political migrants have strong preferences to live in the host country. 
This is normally a result of political or ethnical persecution in the home country, or 
discrimination because of political or ethnical reasons. Economic motives play a minor 
role in the case of political migration.16
Temporary migration may again be sub classified. One important type of tempo­
rary migration is circulatory migration. With circulatory migration, migrant workers 
move frequently between the host- and the source country. They only stay for a short 
period in the target country, for example for the harvest season. Circulatory migration 
is usually induced by a seasonal excess demand for labor in the immigration country. 
This temporary excess demand for labor can not be supplied by the native work force 
at adequate prices. Circulatory migration is often illegal (Mexico-Southern States of 
the US),17 and it is sometimes crucial for the competitiveness of the respective industry 
(frequently in the agricultural sector) in the host country.
Transient migration describes a situation where migrants move between different 
host countries without necessarily returning home. An example for transient migration 
may be guest worker migration in Europe in the 60’s and 70’s, where migrants from 
Southern European countries moved between Northern European countries. Transient 
migration classifies also a very actual migration phenomenon. Many African or Asian 
migrants enter Europe through Italy, Spain or Portugal and then start to move towards 
Northern countries like Germany or even Sweden.
Return migration has been by far the most important type of migration in Europe 
over the last decades, and it may become again very important in the near future. 
Return migration is the type of migration one has usually in mind when referring 
to migration as being temporary. It describes a situation where migrants return to 
their country of origin after a significant period abroad. A return migrant migrates 
because of mainly economic motives, like high wage differentials between home- and 
host countries, or high unemployment in the home country. He has, however, at least 
initially, a strong preference to live in his home country.
16This third category seems artificial - political migrants are either permanent or temporary mi­
grants. However, different from the other two groups, whose status is either determined by their own 
decision or by the regulations of the host country, the status of political migrants is conditioned on 
the situation in the home country.
17On legal and illegal migration between Mexico and the US, see Chiswick (1988) and Reynolds 
and McCleery (1985, 1988).
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Table 1.1: Return Migration
T y p e E x  A n t e E x  P o s t C l a s s if ic a t io n
I
II
Migration with Intended Return 
Migration with Intended Return
Return 
No Return
R e t u r n  M ig r a t io n
III Migration with no
ReturnIntention to Return M i g r a t io n  w it h
IV Migration with no
No Return
P e r m a n e n t  C h a r a c t e r
Intention to Return
1.3 R eturn  M igration
This research will mainly be concerned with return migration. Before proceeding, it 
seems reasonable to specify the notion return migration in the way it will be used in 
the following chapters. A return migrant will be defined as a migrant who initially and 
over some period of his stay abroad has the firm intention to return home. Should the 
migrant in the end decide to stay permanently, he will still be referred to as a return 
migrant. The reason to define return migration in this way is that economic behavior 
and decisions of migrants do not depend on future realizations, but rather on current 
intentions. Intentions of return are likely to have a strong impact on the migrant’s 
behavior in the host country and, as a consequence, on the economies of host- and 
home country. The definition for return migration as it will be used here is oriented 
on ex-ante intentions, not on ex-post realizations.
Table 1.3 provides a simple categorization. It may be noted that a migrant 
who initially intends to stay permanently abroad, but decides at some point of his 
migration history to return home would not correspond to the above definition of a 
return migrant.
1.3.1 Return Migration - Some Stylized Facts
Return migration was the prevailing type of migration into central Europe between the 
late 50’s and the early 70’s. Labor requirements and high wages of Western Europe’s 
industrialized economies and poverty as well as unemployment in Southern European 
countries and in Turkey induced an immigration boom into the center of Europe. 
By 1973, this migration process had accumulated an estimated stock of 10 million
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migrants from the periphery into the core of Europe (King (1985), p.38). Since then, 
the trend has reversed, partly due to the oil-induced recession in the immigration 
countries and partly encouraged by positive economic developments in the countries 
of origin. And, of course, due to the essentially temporary character of this type of 
migration which induced migrants to return to their home countries. Return migration 
is likely to become again important for Europe in the near future, and this time between 
the Eastern European countries and the industrialized countries of Western Europe. 
Return migration is not only a European phenomenon. It is also the major form of 
migration between Asian countries like Thailand18 and countries of the Middle East.
As a general feature, the target countries of return migration exhibit an excess 
demand for labor in at least some segments of the labor market. This labor can not be 
supplied by the local work force either in the quantity requested, or at adequate prices, 
or both. The emigration countries are generally characterized by an excess supply of 
labor and/or wage rates that are far below those offered in the target countries.
Migration between source- and target country is generally meant and wished to 
be temporary by both the governments of the emigration- and the immigration country, 
and, at least initially, by the migrant himself. Emigration countries often consider this 
form of migration as a relief from the pressure of excess labor supply in their labor 
markets. Furthermore, the temporary stay of the migrant worker abroad is regarded by 
the emigration country as a means to acquire human capital (by schooling and training 
of migrants in the target counties) that is needed for the future construction of own 
industries (Mehrlander (1980), p.82). Savings and remittances of migrants further 
provide development support for the migrant’s home region in the emigration country. 
Additionally, they often provide a major balance of payments support for the labor 
exporting country.19
The immigration countries hope to bridge a temporary shortage in labor supply 
by temporary inflows of migrant labor. Furthermore, return migration helps to avoid 
the implementation of costly labor-saving technologies. The migrant himself usually 
wishes to accumulate a stock of savings and to return after a significant number of 
years abroad. The accumulation of a saving target is a common feature of return
18For a  survey on return migration between Thailand and countries of the Middle East, see 
Pitayanon (1986).
19For instance, Robinson (1986) reports that remittances of Pakistanis to the Middle East finance 
some 86% of Pakistan’s trade deficit. Kumcu (1989) emphasizes the role of remittances and savings 
as a m ajor balance of payments support for countries like Turkey and Yugoslavia. Hiemenz and 
Schatz (1979) report tha t in 1973, transfers of earnings of foreign workers in Germany to Turkey and 
Yugoslavia were 4,700 Million DM, which amounted to over twice the total foreign exchange obtained 
through exports of goods from those countries to  the host country.
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migration. Savings are often used to buy houses in the home countries or to establish 
small businesses upon return.20 Piore (1979, p.54) emphasizes the accumulation of 
savings as a special feature of temporary migration. Paine (1974, p.101) considers the 
saving of some target amount as the chief purpose of return migrants.
Many immigration countries only allow for temporary stays and issue temporary 
work permits (e.g. Switzerland, countries of the Middle East). Other countries do 
not impose such rigorous restrictions on the migrant’s duration of stay, or they are 
not allowed to do so by international agreements. For instance, member states of the 
European Community cannot simply urge migrant workers from other member states 
to return home. Sometimes special agreements between emigration- and immigration 
countries have been set up that limit the possibilities for restrictions on the migrant’s 
duration of stay. Furthermore, legal regulations may foresee a permanent working 
permit when the migrant has been in the country for a certain number of years. As 
a consequence, the return of these migrants is often to a large extent determined by 
their own choice. The government of the host country may provide some incentives to 
induce migrants to return,21 but it often can not force them to do so.
There is ample evidence that a considerable part of return migrants do in fact re­
turn to their home countries.22 Nevertheless, in times of economic downturn and rising 
rates of unemployment, migrants are often considered to contribute to job shortages 
in the host countries. Therefore, these migrants become therefore a matter of heated 
political discussion. In these situations, repatriation projects like the one mentioned 
above are launched.
1.3.2 Interest o f the Thesis
This research is mainly concerned with the decision processes of return migrants. A 
thorough understanding of how migrant workers meet their decisions, and of what 
influences their decisive behavior may allow design of policies that induce migrants to
20For example, Gmelch (1980, p .150) reports that in Ireland 30% of returnee households had estab­
lished small businesses.
21 For example, the German government instituted measures like the Return Migration Assistance 
Act of 1983, which was directed at migrants from non-European Community countries. The aim of 
this repatriation assistance ( Ruckkekrhilfe), which was paid to those migrants who agreed to return 
to  their home countries permanently, was to  achieve a large reduction in the foreign population.
22Bohning (1984, p .147) estimates that "more than two thirds of the foreign workers admitted to the 
Federal Republic [of Germany], and more than four fifth in the case of Switzerland, have returned” . 
Glytsoe (1988) reports th a t from the 1 million Greeks migrating to West Germany between 1960 and 
1984, 85% gradually returned home.
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behave in a way so as to correspond to the intentions of policy makers. This may then 
be achieved by a sophisticated system of incentives which indirectly determine migrants 
decisions, rather than by a strict and direct framework of laws and regulations.
The following chapters will try to shed some light on issues that seem to be im­
portant in the context of return migration. The questions asked are of the following 
kind. When considering the situation of a return migrant in the host country, what 
determines his investment into human capital, and, as a consequence, his earnings 
position in the foreign labor market? Is there any empirical evidence that, over the 
migration history, the earnings position of return migrants, relative to native workers, 
develops differently from the earnings position of permanent migrants? What impact 
has the intended duration of stay on the migrant’s earnings profile? What effect have 
differences in individual characteristics and intentions on the earnings position of mi­
grant workers? Are these differences measurable, and what are the implications for 
empirical analysis?
Furthermore, how do return migrants meet their migration decisions, what deter­
mines their return decisions, their savings decisions and their savings target? Is their 
any impact of the intended duration of stay on the migrant’s savings behavior? Will 
the introduction of uncertainty change the implications of a deterministic framework? 
Is it possible to isolate the factors which determine the intended return of a migrant 
worker? Is there empirical evidence of some observed variables having a significant im­
pact on return decisions, and are the empirical results consistent with the implications 
of the theory?
The remaining part of this research will try to give answers to these questions. 
The next section will provide a general outline of the following chapters. In the anal­
ysis, the more general term temporary migration is sometimes used instead of return 
migration. It should be noted that the chapters were written as independent papers and 
are therefore self-explaining. However, the introductory parts may therefore sometimes 
be repetitive.
1.4 General Outline
When new immigrants enter the labor market of the host country, their earnings are 
initially considerably lower than those of comparable native workers. However, over 
time migrants acquire skills and assimilate to the foreign labor market conditions. A 
variety of recent empirical studiesinvestigate whether the assimilation to the foreign 
labor market is sufficiently strong so as to close the initial earnings gap between migrant
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workers and the native population.
Using data for the USA, Canada and Australia, the common conclusion of these 
studies is that the initial earnings gap between migrants and natives decreases over 
time. In some cases, earnings profiles of migrants even cross over with those of compa­
rable native workers. The main explanations for the rapid decrease of the earnings gap 
between migrants and natives is a strong incentive of migrants to invest into human 
capital which is specific to the needs of the labor market of the host country. The 
cross-over of migrants’ earnings profiles with those of native workers, as observed in 
some studies, is usually explained by the selective character of migration. Migrants 
are drawn from the upper part of the ability distribution of the home country popu­
lation. Under the assumption that abilities are similarly distributed in home country 
and host country, the average migrant worker should consequently be more able than 
the average native worker.
A common feature of the kind of migration examined in these studies is that it is 
permanent rather than temporary. Chapter 2 will reconsider the earnings adjustment 
of migrant workers when migration is mainly of a temporary character. In particular, 
it will be shown that in the case of temporary migration the optimal investment into 
country specific human capital should be lower than in the case of permanent migration. 
Investments may not be sufficient to allow migrants’ earnings to catch up with those 
of native workers. Furthermore, it will be pointed out that migration is positively 
selective only under certain labor market conditions. These hypotheses will then be 
empirically tested, using data for return migrants in West Germany. The empirical 
findings support the hypotheses of low investment into human capital when migration 
is temporary. The results suggest a need to differentiate carefully between temporary 
and permanent migration when investigating migrant’s earnings assimilation.
Chapter 3 develops a model that analyzes human capital investment and earnings 
patterns of target saving temporary migrants in a continuous time framework. The 
analysis will point out differences in investment- and earnings profiles which are due 
to differences in individual characteristics of migrant workers. The model predicts 
that earnings profiles of temporary migrants vary considerably due to differences in 
their saving targets, their ability level, their skill level upon arrival, their consumption 
pattern and their intentions after return to their home countries. The model provides 
a theoretical basis for the estimation of earnings profiles of temporary migrants.
Chapter 4 analyzes savings behavior and migration decisions of temporary mi­
grants in a two-period model where the length of each period is a further choice variable. 
Special attention is given to the impact of a stochastic environment on the migrant’s 
choice. The paper emphasizes two aspects which are likely to explain to some extent
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the relatively high savings of migrant workers: savings due to life cycle motives, and 
savings due to precautionary motives. Furthermore, the impact of uncertainty about 
future income on the migration decision as such and on the time the migrant wishes 
to stay in the host country is analyzed. The results show that the effect of uncertainty 
on the time the migrant intends to stay abroad is ambiguous. It depends not only 
in sign, but also in size on the utility structure of the migrant worker as well as on 
characteristics of the economies of host- and home country.
Chapter 5 analyzes return decisions of temporary migrants. A theoretical in­
tertemporal model will be developed where the point of return to the home country 
is endogenous. Hypotheses implied by the theory are then empirically tested, using 
micro data on migrant workers to Germany. The empirical analysis follows two steps: 
first, the decision of the migrant whether or not to return is analyzed. Secondly, the 
length of expected duration of those who want to return is investigated. The empirical 
results are consistent with the implications of the theory.
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Chapter 2
Earnings Adjustm ent of 
Temporary M igrants
2.1 Introduction
In recent years the labor market adjustment of immigrants and the speed of the ad­
justment of their earnings to the level of respective native workers has been of growing 
interest in the economic literature. Following Chiswick’s (1978) seminal article, a 
number of contributions applied some extended version of the human capital earnings 
function as developed by Mincer (1974) to cross-sectional as well as longitudinal data.1 
The general conclusion of these studies was that immigrants are doing surprisingly well 
in the American, Canadian and Australian labor market. The empirical results indicate 
that earnings of migrant workers, being initially lower, grow rapidly and, in some cas­
es, overtake those of comparable native workers after no more than 10-15 years.2 The 
steeper age-earnings profiles of migrant workers compared with native workers were 
usually explained by a stronger incentive to invest into human capital. The finding
1See, for example, Chiswick (1978), Tandon (1978), Long (1980), Borjas (1982, 1989), Chiswick 
and Miller (1985), and Meng (1987).
2Chiswick (1978) found that earnings of migrants in the American labor market exceed earnings 
of native-born men with same characteristics after 10-15 years. Analyzing earnings adjustments of 
migrants in the Canadian labor market, Meng (1987) calculated that the native-foreign earnings gap 
closes after 14 years. Borjas (1989) used a longitudinal data set on high-skilled workers for the 
US. He argued th a t cross-sectional results overestimate the positive assimilation of migrant workers 
because return migration may not be randomly distributed among migrants and the quality of migrant 
cohorts may deteriorate over time. However, his results support the general perception that immigrant 
earnings do catch up to those of native workers, although the rate of convergence is relatively slow 
and an overtaking of earnings does not take place for all cohorts.
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that earnings of migrants exceed those of native workers after an adaptation period 
was explained by a higher level of labor market ability and work motivation (Chiswick 
1978). One could accordingly draw the general conclusion that migrants succeed in 
compensating for their initial earnings disadvantage by considerable investment into 
country-specific human capital and, furthermore, that migrants are often a self-selected 
group, having a higher ability and motivation than the average native worker.
However, the kind of migration examined in the studies mentioned above was 
permanent rather than temporary. Moreover, the migrant was confronted with highly 
competitive labor markets, favoring selective migration. Therefore, the questions arise 
whether these results remain valid if migration is temporary and if labor is not only 
"pulled” by a favorable labor market situation in the host country, but also ”pushed” 
by highly unfavorable conditions in the source country.
This chapter will try to answer these questions. Section 2 will present some 
theoretical considerations, pointing out that the two main hypotheses used to explain 
the favorable situation of migrants in the labor markets of the receiving countries, 
high investment incentives and positive selective migration, will not necessarily be 
true if temporary migration is considered. An example for the kind of migration for 
which the above hypotheses are not likely to hold would be the temporary migration 
from Southern Europe and Turkey to West Germany. Section 3 will then empirically 
examine the assimilation of temporary migrants to the labor market conditions in West 
Germany. The empirical findings support the hypotheses outlined in the theoretical 
section. The main conclusion is then that it is necessary to carefully differentiate 
between permanent and temporary migration if analyzing the earnings adjustment of 
migrant workers.
2.2 Som e T heoretical C onsiderations
2.2.1 Country-Specific Human Capital Investment and the 
Duration of Stay
The empirical literature on the speed of adjustment of immigrants to the labor market 
conditions of the country of immigration takes as a point of departure the human capital 
earnings function, as initiated by Becker and Chiswick (1966) and further developed 
by Mincer (1974). According to Mincer, it should be assumed that after leaving school 
the worker continues to devote a certain amount of his resources to furthering skills 
or acquiring job related knowledge. Measured earnings or net earnings are then the
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difference between the worker’s earnings potential, or gross earnings, and the cost of 
investment into human capital in that period.3
In the case of migrants, however, a second factor has to be considered. Since the 
human capital the migrant acquired in his home country is only partially transferable 
to the foreign labor market, the migrant, once being in the receiving country, will 
additionally adopt host-country specific human capital.
Accordingly, measured earnings of the migrant at time t may be expressed by the 
following expression:
InYn =  InEit +  /n(l -  kit -  fiit) (2.1)
Yit are measured earnings and E h is the migrant’s gross earnings potential, both at 
time t. i is an index for the iih individual. kit and fin are the fractions of the earnings 
potential devoted to human capital investment, either by furthering human capital 
or by acquiring country-specific skills, respectively. Assume that the fraction of the 
earnings capacity which is invested decline linearly during the working life and the 
duration of stay:4
=  *» ( l  -  j r )  i ft, =  fto ( l  -  j )  (2.2)
where kio and /i,o are the ratios of post-school investment to potential earnings after 
leaving school and of host-country specific human capital investment to potential earn­
ings upon entering the host-country, respectively. T1, is the length of working life and 
0, the amount of years the migrant worker intends to stay in the host country, j  and 
h are time indices. Either investment ceases if j  = T, or h = 6,.
The gross earnings Ett of a migrant in a certain period t depend on the earnings 
potential he accumulated before and after migration. In logarithmic form and using a 
continuous notation, Eh can be expressed as follows:
3The co6t of investment into human capital is best understood in terms of opportunity costs. 
If the ”full income” of a worker is equal to the time he is able and willing to devote to working 
activities, weighted with the wage rate that corresponds to the worker’s stock of human capital, 
then the measured income would equal the full income minus the value of time spent for investment 
activities.
4The linearity assumption is only an approximation of the optimal path of investment. The paths 
of fiit and can be thought of as the solution of an optimal control problem. For an extensive 
treatm ent of human capital investment of temporary migrants in an optimal control framework, see 
chapter 3.
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InEu =  InE f +  r-S,- + r{ f kit dt +  i  n it
Jo Jo
dt (2.3)
E f  are gross earnings without any investment into human capital, 5, are years of 
schooling, t,- is the total time of working experience and /, is the time of residence of 
the migrant in the host country, r f ,  r,- and p, are the rates of return on investment 
into schooling, human capital, and investment into host country-specific human capital, 
respectively.
Inserting (2.1) and (2.2) into (2.3), solving the integrals and rearranging terms 
results in the following expression:
lnYit =  InE f +  /n(l -  kit -  /i„) +  r'S,- +  r,fc,or, -  + Qt^ o h  ~  (2.4)
Assuming the values of fco,/io*r *5r an<^  P 3,8 constant among individuals, (2.4) indicates 
that differences in migrants’ earnings are explained by different schooling backgrounds 
Si and different lengths of working experience as well as varying durations of residence 
/, in the host country. Furthermore, the theoretical derivation above suggests that the 
form of the investment profile of migrant workers and thus their earnings depends 
on the migrants expected total duration of stay, 6. This variable is neglected in all 
studies that investigate the assimilation of the earnings of migrant workers. In the 
case of permanent migration, 6 may not help to explain differences among migrants’ 
earnings. However, if 9 varies considerably among individual migrants as it is the 
case with temporary migration, this variable may explain a significant part of earnings 
differences among migrant workers. Equation (2.4) indicates that, everything else being 
equal, the longer the migrant expects to stay in the host country, the less concave is his 
earnings profile. Therefore, the slope of earnings profiles may vary among otherwise 
identical temporary migrants if they have different expectations about how long to stay 
in the host country. Furthermore, since the migration history of the average temporary 
migrant is shorter than that of a permanent migrant, the above considerations seem to 
indicate that temporary migrants’ earnings profiles are flatter than those of permanent 
migrants.
2.2.2 Selective Migration
The usual explanation for the empirical findings that migrant’s earnings do not only 
adapt, but even overcome those of native workers is that migrants have, on average, 
higher innate labor market abilities than native workers. Arguing that the rate of
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return to the migration decision is higher for a high-ability person than for a low- 
ability person, migration is self-selective.
The underlying assumption of the selective migration hypothesis as presented by 
Chiswick (1978, 1986) is that migrants are fully employed in both labor markets. If, 
however, the labor market of the emigration country is characterized by high unem­
ployment that affects low-ability workers to a higher extent than high-ability workers, 
and if in the immigration country prevails an excess demand for labor, migration may 
even be selective in a negative sense.
This can easily be shown by reconsidering and extending Chiswick’s theoretical 
argument of positive selective migration. Under the simplifying assumptions that earn­
ings do not vary with experience, work life is long and migration costs are incurred 
only in the initial period, the rate of return to the migration decision for a more able 
person is, according to Chiswick (1986), given by
_  (wH — u j5)(1 + k) w11 — ws ^  .
r  “  (l + k)<P + <P =  cP + ^ c P  M )
where wH and ws are earnings in the host- and the source country, respectively, c° are 
opportunity (time) costs and cP direct costs of migration. (2.5) assumes that a more 
able person has earnings k% higher in both countries than a low able person. Since 
c° are the time costs of migration, these costs increase with the ability level. It is 
obvious from (2.5), that, for (P > 0, the rate of return is higher for the person with a 
higher ability level. Chiswick then concludes that the incentive to migrate is higher for 
high-ability workers. If abilities are similarly distributed among countries, immigrants 
will consequently have, on average, higher level of abilities than native workers. The 
selection process will be more intense the larger the direct costs of migration, cD.
Chiswick’s argument, however, is only true if certain labor market conditions are 
fulfilled. Assume an excess demand for labor in the host country and an excess supply 
for labor in the source country. In the case of temporary migration, host- and source 
country are often characterized by such labor market situations. Migration is often 
induced by a temporary excess demand for unskilled or semiskilled labor in the host 
country. The labor attracted stems from countries with significantly poorer economic 
conditions and, very often, an excess supply for labor in the low-skilled labor market.
Assume further that in the source country a high ability worker will more easily 
find a job than a low ability worker. Let k correspond to the deviation from the 
average ability level in the country of emigration and let p(k) be the probability that 
a worker with level k is employed in the source country, with p'{k) > 0. b denotes
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an unemployment benefit in the source country, with b < ws . Adopting Chiswick’s 
notation, the rate of return on the migration decision to a worker with level k can then 
be written as:5
_ t»i'-[u > sp(J:) + ( l -,,(*))!>]
r : -------------- i i +- j _ cc ------------ <2'6>C T 1 + ki'
The impact of a rise in k is now ambiguous: beside the positive effect on r, as explained 
above, a higher k will increase labor market opportunities of the potential migrant 
in his home country and, accordingly, decrease r. Therefore, for some probability 
distribution p{k), some ability distribution and some set of values for earnings, costs 
and unemployment benefits the rate of return could well be highest at very low ability 
levels.6 In that case, it would be more profitable for the less able worker to migrate: 
migration would accordingly be negatively rather than positively selective.
Although the arguments are extremely simple, the above considerations make 
clear that the kind of the selection process taking place strongly depends on the e- 
conomic situation and the labor market conditions in both, the host- and the source 
country. In terms of the above analysis, migration will tend to be negative selective if 
unemployment benefits in the home country and the direct cost of migration are low, 
if there is an excess supply of labor in the home country while there is full employment 
in the host country and if the probability of being unemployed is higher for those with 
lower levels of probability.7
To summarize, the above considerations suggest that earnings profiles of tempo­
rary migrants are flatter than those of permanent migrants, resulting from a shorter 
pay-off period for any country-specific human capital investment. Furthermore, the 
generally assumed positive selection process is found to be strongly dependent on the
5Since c°  are time costs of migration, they will as well depend on p(k). Assuming c°  as constant 
does not change the intuition of the argument and simplifies matters.
6Let the derivation of abilities from the average ability level in the source country be normally 
distributed around the mean k — 0. Let a  be the variance, with a  =  0.5. Accordingly, f ( k )  ~  
N ( 0 , 0.5). Furthermore, let the probability tha t a person with relative ability level k is employed be 
equal to the cumulative distribution: p(k)  =  F(k).  If b =  0 and, for instance, wH =  10, ws  =  5, 
c° =  2 and c° =  1, the ra te of return will be highest for k =  —0.2. For similar distributions of abilities 
in the host- and the home country, migration would tend to be negatively selective.
7 A further analysis of the selective migration hypothesis is presented by Borjas (1987). Using a 
theoretical framework set up by Roy (1951), he shows that the selection bias depends on the dispersion 
of earnings in the home- and in the host country and on the correlation between the disturbances 
affecting both labor markets. According to  his analysis, a necessary condition for a positive selection 
is th a t the correlation between disturbances affecting both labor markets is sufficiently high and that 
income is more dispersed in the host country than in the home country.
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economic situations in host- and source country. In the case of temporary migration 
economic circumstances may favor non-selective or even negative selective migration 
rather than positive selective migration.8
2.2.3 Migration to West Germany - Some Stylized Facts
Looking more closely at the history of temporary migration to West Germany, one finds 
that, according to the theoretical considerations above, both arguments that are used to 
explain the strong position of migrants in the Australian, Canadian and US-American 
labor market are not likely to hold for temporary migrants in West-Germany.
Post-war labor immigration into West Germany started in the mid 50’s and ac­
celerated rapidly until 1973. The percentage of foreigners employed in the labor force 
increased from 0.6% in 1957 to 11.2% in 1973, the highest percentage of foreign workers 
ever employed in West Germany, and declined thereafter.9 This heavy immigration of 
laborers mainly from Southern European countries and from Turkey was caused by 
the rapid economic development in West Germany after the second world war and the 
resulting growing excess demand for labor. It was supported by high unemployment 
rates and low per capita incomes in the countries of origin. The growing inflow of 
foreign workers into the German labor market was accompanied by a number of mea­
sures regulating legal, social and labor market conditions. The fear of the unions that 
foreign labor might be used by employers to keep wages down, the interest of employers 
in encouraging recruitment of foreign workers, as well as the effort of source country 
governments to sustain equal rights for their citizens in the host countries were large­
ly responsible for a number of agreements that virtually accorded equal treatment of 
migrants in the German labor market and within the social security system. Further­
more, in the 60’s recruitment agreements were concluded between Germany and all the 
main source countries which considerably facilitated migration for the worker by guar­
anteeing him a one year contract upon arrival, accommodation and payment of travel 
expenses. Moreover, he could not be dismissed during the first year of residence.10 
Recruitment activities stopped in 1973, the turning point of the strong economic boom 
in Germany.
Accordingly, the situation of temporary migrants coming to Germany was charac­
8Note an im portant difference between the two arguments that favor a lower earnings pattern: 
While the level of ability imposes a restriction on the migrant to relatively improve his earnings 
position, low investments as a result of a short expected migration history are a free-choice decision.
9Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, Arbeitsstatistik 1974
10Mehrlander (1980), pp. 81, 82
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terized by low costs of migration and high rates of return resulting from the considerable 
economic differences between most source countries and the host country. Emigration 
may have been especially appealing to those who would have had difficulties to find a 
job in the home country. In addition, the duration of stay was expected to be tem­
porary both by the governments concerned and by the guest worker himself. This 
may result in a lower incentive to invest into country-specific human capital as is the 
case with permanent migration. Consequently, one would expect to find migration to 
West-Germany to be less positively selective and the effort of the migrant to invest 
into country-specific human capital to be low.
In what follows, earnings profiles of temporary migrants in West Germany will be 
estimated. The main concern will be to test whether profiles differ from those found for 
permanent migrants in the labor markets of Australia, Canada and the United States. 
To test the hypothesis that the duration of stay has a positive impact on country 
specific human capital investment, additional tests are carried out, using interview 
data on the expected length of stay of the migrant worker.
2.3 A n Em pirical A nalysis
2.3.1 Data and Sample Characteristics
The empirical analysis below uses as a data base the first wave of the German socio­
economic panel, collected in 1984. The panel is organized on a household base. Besides 
asking about household specific characteristics, all people above 16 years were person­
ally interviewed. The first wave consists of 6000 households which can be subdivided 
into two subsamples, according to the nationality of the head of the household. The 
subsample with a German household head comprises 4500 households, whilst that with 
a household head of Turkish, Spanish, Jugoslavian, Greek or Italian nationality com­
prises 1500 households.
The data used for this study is restricted to men of foreign and German nation­
ality, above the age of 16 in 1984, who were full time employed at the time of the 
interview. Self-employed persons, persons who are enrolled in educational programs or 
who do an apprenticeship and state employees are excluded from the analysis. The lat­
ter group had to be removed from the sample since people with non German nationality 
are usually not allowed to become state employees. After removing all individuals who 
do not report their monthly gross earnings or their year of immigration (for foreigners), 
the final sample is reduced to 1876 persons with German nationality and 1083 persons
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Table 2.1: Sample Characteristics of Native and Foreign males, 1984
N atives Foreigners
Mean SD Mean SD
E a r n in g s  (DM ) 3 3 3 4 1312 2670 661
L o g  o f  E a r n in g s 8 .05 0.35 7 .86 0.25
A g e 3 9 .90 11.28 3 9 .6 0 10.68
Y e a r s  o f  S c h o o l i n g 11 1 .94 3.19 1.17 2.38
Y e a r s  o f  T r a in in g “ 3 .0 8 2.52 1.32 2.35
Y e a r s  o f  W o r k in g  E x p e r ie n c e 2 0 .1 8 11.70 20 .31 10.63
M a r r ie d  (% ) 75 .94 43.34 8 5 .3 3 35.40
Y e a r s  s in c e  M ig r a t io n * * 1 4 .76 5.12
L a n g u a g e  s a t is f a c t o r y  (% ) * * 3 9 .7 6 48.96
L a n g u a g e  g o o d  o r  v e r y  g o o d  (%) * * 4 3 .0 8 49.54
S a m p l e  S ize 1876 1084
SO U R C E : Socio-Economic Panel, wave 1, 1984.
with foreign nationality.
Table 2.1 compares some economic and socio-economic characteristics of Ger­
man nationals and immigrants with foreign nationality. The average gross-earnings, 
reported as earnings in the month preceding the interview, are 20% higher for German 
nationals compared with foreign workers. This substantial absolute income difference 
might be partially explained by the different schooling- and training backgrounds of 
the two groups. From the sample information two different variables on the educational 
background can be extracted. Both refer to the level of education received after the 
age of 14.12 The variable Schooling (Sch) measures the years spent in school, evening 
school or at university, while the variable Training (TRAIN) measures the years of job- 
specific education and apprenticeship. The average amount of years of both forms of 
educational input is higher for natives than for foreign nationals. Both groups have ap­
proximately the same average age (A g e ) and working experience ( E x p ), with working 
experience measured as the amount of years a person was full time employed. A higher 
percentage of foreign nationals in the sample is married. A relatively high percentage
12The empirical analysis below therefore assumes an equal schooling background for all persons 
before the age of 15. A further differentiation of education and schooling was not possible since the 
data had to  be constructed using a biographical scheme that lists life activities after the age of 14.
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Table 2.2: Intended Length of Stay and Total Length of Stay, Foreign Males, 19S4
Interval (in years)
»“HVI 1 < x < 5 5 < x < 10 10 < x < 15 15 < x < 20 20 < x < 30 > 30
Ysm  (in %) 0.31 5.33 8.88 49.21 20.68 15.56 0.00
Istay  (in%) 6.47 31.97 21.94 4.49 3.23 0.63 31.26°
T o tst a y  (in%) 0.00 0.31 1.88 12.23 20.48 26.57 38.55
SOURCE: Socio-Economic Panel, wave 1, 1984. Sample size: 957 observations.
“99% of this number intend to stay forever.
of migrant workers claimed to have at least a satisfactory knowledge of the German 
language, even though none of the countries of origin uses German as a main language. 
The average amount of years since migration (Ysm) is fairly high, indicating that most 
of the migrants immigrated before 1973, the year when recruitment activities stopped.
Subdivided into 7 time intervals, Table 2.2 reports statistics on the percentage of 
migrants that fall into the respective sub category on the years they have already spent 
in Germany, YSM, the length of time they intend to further remain in Germany, I s t a y , 
and the total length of stay, TOTSTAY. Specifically, the numbers for the construction 
of the variable ISTAY are based on interviews which asked foreign nationals how long 
they further expect to stay in Germany. Possible answers were forever or a specific 
number of years.13 TOTSTAY is then calculated by simply adding the amount of years 
the migrant intends to remain in the host country and the number of years since 
migration.
The first row of table 2.2 indicates that 85% of the migrant population in the 
sample has been in Germany for more than 10 years. The numbers in the second row 
reveal that nearly one third of the migrant population intends to stay more than 30 
years or forever. However, more than 55% of the migrants intend to return to their 
home countries within the next ten years. The numbers reveal, furthermore, that of 
the migrant population living in Germany less than one third intends to change the 
temporary status into a permanent status, even though the intended total length of 
stay of more than 95% of migrant workers is longer than 10 years. One could expect 
that from those who do want to return to their home countries a high percentage will 
retire in Germany and return after retirement. This is, however, not the case. From 
those who do not intend to stay forever in Germany (69% of the migrant subsample), 
only 2.3% want to return after the age of 64.14 This implies that the vast majority 
of migrants intends to either try to find employment in their home country, live on
13Due to  missing values in these variables, the sample reduces to  957 observations.
148.8% will be older than 60 at the point of expected return.
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savings or become self-employed after return.
2.3.2 A Comparative Analysis of Earnings of German and 
Foreign Nationals
Different empirical specifications of equation (2.4) will be used for estimation, using 
data on natives, on foreign nationals and a pooled data set. In this section the hy­
pothesis will be tested whether, as found for other countries, the earnings of migrant 
workers in Germany do catch up with those of German nationals. The assumption of 
previous studies will be adopted that, even if two otherwise identical migrants differ 
in their expected duration of stay, their experience-earnings profiles are the same, i.e. 
6i =  9 V*. This restriction will then be relaxed in section 2.3.3.
Table 2.3 reports OLS estimation results using data on German natives (column 
(1)) and a pooled dataset of both, foreign nationals and natives (column (2)-(6)).15 The 
coefficients presented in column (1) emerge from a regression of the natural logarithm 
of monthly earnings on the exogenous variables labor market experience (EXP), labor 
market experience squared (EX PSQ ), marital status (M ARRIED), years of schooling 
(Sch) and job-specific education and apprenticeship ( T r a in ). Results in columns (2)
- (6) are produced by pooling the two subsamples of natives and migrants. Regression 
equations in columns (2) and (3) are extended by a dummy variable ( F o r ) that is 1 for 
foreign nationals, and by the variables years since migration and years since migration 
squared, ( Y s m ) and ( Y s m s q ), respectively. These variables are zero for natives. The 
equations presented in column (4) -(6) additionally allow for varying parameters of the 
experience variables and the schooling variables between natives and foreign nationals. 
Furthermore, dummy variables on language abilities are introduced, where L2 stands 
for satisfactory and L3 for good or very good knowledge of the German language.
The results using the native subsample (column (1)) are quite similar to those 
found in other countries. All coefficients have the expected sign and are significantly 
different from zero. Evaluated at 5 years of experience, an additional year of being 
in the labor force increases earnings of natives by 2.97%. After 15 years of working 
experience the positive impact of an additional year of experience has been reduced to 
1.5%. The impact of schooling and job-specific education on earnings of natives are
1SA test as suggested by Breusch and Pagan (1980) revealed that all estimations suffer from 
heteroscedasticity. The appropriate estimators for the variances of the parameter estimates are ob­
tained by using a  method as suggested by White (1980). W hite’s estimate of the covariance matrix is 
consistent and allows to  draw inferences from OLS results without necessarily specifying the form of 
heteroscedasticity.
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Table 2.3: Regression Analysis of Earnings of Foreign and German Nationals 
(Dependent Variable: Natural Logarithm of Monthly Earnings)
V a r i a b l e  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
C o n st a n t 7 .4 3 7 .51 7 .51 7 .4 8 7 .4 3 7 .4 3
(264.31) (329.63) (320.71) (279.23) (264.68) (264.73)
E x p 0 .0 3 7 0 .0 3 2 0 .0 3 2 0 .0 3 6 0 .0 3 7 0 .0 3 7
(13.18) (16.02) (15.58) (13.42) (13.96) (13.93)
E x ps q -0 .0 0 0 7 3 -0 .0 0 0 6 5 -0 .0 0 0 6 5 -0 .0 0 0 7 2 -0 .0 0 0 7 4 -0 .0 0 0 7 4
(-11.95) (-14.68) (-14.38) (-12.01) (-12.19) (-12.18)
S ch 0 .0 5 0 0 .041 0 .0 4 0 0 .0 4 0 0 .0 5 0 0 .0 5 0
(13.03) (13.36) (13.22) (13.05) (13.08) (13.07)
T rain 0 .0 2 3 0 .0 1 9 0 .0 2 0 0 .0 1 9 0 .0 2 3 0 .0 2 3
(6.88) (8.18) (8.04) (8.10) (6.95) (6.94)
M a r r ie d 0 .1 3 8 0 .1 2 9 0 .1 2 9 0 .1 2 7 0 .1 2 5 0 .1 2 7
(8.43) (9.41) (9.42) (9.30) (9.32) (9.44)
F o r -0 .1 5 2 -0 .2 1 0 -0 .1 6 5 -0 .0 2 0 -0 .0 6 5
(-13.68) (-3.15) (-2.35) (-0.29) (-0.89)
F o r *Y sm 0 .0 0 5 6 0 .0 1 3 4 0 .0 1 5 2 0 .0 1 4 9
(0.66) (1.50) (1.74) (1.67)
F o r *Y sm sq -0 .0 0 0 1 0 -0 .0 0 0 2 9 -0 .0 0 0 2 7 -0 .0 0 0 2 9
(-0.39) (-1.08) (-1.02) (-1.08)
F o r * E x p -0 .0 1 1
(-2.79)
-0 .0 1 9
(-5.06)
-0 .0 1 9
(-4.99)
F o r * E x ps q 0 .0 0 0 2 2
(2.45)
0 .0 0 0 3 2
(3.83)
0 .0 0 0 3 4
(3.98)
F o r *Sch -0 .0 4 0
(-7.21)
-0 .0 4 0
(-7.36)
F o r * T ra in -0 .0 1 0
(-2.06)
-0 .0 1 0
(-2.17)
F o r *L2 0 .0 4 0
(1.89)
F o r *L3 0 .0 6 7
(3.06)
ADJ. R2 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34
No. o f Obs. 1876 2960 2960 2960 2960 2960
SOURCE: Socio-Economic Panel, wave 1, 1984. Note: t-ratios in parenthesis. Reported 
t-statistics are based on standard errors which are corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
Regression results presented in column (1) are generated using the data set on German 
nationals only. Results in column (2)-(6) are based on a pooled data set of natives and 
foreign nationals.
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quite different. While an extra year of job-specific education raises income by 2.3%, 
the impact of an additional year of after-elementary schooling is considerably larger 
(5%). Married men have earnings 14% higher than non-married men.
Column (2) reports results emerging from using the pooled data set. The dummy 
variable for foreigners, FOR, is strongly significant. The coefficient indicates that the 
overall earnings difference between native and foreign workers, which was found to be 
21% (table 2.2), reduces to 15% after controlling for different backgrounds of school­
ing and training. The poorer educational background of migrant workers is therefore 
responsible only for a small part of the earnings gap.
Coefficients for the variables Y sm and YSMSQ (column (3)) have the expected 
sign, but are not significant.16 These results seem to indicate that the duration of stay 
in the host country does not have a narrowing impact on the earnings gap between 
German nationals and migrant workers. However, allowing for varying parameters on 
the experience variable between the two groups slightly increases size and significance 
of the YSM-coefficient (see results in column (4)). Since a further year in the host 
country affects migrants’ earnings via the years since migration variables as well as 
via the experience variables, the results in columns (4) and (5) indicate that the effect 
of a further year of residence, although improving the relative earnings difference of 
immigrants, is compensated by the considerably lower effect of the experience variable 
on immigrants earnings (F or*Ex p ), as compared with the effect on natives earnings.
To gain further insight into the relative adjustment of migrants’ earnings, esti­
mation results from the two subsamples on native and foreign workers (column (1) in 
table 2.3 and 2.4, respectively) are used to calculate the percent earnings increase for 
an additional year of experience in the German labor market. According to table 2.1, 
migrants enter the German labor market after an average labor market experience in 
their home country of 5.5 years. Upon entering the host country, each additional year 
in the German labor market increases their earnings by 8 In Y Mf bt  =  0.030 -  0.0015 t 
(calculations based on column (1), table 2.4). Measured likewise after 5.5 years of labor 
market experience, an additional year raises earnings of native workers by S In Y N/ St  
—  0.029 -  0.00146 t (calculations are based on column 1, table 2.3). Both expressions 
are not substantially different. Evaluated at 5 years after entry into the German labor 
market (which corresponds to 10.5 years being in the labor force), an additional year 
increases migrant’s earnings by 2.25%, while it increases earnings of a comparable na­
tive worker by 2.17%. After 10 years in Germany, or 15.5 years in the labor force, the 
respective numbers are 1.5% for migrants and 1.44% for natives.
16The null hypothesis of the coefficients of Y sm  and Y smsq  being jointly equal to zero could not 
be rejected at the 10% level of significance. The respective F-statistic is F(2, 2951) =  0.088.
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Accordingly, there is no earnings crossover and virtually no narrowing impact of 
the duration of residence on the income gap between temporary migrants and Ger­
man nationals as found in other empirical studies on migrants’ earnings. Temporary 
migrants do not improve their relative earnings position in the German labor market.
Column (5) in table 2.3 reports results of an estimation that allows for varying 
coefficients of the educational variables between foreign and German nationals. A year 
of schooling or training affects earnings of migrants and native workers to a different 
extend. The effect of an additional year of schooling of foreign citizens on monthly 
earnings is significantly lower than for German nationals. The difference is consid­
erable: while each year of schooling increases earnings of natives by 5%, it increases 
earnings of migrants by only 1%. The effect of a year of job-specific education and 
apprenticeship on earnings of migrants is likewise significantly lower than on earnings 
of native workers. An explanation for these results may be that migrants’ schooling 
and job-specific education took mainly place in the home countries and is of small value 
in the German labor market. Finally, the results in column (6) indicate that a good 
or very good knowledge of the German language (L3) reduces the earnings differential 
considerably (6.7%).17 Those with a satisfactory language ability (L2) have earnings 
which are 4% higher than those with a poor knowledge of the German language.
To summarize, the above results indicate that migrant workers in the German 
labor market do not improve their earnings position, relative to comparable native 
workers. These results are in contrast to the findings for other countries. The earnings 
gap between migrants and natives does not close over the whole migration history of 
the foreign worker.
The empirical findings may be explained by the hypotheses stated above: in terms 
of the human capital framework, temporary migrants in the German labor market may 
not invest amounts into host country specific human capital that are sufficient to catch 
up with native earnings. Furthermore, temporary migration to West Germany may be 
less selective as permanent migration to Australia, Canada or the United States.
2.3.3 Immigrant Earnings and the Expected Duration of S- 
tay
Turning to an analysis of earnings of the subgroup of foreign nationals only, this section 
will be particularly concerned with the effect of the expected duration of stay on
17Note th a t coefficients on the language variables measure differential effects, both compared with 
a  poor knowledge of the German language.
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country-specific human capital investment. Results of an estimation specification as 
suggested by the theoretical analysis above as well as estimations using only the foreign 
subsample are given in table 2.4.
Comparing results in column (1) and (2) of table 2.3 with those in column (1) 
of table (4) reveals that the effect of both educational variables on migrant’s earnings 
is found to be considerably smaller than on native’s earnings, as was indicated by the 
results using the pooled sample. The variables schooling (S c h ) and training ( T r a i n ) 
have approximately the same absolute effect on immigrants’ earnings. This, however, 
contrasts to German nationals, where (SCH ) has nearly a 50% higher impact on earnings 
than does ( T r a i n ). Being married (M a r r i e d ) has a higher impact on earnings of 
native workers than on earnings of foreign workers.
The absolute effect of the duration of residence in Germany ( Y s m ) on earnings 
is positive. Although migrant workers do virtually not improve their relative earn­
ings position, the years of residence have a positive impact on their absolute earnings 
position (the variable Y s m  is significant at the 10% level). At the point of arrival, 
an additional year of residence increases earnings by 1.6%.18 In column (2), dichoto- 
mous variables for language abilities are added to the estimation equation as additional 
indicators of assimilation. Migrants with a satisfactory knowledge of the German lan­
guage have earnings 4% higher than their colleagues with poor language knowledge. 
This income difference increases to 6.5% if the latter group is compared with migrant 
workers with good or very good language knowledge. These differences in income due 
to language ability indicate that even in the low-skilled or semi-skilled labor market 
language ability is thought to be correlated with productivity by German employers. 
It may also indicate that workers with knowledge of the German language are more 
capable of acquiring and using specific labor market information and, consequently, 
obtain better-paid jobs.
As already indicated in section 2.2, the decision of an individual whether, and how 
much, to invest in human capital depends positively on the time horizon he considers 
as the pay-off period for a given investment.19 In the case of migrants, and defining a 
linear investment function for country-specific human capital investment, the resulting 
earnings equation indicates that the coefficient on the quadratic term of residence in the 
host-county (YSM SQ) should differ among individuals according to their expected total
18Note tha t this only indicates that years of residence improve the absolute earnings position of 
migrant workers. This does not imply that it improves their earnings position relative to comparable 
native workers.
,9For a thorough theoretical analysis of the impact of the duration of stay on migrant’s investment 
into host country specific human capital, see chapter 3.
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Table 2.4: Regression Analysis of Earnings of Foreign Nationals 
(Dependent Variable: Natural Logarithm of Monthly Earnings)
Va r ia b l e  (1) (2) (3) (4)
C o n s t a n t 7.41 7.37 7.43 7.40
(113.24) (109.30) (178.47) (94.73)
E x p 0.019 0.019 0.022 0.022
(6.82) (6.73) (7.38) (7.18)
E x p s q -0.00044 -0.00042 -0.00047 -0.00048
(-7.38) (-7.01) (-7.53) (-7.44)
Sch 0.011 0.010 0.013 0.013
(2.71) (2.58) (3.15) (3.17)
T r a in 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.016
(3.60) (3.59) (4.67) (4.64)
M a r r ie d 0.093 0.098 0.084 0.081
(4.06) (4.30) (3.17) (3.09)
Y sm 0.016 0.016 0.012 0.011
(1.89) (1.82) (4.08) (1.15)
Y s m s q -0.00031 -0.00033 -0.00016
(-1.19) (-1.23) (-0.52)
L2 0.040
(1.91)
L3 0.065
(2.99)
Y s m s q / T o t -0.0056
(-2.05)
T o t 0.0010
(1.36)
ADJ. R2 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15
No. o f Obs. 1084 1084 957 957
SOURCE: The Socio-Economic Panel, 1984.
Note: t-ratios in parenthesis. Reported t-statistics are based 
on standard errors which are corrected for heteroscedasticity
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duration of stay (see equation (2.4)). However, this simple deterministic specification 
assumes that the migrant has upon arrival in the host country a firm idea for how 
long to stay, and that his planned duration will finally realize. But it is unlikely that 
migrants enter the host country with firm intentions about their duration of stay, and 
it is even more unlikely that duration intentions upon arrival will finally realize. During 
their migration history, migrants may frequently revise their intentions. Furthermore, 
intended durations are not necessarily strongly exogenous, but the migrant’s earnings 
position may likewise influence these intentions.
The available data allow to reconstruct a total duration of stay which is based 
on intended durations in 1984 and the years of residence. This number may, of course, 
differ from what the migrant would have said upon arrival. However, despite these 
shortcomings, it seems worthwhile to use this data for a test on the hypothesis that 
earnings profiles differ among migrants with different expected durations of stay.
An empirical specification of the variable 6 is therefore constructed along the 
following lines: when the migrant worker intends to return before reaching retirement 
age (which was assumed to be equal to 64), T o t  is calculated as the sum of the 
expected total duration of stay and the years since migration. It is therefore equal 
to TOTSTAY above. When the migrant intends to either return after retirement age 
or to stay forever, and based on the assumption that after an active working life no 
earnings-effective country specific human capital investment will take place any more, 
T o t  was constructed by adding to the years since migration the difference between 64 
and the age of the migrant.
According to equation (4), the intended duration should have an impact on the 
degree of concavity of the earnings profile. This requires the estimation of a regression 
with varying coefficients on the variable YSMSQ. Estimation results are given in column 
(3) of table 2.4.20 Coefficients on the two variables Y sm and Y smsq/ T ot are strongly 
significant. The numbers indicate that a longer intended total duration of stay improves 
the migrant’s earnings position. After five years of residence, an additional year in the 
country will increase migrants earnings by 0.64% if the expected total duration of stay 
is ten years. This number increases to 0.92% if the migrant intends to stay for 20 
years and to 1.01% if he intends to stay for 30 years. The results therefore support 
the hypothesis, suggested by the above theoretical considerations, that in the case 
of temporary migration the amount of investment in country-specific human capital 
depends positively on the expected length of stay in the host country.
30Note that, due to missing values in the variables which indicate the future intentions of the 
migrant, the sample reduces to 957 observations.
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Column (4) reports results when the variable T ot is introduced as and additional 
regressor. Although the coefficient estimate has the expected sign, it is not significant. 
Furthermore, the significance level of the variables Ysm and Ysmsq decreases.
2.4 Sum m ary and C onclusion
Empirical studies on earnings assimilation of permanent migrants to Australia, Canada 
and the United States have shown that the initial earnings gap between migrants 
and native workers steadily decreases over the time the migrant spends in the host 
country. The main explanations for the steeper earnings profiles of temporary migrants 
was that migrant workers have stronger incentives to invest into their human capital 
than natives. The findings that migrant earnings overtake those of natives after an 
adaptation period was explained with the selective character of migration.
In section 2.2 it was shown that, in a human capital framework, the size of in­
vestment of a migrant into human capital specific to the labor market requirements of 
the host country positively depends on his expected total length of stay. Consequent­
ly, temporary migrants should do worse in the foreign labor market than permanent 
migrants. Furthermore, reconsidering Chiswick’s argument for positive selective migra­
tion, it was found that migration will be positively selective only if certain labor market 
conditions are fulfilled in both, host- and source countries. In the case of temporary 
migration, labor market conditions in both countries are often likely to be unfavorable 
to positive selection. This may reinforce the weak position of these migrants in the 
host country labor market.
To gain some further insight into earnings adjustments of temporary migrants, 
earnings of native workers and migrant workers were analyzed. The data used stems 
from the German socio-economic panel. Temporary migration to West Germany seems 
to exhibit both features that are contrary to a favorable relative earnings position in 
the labor market of the host country: the migration is thought to be temporary and 
economic conditions in both, host country and source countries during the migration 
period seem not to be supportive for a positive selection. The empirical results indicate 
that, unlike the findings for permanent migration to other countries, foreign workers in 
the German labor market receive lower wages than their native counterparts through­
out their working history, other things being equal. There is no earnings-crossover 
between these two groups. The income gap between migrant workers and natives in 
the German labor market is not closing over the migrant’s migration history. Using 
data on the expected length of stay in the host country, empirical findings support the
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hypothesis that the total length of stay positively influences country-specific human 
capital investment and, therefore, earnings of migrants.
The results suggest that it is important to carefully differentiate between perma­
nent and temporary migration when considering the assimilation of migrants in the 
foreign labor market.
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CHAPTER 2. EARNINGS ADJUSTM ENT OF TEM PO RARY M IGRANTS
C hapter 3 
Tem porary M igration and the  
Investm ent into H um an Capital
3.1 Introduction
The economic situation of migrant workers in the labor markets of the host countries 
became an issue of growing interest in the economic literature in recent years. A variety 
of studies empirically investigated the adjustment of earnings of immigrants to those 
of native workers.1 The general finding for countries like Australia, Canada and the 
United States was that migrant workers do surprisingly well in the labor markets of the 
host countries. Being lower upon arrival, migrants earnings gradually adjust to those 
of native workers and, as found in some studies, even overcome those of natives.2
The first finding is explained in terms of the human capital framework: migrants 
have a high incentive to invest into human capital specific to the labor market of the 
host country. They accumulate human capital faster than native workers, resulting in 
relatively steeper earnings profiles. The cross-over of earnings of migrants with those 
of natives is explained with a higher innate ability and work motivation of migrants 
if compared with native workers. However, the generally favorable assimilation of 
permanent migrants in labor markets of Australia, Canada and the United States can 
not be generalized for all types of migration. Analyzing earnings profiles of temporary 
immigrants to West Germany, it was shown in chapter 2 that there is virtually no wage
1see, e.g. (Borjas (1985), (1987), (1989), Beggs and Chapman (1989), Chiswick (1978), Chiswick
and Miller (1985), Carliner (1980), Long (1980) and Meng (1987).
3Chiswick (1978) reports that earnings of migrants in the American labor market exceed those of 
native workers after 10-15 years. Meng (1987) calculated that the earnings gap between natives and 
immigrants in the Canadian labor market closes after 14 years.
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catch-up of migrants in the German labor market as was found for other countries. He 
explains his findings with the temporary character of the type of migration considered, 
having a flattening impact on earnings profiles.
It seems that the results of any empirical analysis on migrants earnings position 
depend strongly on the type of migration considered. Explanations of empirical findings 
need a more thorough theoretical foundation. A variety of questions arise that can only 
be answered in a theoretical framework. For instance, Chiswick’s (1978) explains his 
findings of a wage cross-over with high incentives of migrants to invest in country 
specific human capital and higher ability levels. Do these two factors independently 
influence the migrants earnings path or are there interactions between the level of a 
migrant’s ability and his incentive to invest into human capital? And is the hypothesis 
theoretically justified that a low transferability of skills has a steepening effect on 
migrants earnings profiles? Furthermore, the literature does not define what really 
creates an incentive to invest into human capital. The incentive to invest into human 
capital should relate to the value of any further unit of human capital. A rise in 
those variables that positively influence this value would accordingly provide a positive 
investment incentive. If measurable, an identification of these variables would allow 
for some statements about investment incentives of a given migrant population.
Turning to temporary migration, there is a variety of additional factors that 
should be considered if analyzing the migrant’s earnings position. First of all, it has 
to be defined why workers do only temporarily migrate. Which factors determine the 
migrant’s duration of stay and how does this influence his optimal investment into 
human capital? Different from existing models of human capital investment over an 
individual’s life cycle,3 the optimal decision of a temporary migrant on how much to 
invest into his human capital during his stay in the host country depends crucially on 
a variety of parameters that either do not have to be considered in life cycle models, 
like the value a worker attaches to the stock of human capital acquired when leaving 
the labor market, or may be assumed to be constant among individuals, like the total 
duration of the worker in the labor market considered.
This chapter will present a model to analyze the human capital investment and 
the path of earnings of temporary migrants who are ” target savers” : migrants who only 
intend to stay in the host country as long as it is necessary to accumulate a certain 
stock of savings and then return to their home countries.4 The main concern of the
3see, e.g., Ben-Porath (1967), von Weizsäcker (1967), Haley (1973), Heckman (1976), Blinder and 
Weiss (1976) and Rosen (1976).
4There is ample evidence tha t migration from Southern- to Northern European countries over the 
last decades consists largely of target saving temporary migrants. Glytsos (1988) characterizes these
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analysis will be to identify parameters that are responsible for differences in migrants 
earnings position and to investigate their impact on earnings profiles. The results will 
be illustrated by simulations. The analysis provides a systematic theoretical analysis of 
factors that may have an impact on the earnings situation of target saving temporary 
migrants. The model has a variety of implications for empirical work.
In particular, section 3.2 outlines the assumptions and the basic model and de­
scribes the optimization problem of the migrant. Section 3.3 considers only the period 
of positive investment into human capital production and analyzes the impact of dif­
ferences in individual characteristics on investment- and earnings profiles. Section 3.4 
investigates the occurrence and length of corner solutions, i.e., intervals with zero or 
full investment into human capital. Section 3.5 summarizes the main results and points 
out the consequences for empirical analysis.
3.2 H um an C apital Investm ent and Target Saving  
M igrants
3.2.1 The Target Saving Migrant
Why does temporary migration occur at all? Why should a migrant want to return to 
his home country after having worked for some years in the host country? According 
to Hicks (1932), the decision to migrate is simply induced by a higher rate of return on 
a unit of human capital stock in the host country (net economic advantages). Conse­
migrants as “...staying relatively short periods of time in the receiving country, accumulating consid­
erable amounts of money, remitting part of it during their stay abroad and returning home with the 
rest” . He reports that, from the one million Greeks emigrating to West Germany between 1960 and 
1984, 85% returned gradually home. Remittances over this period amounted to about $ 4 billion. 
Based on a representative sample from 1972, the ” Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit” found out that guest 
workers to West Germany transferred between 30% and 45% of their disposable annual income to 
their home countries. Furthermore, a part of migrant households accumulated a considerable stock 
of savings in Germany. Depending on the nationality, only 15% - 25% had firmly decided to stay in 
West Germany (see ” Monatsberichte der Deutschen Bundesbank” , April 1974). Kumcu (1989) re­
ports, using a survey conducted by the "Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey”, th a t the marginal 
propensity to  save of turkish households in West-Germany ranks between 0.21 and 0.48. Macmil­
lan (1982) reports similar numbers concerning the saving behavior for migrants in other European 
countries. In an excellent and comprehensive survey on migration of Thai workers to countries of the 
Middle East Pitayanon (1986) reports that remittances of migrant workers are considerable and to a 
large proportion invested into savings. The temporary character of migration is implied by a contract 
system tha t allows the worker to stay only for a restricted period.
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quently, once having migrated, why should the migrant deliberately return to his home 
country? An answer would be that the consumption of an equal bundle of goods will 
yield different levels of utility, according to whether consumption takes place in the 
host- or in the source country.5 Although the value of the migrant’s stock of human 
capital may be higher in the host country, he may rather enjoy to consume in the 
home- than in the host country. More technically, if the marginal utility of consuming 
a given bundle of goods is higher in the home- than in the host country, and if, on 
the other side, the rental rate on a given stock of human capital is higher in the host- 
than in the home country, then migration is likely to be temporary. The argument is 
simple: in an intertemporal context, each unit of time the migrant offers to the labor 
market of the host country will increase his lifetime wealth by more than if this unit 
of time is offered to the labor market of the home country. It therefore increases his 
lifetime consumption and lifetime utility. On the other side, each unit of time spend 
in the host country will enable the migrant to consume during this time in his home 
country. Since life is finite and the marginal utility of consuming a given flow of goods 
is higher in the source country, this will have a decreasing impact on lifetime utility. 
It is now intuitively obvious that there should be an optimal length of stay t '  in the 
host country.6 Since marginal utility is lower, the migrant will consume relatively less 
in the home- than in the host country and, accordingly, accumulate a certain stock of 
savings. Before he migrates, he will have to optimally determine the size of savings to 
be accumulated., the length of stay and his consumption pattern .7
However, at the time of decision making, the migrant may not be fully informed 
about the labor market situation in the host country. Let the migrant assume, when 
solving his optimization problem, that he will not increase his stock of human capital 
once being in the host country. This seems not to be an unrealistic assumption: friends 
or returners may have informed him about the earnings he may expect, given his 
level of skills. Since he is not well informed about the foreign labor market, he may 
not be able to anticipate any possibility of an improvement of his earnings position 
by human capital investment and rather rely on his relatively certain information.
5The utility gained by consuming a given bundle of goods may depend on the environment where 
consumption takes place, including friends and family.
®In this framework, a permanent migrant is either characterized by a higher or equal marginal 
utility of a  given bundle of goods in the host- than in the source country or by a corner solution of 
his optimization problem: the optimal time to be spent in the home country happens to be at least 
equal to  his lifetime.
7For a thorough treatm ent of the migrant’s optimization problem determining the optimal length 
of stay, the stock of savings to be accumulated and the consumption rate in a simple theoretical 
framework, see Djajic and Milboume (1988).
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He now determines the length of stay simultaneously with his saving target and his 
consumption pattern. Upon arrival in the host country, he acquires full information 
about labor market conditions. He then reoptimizes, being restricted concerning his 
saving target, because, e.g. prior precommitments, but being flexible concerning the 
duration of stay. Given wages and prices, the migrant can now influence the length 
of stay by investments into human capital specific to the labor market requirements 
of the host country. He will do so by solving a new optimization problem, with the 
objective to minimize the time necessary to achieve a given saving target.
In what follows, this sub-optimization problem of the migrant will be developed 
and analyzed in detail.
3.2.2 The Basic Model
In the following analysis it will be assumed that at each point in time the migrant can 
choose between two activities: the production of human capital and the production of 
earnings. At any t, he will therefore allocate his time to either one or both of these 
purposes.8 The larger the stock of human capital, the larger is the migrant’s earnings 
potential, i.e. the earnings he would realize per unit of time rented to the market. 
Furthermore, an increase in the stock of human capital will, besides increasing the 
earnings potential per unit of time offered to the market, increase the productivity 
of time in the production of further human capital. Accordingly, the level of human 
capital positively influences the efficiency to produce further human capital.9 Leisure 
time is not explicitly considered in this analysis. Assuming that in each period (or at 
each point in time) the fixed amount of time allocated to either one or both activities 
is smaller than the total amount of time available, leisure could be considered to be a 
part of the "rest time” of the individual (leisure time is ”exogenous” ).
The migrant’s earnings capacity at time t is given by
E(t) = wH(t) (3.1)
where w is the rental rate on one unit of services of human capital and H{t) is the 
stock of human capital at t. E(t)  is the migrant’s earnings potential, i.e. the value
8Note th a t in a  discrete model context, the migrant would have to  decide for every period about 
the fraction of time to be allocated to either activity. In a continuous formulation, every such period 
reduces to one point in time. Therefore, time in a continuous formulation has a dual role: it drives 
the migrant along his duration cycle, and, a t each point in time, it has to be allocated to specific 
activities.
9This assumption follows Ben-Porath (1967) and Heckman (1976).
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of the maximum amount of services the migrant can offer to the labor market. In 
order to increase future earnings, the migrant may invest part of his human capital 
stock at t into the production of further human capital. Assuming for simplicity that 
the only input factor into the production of human capital is human capital itself, the 
production relation is characterized by the following expression:
K(t)  =  F(H(t)s(t))  =  M(a(t)H{t))i  F'(.) >  0, F"(.) < 0. (3.2)
where K(t)  is the flow of produced human capital. F(.) is the production function, 
assumed to be twice differentiable and strictly concave in it’s argument H(t)s(t) and 
s( t) is the fraction of the human capital stock invested into the production of further 
human capital, xp is an ability parameter. rj> may vary among individuals. For the 
following analysis, it will be assumed that F ,(x)x_o —* c, with c : finite. s(<) is 
constrained by
0 < s(i) < 1 (3.3)
If s(t) =  1 , all human capital will be devoted to the production of further human
capital. "Measured” or "actual” earnings at any K(i), are the difference between the
migrant’s earnings potential, E(t) = wH(t), and the forgone earnings by allocating a 
fraction of time to investment activities:
K(<) =  ( 1 - • ( < ) ) £ ( « )  (3-4)
Consumption in the host country will enter the migrant’s optimization problem as a 
constraint: since his objective is not to maximize utility during his stay in the host 
country, but to minimize the time necessary to realize his saving target, it will be 
assumed that he wants to sustain a level of consumption so as to maintain a utility level 
that is in a fixed relation to that he realized in the source country.10 However, the size 
of the flow of consumption necessary to yield a constant flow of utility is not necessarily 
constant over the migrant’s stay in the host country. Adopting the hypothesis that the 
utility gained from consuming a bundle of goods depends on the consumption pattern
10Note th a t this assumption does not imply tha t the migrant will realize the same overall utility 
as in the home country; consider a separable utility function U{c ,X)  — i/[u(c), v(A’)], where c is 
consumption and X  are all other utility-creating arguments like family, friends, environment etc. 
Only the first part ti(c) is of interest here.
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of the social reference group,11 such consumption will only produce a constant utility 
if the migrant will not change his social environment.
However, temporary migration is usually caused by a higher general wage level 
and a more favorable labor market condition in the host country, as compared to the 
home country. The country of immigration is generally characterized by higher stan­
dards of living, as compared to the countries of emigration. If the migrant integrates 
to a certain extend into the foreign society, he may gradually change his social refer­
ence group. Living initially in an environment consisting of compatriots, the migrant 
may slowly explore the foreign life style and adopt foreign consumption patterns. The 
utility he gains from a given bundle of goods may accordingly decline. The integration 
process will be correlated with migrants’ efforts to accumulate country-specific human 
capital. Integration is often equivalent to wage-effective human capital investment: 
learning the language, adoption of foreign habits and the foreign nationality may often 
be a necessary requirement to obtain certain job positions. To maintain the prior level 
of utility, the migrant may have to change the composition as well as the amount of 
goods consumed. Therefore, the investment into country-specific human capital will, 
on the one side, increase the migrant’s earnings capacity but, on the other side, may 
require him to increase his expenditures on consumption.12
Let the prior fixed level of utility from consumption be given by u. Assume that 
u =  u[c(f) — 71 G(H(t))] = ln[c(t) — 71 G(H(t))]. G(H(t))  is the integration function, 
transforming a given stock of wage-effective human capital into integration potential. 
The coefficient 71 indicates in how far this integration potential is consumption effective, 
i.e. the degree to which integration implies an increase of consumption necessary to 
maintain a given level of utility. Solving for c(t), the flow of consumption of goods can 
be written as follows:
c(l) =  7o +  - i M H m  < ?(.)>  0; G(tf(0)) = 0; 7„ =  e‘ (3.5)
Integration is accelerating if C?w(.) >  0 , decelerating, if G',,(.) <  0 , and constant, if 
G"(.) — 0. In the analysis below, only constant and decelerating integration will be 
considered. If 7 X =  0, the integration potential has no consumption augmenting impact. 
This would be the case if e.g. migrants, though having an integration potential given
n The notion th a t the level as well as the composition of consumption is strongly dependent on the 
consumption pattern of the social reference group was first brought up by Duesenberry (1949).
l i To simplify the analysis, prices and availability of goods are assumed to be equal in both countries
and the price level for consumption will be set equal to 1. Note that, since prices are equal in both 
countries, any change in size or composition of the migrant’s consumption bundle is not due to changes 
in relative prices, but caused by a change in the migrant’s social reference group.
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by G(H(t)),  are forced to live in special districts so that imitation effects or adoption 
of foreign consumption patterns are not probable to occur or if consumption patterns 
in the host country are very similar to those in the source country so that integration 
does not have a consumption augmenting effect. One could also think of 71 to depend 
on e.g. religious motives that prohibit the adoption of certain consumption patterns.
The stock of human capital is changing according to the following equation:
H(t) = K(t)  -  aH(t); H(0) =  H0 (3.6)
<7 is the rate of depreciation of human capital and H0 the stock of human capital that 
is wage effective at the time of immigration. The total savings at t, or, equivalently, 
the change in the stock of savings, may be written (in real terms):
A{t) = rA(t ) +  to(l -  *(<)) H(t) -  c(t); ¿(0) =  4> (3.7)
r  is the interest rate, assumed to be constant over time, and A q is the stock of initial 
capital or savings. The migrant’s optimization problem is now to minimize the amount 
of time necessary to accumulate a given saving target A. He therefore solves the 
following optimization problem:
max Í  —1 dt (3-8)
Jo
s.t. (3.6), (3.7) and 
A(T) > Ä 
T  € [0, ¿1]
T is the point of return. Since T is endogenous to the problem, with as an upper 
bound, the optimization problem is one of a free-time horizon with one end point 
restriction .13 Since neither the objective function nor the differential equations (3.6),
(3.7) explicitly depend on t, the system is autonomous. In this formulation, the migrant 
has in each t to optimally decide about s(t), the fraction of the existing stock of human
13[<o <1] is the maximal duration of stay in the ho6t country. <1 is the point of return the migrant 
considered, before leaving his home country, as necessary to realize a given saving target in the "worst 
case” , i.e. without any further investment into human capital.
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capital to be invested into the further production of human capital, so as to steer the 
system from an initial state Ao to the desired state A  in a minimum amount of time.14 
The Hamiltonian for this problem is:
K(H(t), A(t),  A!(f), A2(t), s(t)) = -po + Ai(t)[rA(t) +  ™(1 -  s(t))H(t) -  (3.9)
(70 +  liG(H(i))]  +  X2(t)[F(H(t)s(t)) -  aH(t)}
^i(0> ^2 (0  and Po are costate variables, associated with equations (3.7), (3.6) and 
the objective function, respectively. In addition to the initial conditions and (3.6) and
(3.7), first-order necessary conditions for an optimum are:
K(t)  = - ^  = ~ r K ( t )  (3.9-a)
A#> = -177 = -A i(*)Mi -  -  71 g w o )] -  A jio in .K io  -  *] (3.9-b)
-  Po +  A ;(i)M ‘(i) +  u,(l -  s '( t) )H'( t)  -  (70 +  i iG(H'(t))}  (3.9-c)
+ A -  ° u ‘(i)] I  “  J  ; £  *  £  o < « <  r .
K ( T ) > 0 ;  A;(r)[A*(T) -  Â] = 0; \ \ {T )  = 0 . (3.9-d)
[po,AÏ(f),A;(<)j ±  [0,0,0] Vf; po = 0 or po = 1. (3.9-e)
i > ° : s(t) =  1
-  =  -A i(0 u )^*(i) +  A2* ( 0 n ) ^ ( 0 <  = 0  : ^(O € (0,1) (3.9-f)
3 I < 0  : s(t) =  0
14If the duration of stay in the host country is legally restricted to  a certain period length (e.g. Thai 
migrants in countries of the Middle East), the migrant would maximize the final amount of savings 
A( T)  in the given time subject to  (3.6) and (3.7). Though the optimal paths of all variables are only 
identical if the saving stock achieved in the time restricted problem happens to  be equal to the saving 
target in the free-time horizon problem (or v.v.), most of the following analytical results are valid in 
both cases. This follows from the structure of the optimization problem: in both cases, neither control 
variables nor state variables do appear in the objective function.
52 CHAPTER 3. HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT
The interpretation of the costate variables Aj and A2 is straightforward. They indicate 
the shadow value of an additional unit of capital or human capital, respectively, in 
the maximization process. For the problem under consideration, — Aj(i) and —A2(t) 
indicate the decrease of the time necessary to stay in the host country if A(t) or 
H(t),  respectively, will be increased by a marginal unit. Condition (3.9-c) results from 
the special structure of the problem: since the duration of stay is endogenous and 
A(t)  is end point restricted, T  has to be determined such as to set the value of the 
Hamiltonian for the optimal control- and state trajectories for all t equal to 0 (if the 
upper bound i 1 is not binding) or >  0 (if the upper bound t1 is binding).15 — A ^ r)  is 
then the decrease in the duration of stay if the saving target will be relaxed by one unit: 
—Ai(T)  =  dT/dA.  From the complementary slackness condition in (3.9-d) it follows 
that Ai(T) =  0 if A(T) — A  > 0, i.e. if the endpoint constraint is not binding. Since the 
problem is a minimal time problem, the constraint will be binding Vi if A > A0. p0 is 
the costate variable associated with the objective function. Let JQ — 1 dt = x(T) = T. 
Then ¿(f) =  —1 and po =  — =  Consequently, p0 is constant. For the problem
under consideration, po > Q and, hence, po =  1 without loss of generality.
The problem of the migrant in each t will then be to decide which fraction of the 
existing stock of human capital H(t)  to invest into the further production of human 
capital and which fraction to allocate to earnings activities. In each t the migrant uses 
as decision rule whether the investment of a marginal unit of human capital into the 
production of further human capital will be of more value, given his constrained ob­
jective, than allocating this unit to earnings activities. He has furthermore to consider 
that each additional unit of human capital produced will increase his stock of human 
capital and, therefore, promote integration and accordingly consumption expenditures.
In what follows the optimal path of s(t) will first be analyzed. As obvious from 
(3.9-f), three policies may be considered to be optimal for some interval over the total 
time horizon [0, T): (a) s* =  1, (6) 5’ =  0, (c) s* € (0,1). Section 3.3 only considers 
the case (c), i.e. an interior solution. The sensitivity of the path of the variables of 
interest to changes in individual characteristics will be analyzed in detail. Section 3.4 
will then analyze the occurrence and duration of corner solutions ((a) and (6)).
15To simplify the analysis, it will be further on assumed tha t the upper bound, which is equal to 
the maximum amount of time the migrant considers as necessary to achieve the given saving target, 
will not become binding: T  <  <j.
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3.3 T he O ptim al Policy in the Case o f an Interior 
Solution
The main concern of the analysis in this section is not to investigate the path of invest­
ment into human capital and the resulting paths of human capital stock and observed 
earnings for a "typical” migrant. The intention is rather to investigate how changes 
in characteristics that are likely to differ considerably among temporary migrants are 
responsible for changes in investment- and earnings patterns. Such differences in char­
acteristics would be the level of ability, the level of skills upon arrival in the host 
country, the total length of stay, which, in turn depends on the migrant’s saving tar­
get, and the value the stock of human capital acquired in the host country has for the 
migrant upon return to the source country. Profiles are further affected by the degree 
to which an integration potential, acquired by human capital investment, becomes con­
sumption effective. The general dynamics of the system as developed in section 3.3.1 
corresponds to the profiles of a representative temporary migrant and will serve as a 
basis for comparative dynamic analyses in later sections, investigating the impact of 
differences in several characteristics on migrants’ investment- and earning’s paths. In 
the following discussion it will be differentiated between investment cycle and duration 
cycle. The duration cycle is the total period a migrant stays in the host country, while 
the investment cycle signifies only the period of positive investment into human capital.
3.3.1 The Optimal Path
Let rj(t) =  \ 2( t ) / \ i ( t )  be the relative shadow price of human capital in terms of real 
capital, tj would correspond to the incentive of a migrant to invest into human capital. 
For s(t) > 0,s(<) ^  1, and using (3.9-a), (3.9-b) and (3.9-f), the change of this shadow 
price over time is given by the following expression:
r,(t) =  7 iG'(H(t)) - w  + q(t)[<r + r] (3.10)
This is a non-homogeneous differential equation. Using the transversality condition 
which implies that r/(T) =  0, the solution is given by:
rf(t) =  e<ff+r)t j *  e-<'+r> >  -  7 ,G'(H(T))]dT (3.11)
The relative shadow price of a unit of human capital, ), is the sum of all future net 
marginal contributions of this unit to the objective function. Let [u> -  71 G'(H{t))] =
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7 (t) be the marginal contribution of an additional unit of human capital stock.16 Ac­
cordingly, in the case of a decelerating integration, G"(.) <  0 and S^(t ) /S  H(t) > 0. 
In the case of a constant integration ¿ 7 (t) /6  H(t) =  0. Since tj(T) =  0, which follows 
from the transversality condition, 7j(i) <  0 if 7/(0 ) > 0 .17
To simplify the following analysis, the integration function will first be assumed 
to be a linear function in H : GH(H(t)) =  0 and G'(H(t)) =  constant. It follows that 
7 (t) =  7  >  0 . Accordingly, (3.11) simplifies to the following expression:
’ W =  (7 ^ 7 )  I1 “  e(‘’+r|l" r | ] (3-12)
It is obvious from (3.12) that the size of r](t) depends directly on the total length of 
stay, T,  and on the degree to which some integration potential may become consump­
tion effective, as indicated by 7 !. As mentioned above, differences in 71 may be due to 
different cultures, religions and integration possibilities of individual migrants. Vari­
ations in ability level ip and the stock of initial human capital Ho do not influence 77 
directly.
In what follows, the paths of the stock of human capital H, total investment sH,  
measured earnings Y , and the fraction of human capital reinvested into the production 
3 , will first be analyzed for a typical migrant, without differentiating among individual 
characteristics.
The path of optimal investment decisions is determined by the equilibrium con­
dition (3.9-f). For the interior solution, this relation reduces to
F 'fciO ffiO ) *?(<) =  “> 5 s € ( 0 , l )  (3.13)
Since the production function is strictly concave and ij(t) < 0, it follows directly from
(3.13) that the total investment into human capital sH  must be strictly monotonically 
decreasing over time: (s H ) <  0. This can be easily seen by inverting (3.13):
s(t)H{t) =  r  ; r < 0  (3.14)
It follows that s(t)H(t)  =  —r '  (w/r}(t)2) ij(t ) <  0. The decrease in sH  may be either due 
to a decrease in the fraction of human capital invested into further production, or to a
16In what follows, it will be assumed tha t [id — 71 G '( i/( i) )]  =  y(t)  > 0 Vi.
17Note th a t, if the stock of human capital acquired in the host country is of further use to the
m igrant after return to the home country, X2(T)  ^  0 and, accordingly, rj(T) ^  0. This case will be
considered in section 3.3.2.4.
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decrease in the stock of human capital or to a decrease in both variables. However, for 
any positive investment, the stock of human capital will rather increase than decrease 
«is long as the depreciation of human capital will not overcompensate the production 
of new human capital. Therefore, as long as the stock of human capital is increasing, 
the fraction of human capital invested into further production has to decrease: i  < 0. 
Since the total input into the production of new human capital is steadily decreasing, 
the stock of human capital has to decrease towards the end of the investment cycle, if 
the depreciation rate is positive. Depending on the size of the change in 77, s may then 
either increase or decrease, but it will eventually go to zero. Analytically, the optimal 
change in the stock of human capital over time can be easily obtained from (3.6) and
(3.14):
m  = m - ^ ) )  -  ^  m  (3 .15)
As long as F  ( t  >  & H {*■)•> the production of human capital overcompen­
sates the decay of the existing stock of human capital, the stock of human capital will 
increase. Since the first term in (3.15) is decreasing over time and the second term is 
increasing, the stock of human capital peaks at some t and decreases thereafter. For 
<t — 0, the stock of human capital will increase over the whole investment cycle. Since 
H(t) < 0, H(t)  is a strictly concave function in t.
Solving equation (3.15) results in the following expression:
H(t)  =  e~otH{0) +  f* e-'<‘- T> F ( r ( - ^ ) ) d r  (3.16)
Jo V\T)
The stock of human capital at time t is the sum of the integral of all depreciation 
weighted investments into human capital in previous periods and the depreciated initial 
stock of human capital. Dividing (3.14) by (3.16) gives the optimal fraction of human 
capital to be invested into reproduction, s(t). Differentiation with respect to t yields
n m )  , , , n
s ( , ) ----------- W ) --------------W F  ( >
The first term in (3.17) is always negative. The second term will be negative or zero 
for H{t) > 0. Consequently, if there is no decay of human capital (<r =  0), s(t) 
will decrease over the whole investment cycle. However, if cr ±  0, the second term 
may temporarily become positive at the end of the cycle. This follows from (3.15): if 
<j > 0, H(t)  may eventually become negative at the end of the investment cycle. If
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a  is sufficiently large, the second term in (3.17) may overcompensate the first term, 
inducing, consequently, s(t) to increase again for a short period. However, since r}(t) 
is a monotonically decreasing function with r)(T) =  0, it follows from (3.9-f) that, for 
w > 0, s(T)  must be equal to zero. Accordingly, s will finally decline, even if there 
may be intervals at the end of the investment cycle with i(i)  > 0.
How will measured earnings develop over the duration cycle? Measured earnings 
Y (t ) are given by equation (3.5). They are the difference between the migrant’s earnings 
potential E ( t ) and the fraction of human capital stock invested into the production of 
further human capital, valued with the rental price of human capital, w. The change 
in measured earnings is given by the following expression:
Y(t)  =  u>(l -  s(t)) H(t) -  wH(t)s(t)  (3.18)
The interpretation of (3.18) is straightforward: H(t)  is the total change in the stock 
of human capital. If H(t)  is positive, potential earnings E(t)  =  wH(t)  will increase by 
the evaluated change in human capital stock. Since, however, a part of this stock is 
reinvested into further production of human capital, the increase in measured earnings 
is reduced by the evaluated fraction s that is invested into the production process. 
Additionally, measured earnings will change by the evaluated change in the fraction
i  of human capital invested into the production process. This change is given by 
the second term in (3.18). Accordingly, as long as H(t) > 0, it follows that s(t) < 0. 
Measured earnings will steadily increase. In the case of a zero depreciation rate (cr = 0), 
earnings will increase as long as s(t) > 0. As if s(<) =  s(t) =  0 (which may occur not 
only in t =  T,  but also for some interval [T — 0, T] at the end of the duration cycle, 
as will be shown in section 3.4.2), Y(t)  =  0. In the case of a positive depreciation rate 
(<7 > 0), H (t ) will become zero at some t and negative thereafter. If s(t) < 0 V i, 
earnings will even then continue to rise its long as (1 — s)H — sH  > 0. Measured 
earnings peak if (1 — s)H  — sH  =  0 and decline thereafter. Note that, consequently, 
measured earnings peak at a later point in time than human capital and potential 
earnings.
The main objective of the target saving migrant is to accumulate a certain stock 
of savings, A. The change in the stock of savings is given by A(t). A(t) represents 
the savings of the migrant worker at t. Savings in t are the difference between income 
in t and consumption expenditures in t. Accordingly, the stock of savings for any t 
is the difference between the potential wealth in i, P W ( t ), and the accumulated full 
consumption until t, FC(t):
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A(t) = P W ( t ) - F C ( t )  (3.19)
with
PW(t)  = A 0ert + f  w[ l -  s(r)] H{r)er<*-T> dr (3.19-a)
Jo
FC(t) = [  [70 +  71 G(H(T)))tr(t- rU r  (3.19-b)
Jo
(3.19) is the budget constraint of the migrant. The change in the stock of savings over 
time, evaluated at t — T,  is given by
A(T)  =  rA(T)  +  [w H(T) -  7l G(H(T)) -  7o] (3.20-a)
It follows from (3.20-a) and the additional condition (3.9-c):
A{T)  -  W )  ’  A ^ f)  (3-2°-b»
Accordingly, A1(7’) is the increase in T  if the saving target is expanded by one unit. 
For w H(t) > 7 ! G((H(t)) + 'y0 V t , this change is definitely positive. Consequently, the 
time being in the country does positively depend on the size of the saving target. It 
is shown in Appendix 1 that the total time horizon T  is a strictly concave function of 
the saving target: T  = g(A), g'(.) > 0, y '( .)  <  0.
Relations (3.19) and (3.9-c) close the system: They describe the optimal time 
being in the country, T,  as a function of the saving target A. They further determine, 
utilizing (3.13) additionally, Aj(0) and A2(0) as functions of the parameters of the 
system. Some qualitative results on the dependence of the shadow prices Aj and A2 on 
the saving target are given in Appendix 1.
To summarize, if there is no depreciation of human capital and if it is optimal at 
the beginning of the duration cycle to invest a positive fraction of human capital into 
further production (s(0) >  0), toted investment sH  and the fraction to be reinvested
5 will both monotonically decrease over the whole cycle, while the stock of human 
capital, H , will increase. If, however, there is a decay of human capital stock, the stock 
of human capital will peak at some t and decrease thereafter. Total investment sH  will 
decrease over the whole cycle. However, the fraction to be reinvested, s, may again 
increase for a short interval at the end of the investment cycle, but will eventually 
decline. For a zero depreciation rate, measured earnings will increase as long as the
58 CHAPTER 3. HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT
investment into the production of human capita] is positive. If a > 0, measured 
earnings will decrease at the end of the duration cycle. They will, furthermore, peak 
at a later point than human capital. Finally, as outlined in the appendix, the optimal 
time being in the country is a strictly concave function of the saving target.
3.3.2 Optimal Investment and Differences in Individual Char­
acteristics
Analyzing differences in investment- and earnings profiles among migrants as a conse­
quence of differences in individual characteristics, one has first to determine in which 
way such differences in characteristics will enter the system. As mentioned above, the 
crucial relation for the dynamics of the system is equation (3.13). Technically, since
the rented rate for a unit of human capital, w , is constant, different investment - 
and earnings profiles among migrants result either from differences in the state and 
the rate of growth of rj or from differences of the functional form and the arguments 
of F(.). Since tj is the relative shadow price the migrant attaches to any further unit 
of human capital, it would correspond to what is called in the literature an "invest­
ment incentive”. Variables that directly influence 77 would accordingly provide a direct 
incentive to invest into human capital, x] directly depends on two variables that may 
differ among individuals: the total horizon of stay, T", and the efTect of integration on 
consumption expenditures, 7 (i). Furthermore, the value of the stock of human capital, 
acquired in the host country, upon return likewise affects 77. The ability level if) influ­
ences the system via the production relation. The stock of initial human capital, i.e. 
the skill level upon arrival H0, has an impact on the system by changing the necessary 
input of s in order to guarantee that (3.12) will hold.
This section analyses in which manner a change in each of the above character­
istics will influence the course of the variables of interest. It is obvious that, since the 
system is closed and interdependent, a change in one characteristic will induce a change 
in another characteristic: for instance, a higher ability level (entering the system via 
the production function) will allow the migrant to achieve the same saving target in 
a shorter amount of time T  (entering the system via 77). To get an idea about the 
effect of changes in characteristics, the analysis below will only consider a change in 
one characteristic in relation (3.13). In the example above, a change in the level of a 
ability would be analyzed for a fixed T,  implying that saving targets differ. Results 
of the comparative dynamic analysis are illustrated by simulating the system for a
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Cobb-Douglas production technology.18
Section 3.3.2.1 . investigates the effect of changes in the level of ability. Section
3.3.2.2. considers changes in the initial skill level, section 3.3.2.3 the impact of a change 
in the time horizon (resulting from a change in the saving target) and section 3.3.2.4 
investigates in which way different purposes after return influence the optimal path of 
human capital investment. Finally, section 3.3.2.O. analyzes in which way properties 
of the integration function and changes of the parameter 71 influence the system.
Different Levels of Abilities
The empirical finding that earnings of foreign workers overtake those of natives after 
an adaptation period is explained by migrants having greater innate abilities than 
native workers (see, e.g., Borjas (1989), Chiswick (1978, 1986), and Meng (1987)). 
However, it is not clearly specified in the literature in which way ability should have an 
impact on the migrant’s earnings profile. Does an increase in ability steepen earnings 
profiles by providing an investment incentive? The comparative dynamic results of this 
section will point out the impact of a change in ability on earnings- and investment 
profiles. Results are illustrated by simulating the system, using a Cobb-Douglas type 
of production technology.
In equation (3.3), ability was introduced as a shift parameter rp of the production 
function of human capital. This parameter may differ among migrants. Rewriting the 
production relation as F(s(t)H(t)) = ip f(s(t)H(t)),  inversion of (3.12) and differenti­
ation with respect to ip results in the following expression:
Ss(t)H(t)  _  „  w
6tl> 6tl> 4 17( 0 ^ 2 '
where £(.) is the inverse function of / '( .) .  Strict concavity of the production relation 
implies that the expression in (3.21) is positive, for t < T.  Accordingly, for any positive 
investment (0  < s < 1), the total input into the production of human capital at a given 
t will be the higher the higher the ability level. Whether this difference will increase or 
decrease over the whole investment cycle depends on the sign and the magnitude of the
18Note th a t, in the case of a Cobb-Douglas type of technology, F '(x )x_ 0 —• oo. Accordingly, it 
follows from (3.9-f) tha t s(t) > 0 for t € [0,T). Therefore, a Cobb-Douglas technology excludes a 
period for which s =  0 (except in T),  as will be discussed in section 3.4. However, because of its 
simple properties, such technology will be used to simulate the optimal path of variables in the case 
of an interior solution.
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second derivative of the function £ ( .) .19 Since, however, the path of 77 is not affected by 
changes in 0 , the gap between the total investment of migrants with different ability 
levels will eventually decline and vanish for t =  T.  It is outlined in Appendix 2 that the 
stock of human capital is higher for a higher abled migrant throughout the investment 
cycle. Furthermore, a higher ability will lead to steeper human capital profiles and a 
later peak point in human capital stock. The fraction of human capital reinvested into 
further production of human capital is initially higher for migrants with a higher level 
of abilities, but will gradually adjust to the level of those with lower abilities.
Measured earnings are lower for the higher abled migrant at the beginning of the 
duration cycle and higher at the end of the duration cycle:
6K(0) n SY{T)  n ,nnn ,
- ^ r < 0 ’ - r r > °  <1 2 2 >
Earnings profiles will accordingly cross over at some t' > 0. The optimal paths of 
investments, human capital stock and earnings are illustrated in figure 1-4. Figure 1 
shows the profiles of total investment of migrants who differ only in their ability level 
(and, since T  is assumed to be equal for both migrants, implicitly in A). The dotted 
line represents the investment path of the high ability migrant. His total investment is 
clearly higher than that of the migrant with lower abilities, but the difference declines 
over the investment cycle. Figure 2 illustrates the path of human capital and figure 3 
the path of measured earnings. Note that for both migrants, measured earnings peak at 
a later point in time than the stock of human capital, as pointed out in the theoretical 
analysis. Furthermore, the high ability migrant reaches his peak point of human capital 
stock later than the low ability migrant, (see Appendix 2 ). The earnings profile of the
higher abled migrant is clearly steeper than that of the lower abled migrant. After
being initially lower, earnings of the higher abled migrant ”cross over” with those of 
the lower abled migrant and continue to increase more rapidly. Figure 4 illustrates 
the respective investment paths’. The fraction of human capital to be reinvested into 
the production process is higher for the higher abled migrant; however, profiles finally 
coincide.
To summarize , earnings profiles of high ability migrants are not only steeper than 
those of low ability migrants, but high ability migrants do also invest longer into human 
capital (this result is derived in Appendix 2). Being initially lower, their earnings 
profiles will ultimately cross over with those of low ability migrants. Furthermore, 
ability does not provide an investment incentive. This follows directly from (3.12): 
8r)(t)/8ij) =  0. Stronger investments and steeper earnings profiles are therefore not
19It is shown in Appendix 2 th a t the difference among profiles is decreasing if C ' f ' f "  < — 1-
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a consequence of incentives, but a consequence of lower marginal costs of producing 
human capital. The results support the hypothesis that higher ability of migrants 
would be an explanation for a cross-over of migrants’ earnings with those of native 
workers.
Different Skill Levels upon Arrival
The initial stock of human capital that is specific to the labor market of the host 
country may vary considerably among migrants. The higher the divergence of labor 
market conditions between source- and host region, the lower will be the stock of initial 
human capital that is directly transferable to the needs of the foreign labor market. 
Accordingly, migrants from countries with labor markets that differ considerably from 
that of the immigration country will arrive with a low level of skills corresponding to 
the needs of the host country labor market. In the literature it is argued that, the 
larger the divergence between labor markets and, accordingly, the lower the migrant’s 
level of skills applicable to the needs of the host country, the steeper would be the 
migrant’s earnings profile (see, e.g., Chiswick 1978, 1986). It will be shown below 
that the initial level of skills, although changing the location of the migrants earnings 
profile, will affect its steepness only via the depreciation rate.
Differences in the level of skills upon arrival are captured in Hq. It follows directly 
from (3.14) that differences in H0 do not affect the total investment into human capital:
( 3 - 2 3 )
Consequently, total investment into further human capital production will not vary 
among migrants with different initial skill levels. It follows from (3.14) and (3.15) that, 
for a zero depreciation rate (a =  0), a higher stock of initial human capital results in a 
parallel upward shift of the human capital profile. However, if a > 0, an increment in 
the initial skill level will shift the human capital profile upwards, but it will decrease 
the rate of growth of human capital:
i m = c~ , > 0 ’ i m = - ° c" ' < 0  ( 3 - 2 4 )
If the depreciation rate is positive, profiles of human capital stock will peak at an earlier 
t' for migrants with a higher initial skill level: (6t ' /SH(0))  < O.20 Figure 5 illustrates
20The derivation of this result follows the same pattern as the respective result for different levels 
of ability, as outlined in Appendix 2. Since H(t ' )  =  0, it follows that =  — £*r , < 0.
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typical profiles of human capital stock for a positive depreciation rate. The dotted line 
represents the migrant with a higher initial stock of human capital.
The fraction reinvested into human capital production in / =  0, s(0), must be 
lower the higher # (0 ). This follows directly from (3.13). Since total investment into 
human capital is not affected by the initial stock of human capital, it follows immedi­
ately that the investment path is the flatter the higher H(0). Investment paths’ are 
illustrated in figure 6 .
Measured earnings will follow the same pattern as the stock of human capital. 
For <7 =  0 , measured earnings will increase at a lower rate the higher the initial stock 
of human capital. This can be directly seen by rewriting (3.5):
Y(t) = w H ( t ) - s ( t ) H ( t ) i v  
Since i[s (i) /i(i)] /6 //(0 ) =  0, it follows that
= we'"*  (3.25)
For the non depreciation case, measured earnings profiles are parallel shifted by wH (0). 
Earnings profiles are illustrated in figure 7, for a > 0.
Accordingly, a change in the initial level of skills, although shifting the location, 
changes the slope of earnings profiles only by way of the depreciation rate. Since 
6r)(t)/6H0 =  0, a lower initial skill level does not provide any incentive effect, nor does 
it influence the marginal cost of producing human capital. In terms of an empirical 
analysis, skills upon arrival should mainly be explained by shifts in the intercept term. 
Slope coefficients should only change if the depreciation rate is large.
Differences in the Saving Target and the Length of Stay
The time the migrant intends to stay in the host country depends positively on his 
saving target A  (see Appendix 1). Depending on individual characteristics and situa­
tions, saving targets and, accordingly, durations of stay in the host country are likely 
to vary considerably among migrants.21 The length of residence T  directly influences 
the relative shadow price of a unit of human capital, 77 (see figure 8 ). Changes in T  will
31 Qualitative results of the analysis apply as well if the time being in the country is restricted by 
e.g. immigration laws and the migrant wants to maximize the stock of savings during this period. A 
higher saving target would then correspond to  a longer residence permit.
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therefore provide an investment incentive. It follows from (3.12) that a longer duration 
of stay has a positive impact on both, size and rate of change of 77:
M l .  M O  .  n
T i F  ’ ~ s T > 0  (3'26)
Differentiating (3.14) with respect to T, one can easily verify that total investment 
into human capital will likewise increase with a rise in T. Accordingly, migrants with 
the intention to stay longer in the host country should have a higher stock of human 
capital throughout their migration history. It follows from (3.15) and (3.16):
SH(i) _  w 6 r)(t) 8 H(t)
~~8 T ~  ’ - J T - - F T  W 2 ~*T~ ~  ~ 8 T  (3‘27)
The change in the growth of human capital is positive before the peak point H =  0 
is reached and negative thereafter. According to (3.27), and for a =  0, the profile of 
human capital stock of a migrant with a longer intention to stay is steeper throughout 
the investment cycle.
The fraction of human capital stock reinvested into further production is, for 
t =  0, the higher, the longer the horizon T. However, the evaluation of 8 s( t ) /8 T  for
0 < t < T  is undetermined in sign.
M O ) > o . M O  =  _ J _
8 T  8 T  H(t)
8s(t)H(t) 6H(t)
T t ---------- S T ~
(3.28)
The first term in brackets of the second expression in (3.28) is the change in total input 
if T  is changing. If H(t) would not be affected by a change in T,  this would exactly be 
the increase in s (0  that is necessary to guarantee that the equilibrium condition (3.13) 
holds. However, since H  is likewise affected by a change in T, the first term will be 
reduced by the change in the stock of human capital as a reaction in the change in T,  
multiplied with the fraction of human capital invested into further production. Since 
(8H(0)/6T)  =  0, the second term is zero for t =  0, but will increase thereafter.
The change in measured earnings, induced by an increment in T,  is given by the 
following expression:
8 T
(3.29)
The first term in (3.29) is the change in measured earnings, resulting from a change 
in human capital stock available for earnings activities. The second term is the cost
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increase which results from a higher investment effort as a consequence of an increase 
in T.  It follows directly from (3.29) and (6H(0)/8T) =  0 that (¿}'(0)/£T) < 0. Since 
s(T) = 0, (6 Y (T ) /6 T ) > 0. Accordingly, initial earnings are lower for those who intend 
to stay longer in the host country. Since their earnings paths are steeper, earnings are 
likely to cross over at some t > 0. Figure 9 illustrates the path of measured earnings 
for two identical migrants who differ only in their saving target and, therefore, T.
The analytical results indicate that the duration of stay of a migrant has a strong 
impact on his investment behavior and the steepness of his earning’s profile. A longer 
duration of stay (and, accordingly, a higher saving target) provides an investment in­
centive by directly influencing the value of each unit of human capital acquired. If 
estimating earnings profiles empirically, an omission of this variable may accordingly 
lead to a considerable estimation bias.22 This becomes obvious from figure 9: If ne­
glecting the impact of the duration of stay on earnings, and observing two otherwise 
identical migrants at tm, one would accordingly impose the wrong restriction of identical 
earnings profiles on the estimation equation. An empirical test on the hypothesis that 
migrants who intend to stay longer in the host country should have steeper earnings 
profiles is provided in chapter 2. The empirical findings support the results derived 
above.
Differences in Purposes after Return
Up to this point, it was assumed that the stock of human capital accumulated in the 
host country is of no further use for the migrant after return to his home country. 
This would be the case if, for instance, the migrant intends to retire after return and 
live on his savings accumulated in the host country. However, if the migrant has not 
only the intention to accumulate a certain stock of human capital, but, additionally, 
wishes to acquire certain skills that are of further use to him after return, the results 
of the analysis may change. For instance, the migrant worker may want to establish 
his own business in the home country for which he needs human capital that he can 
only acquire in the host country. Human capital acquired in the host country may as 
well help him to get better jobs upon return to the home country.23
22Note that the appropriate variable in a non-deterministic world would be the expected total du­
ration of stay.
23The "training aspect” of temporary migration seems to be considered as an im portant positive 
effect by the countries of origin. Mehrländer (1980) reports tha t “... employment abroad was expected 
to improve the training of the workers concerned, ultimately creating a larger reservoir of skilled labor 
in the countries of origin” (p.82).
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In what follows, it will be pointed out in which way earnings profiles of migrants 
who intend to accumulate not only a stock of savings, but also some stock of human 
capital, differ from those of migrants who do not attach any value to the human capital 
acquired in the host country after return. Let *lA(t) denote the relative shadow price 
of a unit of human capital for a migrant who wants to accumulate a certain stock of 
human capital. rj(t) is further defined as in (3.12). From the endpoint restriction on 
H ( T ), i.e. H(T)  > H , where H  is the level of human capita] to be accumulated, it 
follows that X2(T) > 0 and Ai{T){H{T) — H)  =  0. After appropriately reformulating 
and solving the optimization problem, it follows:
VA(t) = V(t) +  e(<,+rM|- 7V ( 7 ’) (3.30)
It will further be assumed that the relative value of a unit of human capital in T  is 
larger than zero: rjA(T) > 0.24 Accordingly, it follows from (3.30) that rjA(t) > r;(i) V t. 
The objective of the migrant to acquire a certain stock of human capital in the host 
country may therefore provide a positive incentive to invest into country specific human 
capital. Differentiation of (3.30) with respect to t reveals that the relative value of 
human capital decreases with a lower rate if rjA ( T )  > 0. This difference is the higher, 
the higher rjA{T).
VA(t) =  V(t) + (<? + r ) e ^ +r^ - T^riA(T) (3.31)
It is immediately obvious from (3.13), (3.30), (3.31) and the strict concavity of the 
production relation that total investment into human capital sH  will be higher for a 
migrant who wishes to accumulate some stock of human capital.25
To analyze the effect of a change in the positive value of human capital stock in 
T  on the path of human capital and measured earnings, one simply substitutes 77(f) 
by rfA(t) and analyzes the change in the state and growth of the respective variables 
as a result of changes in rjA{T). As outlined in Appendix 3, an increase in r}A{T) will 
positively affect the stock of human capital H(t) for all t and will have a steepening 
impact on profiles before and after the peak point of human capital stock. Furthermore,
24Note tha t this implies that the stock of human capital the migrant wishes to accumulate in the 
host country is larger than the stock of human capital he would acquire anyway (i.e. by solving the 
formerly considered optimization problem that imposes no restriction on H( T ) ) . If the constraint on 
H( T)  will not be binding, it follows from the complementary slackness condition that A2(T) =  0 and, 
consequently, the optimization problem would be equivalent to the one treated above: f]A(t) =
2SNote that, for rjA(T) > 0, s(T)  and s{T)H(T)  do not have to be equal to zero at the end of the 
investment cycle, as it is the case if t)(T) =  0.
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the initial fraction of human capital to be reinvested into further production in t =  0 
is higher the higher tja (T). However, this difference will diminish over time.
Measured earnings change according to the following equation:
’ SH{t) 6 s(t)H(t) 'm t )
*VA(T) W S VA(T) 6 t}a (T)
(3.32)
In t =  0, measured earnings of a migrant who wishes to accumulate some stock of 
human capital are below those of a migrant without such intentions. However, earnings 
may eventually cross over at some t >  0. Note that (SY(T)/Si]A(T)) is not necessarily 
positive since s (T)H(T)  > 0.
According to the above analysis, the migrant’s intention to accumulate a certain 
stock of human capital in the host country is likely to provide an incentive to invest into 
human capital. Earnings profiles of such migrants are steeper, but it may take quite 
long until they cross over with those of comparable migrants without the intention to 
accumulate a certain stock of human capital until T. For the empirical analysis, the 
results indicate that migrants’ intention to accumulate some stock of human capital 
has not only an impact on the size of the intercept, but also on slope coefficients.
The shadow value of human capital and the path of measured earnings are illus­
trated in figure 10 and figure 11. The dotted line represents the migrant with further 
intentions after return.
Differences in C onsum ption Patterns
Up to now the analysis merely considered a constant integration. Furthermore, no 
attention was paid to the size of 71 , the parameter that indicates in how far a given 
integration potential becomes consumption effective. As pointed out above, the size 
of 7 ! may depend on the specific situation of the migrant in the host country. Legal 
restrictions and migration policy in the host country may cause 71 to be extremely small 
or even equal to zero. Cultural differences and religious motives may likewise restrict a 
given integration potential from becoming consumption effective, thereby reducing 7 X. 
Consequently, migrants from different countries and with different cultural backgrounds 
may differ considerably in the extend to which their acquired integration potential 
becomes consumption effective. If migrants of different origin are, additionally, treated 
differently in the host country, such differences will vary even more.
Furthermore, the integration function is not necessarily a constant function of 
the stock of human capital accumulated in the host country. Integration may well
3.3. THE OPTIMAL POLICY IN THE CASE OF A N  INTERIOR SOL UTION 67
be decelerating. This would indicate that the human capital acquired for the foreign 
labor market at an early stage is more integration effective than more specific human 
capital acquired at later stages. This seems quite reasonable since early investments 
may comprise the adoption of working patterns, working rules and language, while later 
investments may be much more work specific and, therefore, less integration effective.
The following analysis will investigate the impact of a change in the parameter 71 
on investment and earnings pattern for the case of a constant integration. Furthermore, 
constant integration will then be compared with decelerating integration.
A change in 71 has a direct and an indirect impact (via the integration function 
and the stock of human capital) on the relative shadow price of a unit of human capital, 
V-
¿71 ■ j f '
> + r ) ( t - D
¿71
dr (3.33)
In the case of a constant integration, the second term in (3.33) vanishes. Expression 
(3.33) is then definitely negative: The higher the extend to which a given integration 
potential becomes consumption effective, the lower the relative shadow price of a unit 
of human capital. An increase in 71 would therefore provide a negative incentive effect. 
However, if the integration process is decelerating, any additional unit of human capital 
will increase consumption expenditures by less than the former unit. An increase in 
the stock of human capital as a result of an increase in 71 will therefore raise the 
earnings potential by more than the integration potential. This effect is captured by 
the second term in (3.33). This indirect effect of a change in 7 j should be considerably 
smaller than the direct effect. For (6 H / 6 71) > 0 (see below), it then follows that 
G'(.) + 7 iG"(.)(6 H / 6 f i )  > 0. Accordingly, (5*?(*)/^7 i) < °-
For the change in the total investment into human capital as a reaction of a 
change in 71 , one obtains:
Ss(t)H(t) w S Tj(t)
— h T ~  =  - r ( - > i 5 ( i ) T ^  ( 3 - 3 4 )
The expression in (3.34) is negative. Consequently, the higher 71 , the lower is the total 
investment into human capital stock. Furthermore:
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=  «  i l  _  jm
¿7! t/2 Î7 i 6 7i (3.35-b)
It is obvious from (3.35-a) and (3.35-b) that, the larger 71 , the lower the stock of human 
capital and the flatter profiles of human capital stock. The rate of change of human 
capital stock is lower before and after the peak point. One can easily show that, for 
small <7 , the peak point t' of human capital stock will be the earlier the higher 71 . The 
fraction to be reinvested into human capital in t = 0, s(0), is the smaller the higher 
71 . However, this difference is decreasing over time. Measured earnings will change 
according to the following expression:
(3.36)
The first term in (3.36) is the impact on measured earnings of the change in 71 by 
changing the stock of human capital. For / > 0, this effect is clearly negative. The 
second term is the change in earnings due to a change in the fraction of human capital
allocated to further investment into human capital. Since (6 s / 6 71 ) < 0, this effect on 
earnings is positive. It follows that (¿V ^O )/^ !) > 0 (since (S H(0) / 6 -yi ) =  0) and 
(SY(T)/ 6^ 1) < 0. Accordingly, migrants who, due to either cultural and religious or 
legal restrictions, to a larger extent integrate into the foreign society in such a way 
that their integration potential becomes consumption effective, have higher measured 
earnings in the beginning of their duration cycle. This is due to a lower investment 
into human capital. At the end of the duration cycle, however, their earnings are 
lower. Earnings will cross over with those of migrants with a lower 71 a t some t > 0.26 
Earnings paths are illustrated in figure 12. The results indicate that migrants who are 
not heavily restricted to integrate into the foreign society, neither by legal restrictions 
nor by cultural constraints, should have earnings profiles that are flatter than those 
of migrants who do not integrate so easily. The analysis supports empirical findings
that migrants, who are culturally more different, have steeper earnings profiles (see, 
e.g., Chiswick (1978), Chiswick and Miller (1985), and Meng (1987)). However, the
between variables that represent the level of skills of a migrant, explaining differences
26Since the second term  in (3.36) is very small, compared with the first term, the crossover point 
should be at an early stage.
reason would not be that those migrants have a lower stock of readily transferable 
initial human capital upon arrival (see section 3.3.2.2), but rather that easy integration 
provides a disincentive effect for human capital investment and increases demand for 
consumption.27 If estimating earnings equations, one should accordingly differentiate
27Note tha t an increase in w, the rental rate on human capital, would have an opposite effect,
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in the intercept term, and variables that measure the degree to which a migrant may 
adopt foreign consumption patterns, explaining differences in slope parameters.
The properties of the integration function will likewise influence the relative shad­
ow price of human capital and, consequently, investment as well as human capital stock 
and earnings. Keeping 7 1 constant, the size of rj(t) depends on the second derivative 
of the integration function. The smaller G"(.), the higher is r}(t) for any t < T. For 
illustration, consider the extreme case: if comparing a constant and a decelerating 
integration process, it follows from (3.10) and (3.11):
A-KO =  1 D(t)-r>c (t) =  j f  [ jT  7W«i» dr > 0 , with 7 (t) =  [—71 (?"(.)//(/)]
(3.37)
77° , rjD are the relative shadow prices in the case of constant and decelerating integra­
tion, respectively. For a  =  0, A7?(i) is a strictly monotonically decreasing function in 
t, with max A tj =  A»/(0) and min A t] — A tj(T) — 0. Since A 77 is the larger the smaller 
G"(.), it follows that total investment will positively depend on the size of —G"(.). 
Accordingly, human capital stock will increase faster, if integration is decelerating, as 
will measured earnings.
3.4 Full and Zero Investm ent
The analysis above is solely concerned with the optimal path of relevant variables if 
s € (0,1). However, it might well be the case that it is optimal for the migrant to 
invest all or none of his human capital into further production. The condition for a
boundary solution to be optimal follows directly from (3.9-f):
r m m w )  { : =  l  <3-38)I <  w : s{t) =  0
The interpretation of (3.38) is straightforward: If the marginal benefit of all human 
capital, if invested into further production, is higher or equal to the marginal costs 
w that arise by drawing off the last unit from earnings investment, then s(f) =  1. 
Investment will be zero if marginal costs are higher or equal to the value of the marginal 
product of the first unit to be invested.
providing & positive investment incentive and thus generating earnings profiles that are steeper but 
starting out with lower earnings in t =  0.
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For the following analysis, recall the following property of the production relation:
o =  ^ / ' ( s H )^ - .o  —<► c
Accordingly, the marginal product of the first or last infinitesimally small fraction of 
human capital invested into further production is finite and goes in the limit to c.28
The following analysis will investigate whether and in which order the policies of 
full and zero investment could be considered by the migrant to be optimal over some 
interval of his duration cycle. The dependence of the length of boundary policies on 
characteristics of the migrant will further be pointed out.
3.4.1 Full Investment
The first question to be answered is whether it is optimal for the migrant to invest 
over some interval his entire stock of human capital into the production of further 
human capital, i.e. whether there exists a period for which s(t) =  1 forms an optimal 
investment policy. As obvious from (3.4), measured earnings would in this case be 
equal to zero. The shadow value of a unit of human capital for s(i) = 1 follows from 
the first order condition of the maximization problem and is given by the following 
expression:
r T
(3.39)T}(t) =  —7  e£ [(°+T)- Fr)]dadT
It follows that 7/(0) < 0, t}(T) =  0 and 77(f) > 0. Consequently, if s(f) =  1, 77(f) 
will always be smaller or equal to zero. This is in contradiction to the equilibrium 
condition (3.38): if s(t) =  1, F '(.) 77(f) > w. If w > 0 and F'(.) > 0, 77(f) < 0 will 
always contradict the equilibrium condition. Accordingly, there will be no period of 
full investment into the production of human capital over the whole duration cycle of 
the temporary migrant.29
MNote th a t this condition is not fulfilled for a Cobb Douglas technology, wiiich was used for sim­
ulation purposes, with F' ( z ) x- .0 —► 00, where s(t) =  0 will only occur if tj(l) =  0. For any positive 
rental rate w,  «(f) will always be chosen small enough to fulfill (3.13), for t < T.
w The intuitive argument goes as follows: if 5 =  1, any unit of further human capital would rather 
increase than decrease the time being in the host country since further savings would not be accu­
m ulated, bu t savings would rather be used up. Since Aj indicates the decrease of time being in the 
country if the stock of human capital increases by one unit, the sign of A2 should change, which would 
then result in the contradiction outlined above.
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3.4.2 Zero investment
From the equilibrium condition (3.38) follows that s(i) =  0 if F'(.)j]{t) < w. Since 
ij(t) < 0, it follows that, whenever the evaluated marginal product of the first unit 
invested into the accumulation of human capital is smaller than the value of this unit 
if allocated to earnings activities, it would be optimal not to invest over the whole 
duration cycle. The size of the relative shadow price at 0, 77(0 ), depends crucially on 
the time the migrant intents to stay in the country, as can easily be seen from (3.12). 
The larger is T,  the larger will be 77(0 ), keeping everything else constant.
It follows from (3.12) and (3.38) that the minimum length of stay necessary to 
induce the migrant to invest into the production of human capital is given by the 
following expression:
T  =
cr + r
In
(■ -
w(cr +  r) \
i F ' ( s ( W ( 0 ) ) )
(3.40)
Accordingly, if the migrant intends to stay less than T , it would be optimal for him 
not to undertake any investment into his human capital over his whole duration cycle. 
The critical T,  below which no investment is worthwhile, depends on the migrant’s 
individual characteristics as on global variables like 10 and r. For ^f,^o)*»(o)) < ^  
simple comparative statics reveal:
? ? < 0 ;  o m > 0 - ^ > 0 ;  ^ > 0 ;  ( 3 4 1 )
Accordingly, the critical time a migrant has to stay in the host country to make any 
investment worthwhile is longer the higher the migrant’s level of initial skills, the 
higher the degree to which some integration potential becomes consumption effective 
and the higher the rental rate on a unit of human capital. It is shorter the higher the 
migrant’s abilities. When comparing two migrants with the same intended duration of 
stay, the one who is not likely to invest into human capital would be characterized by 
average or low abilities, but highly skilled, who is not restricted or constraint to adopt 
foreign consumption patterns. A high wage level in the immigration country reduces 
the likelihood that a migrant will invest into human capital.
Assume now that T  is large enough, so that the migrant will undertake some 
investment into his human capital. It then follows from (3.12) that the relative shadow 
price of human capital is decreasing over time, with tj(T) =  O.30 Consequently, since
30This is, of course, not the case if the stock of human capital accumulated is of further use to the 
migrant upon return, as analyzed in section 3.3.2.4.
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T}(t) is a continuous function, it follows from (3.38) that there must exist a period 
[T — 0,7], 6 > 0 , without any investment, if the rental price for human capital, u>, is 
positive. This period is characterized by the following inequality:
r<5( r ) H ( r ) ) <W- T e \ T - 0 , T \  (3.42)
(<r +  r)
The size of $ depends on the parameters of the problem and the technology of human 
capital production as well as on the stock of human capital at (T — 0), H (T  — 6). If 
human capital production is very inefficient, or if the rental price for human capital w 
is very high, 6 may be quite large. In Appendix 2 it is shown that the length of the 
investment cycle depends positively on the level of ability. If 0 > T, no investment 
into human capital will take place over the whole duration cycle. This case is then 
equivalent to the one discussed above.
The above considerations assumed a linear integration function: each addition­
al unit of human capital stock will increase consumption expenditures necessary to 
maintain a constant level of utility in a linear way. However, integration may as 
well be decelerating. In this case, G"{.) <  0. Accordingly, each additional unit 
of human capital acquired will, although raising the migrant’s earnings capacity by 
uj, increase his integration potential by less than the former unit. It follows that 
7 (f) =  [—'y1G,,(.)H(t)} >  0 for H(t) > 0. By differentiating (3.10) with respect to t it 
can  easily be shown that, if integration is decelerating, T) decreases faster than in th6 
case of a constant integration:
v(0  =  - 7 ( 0  +  viO l* +  rl (3-43)
Note that 7  =  0 if the integration is constant. It follows from (3.37) that Atf(t), the 
difference between the shadow price in the case of constant and decelerating integration, 
is decreasing over time and vanishes for t =  T. Accordingly, the length of a period over 
which 7] falls below a certain threshold fj must be longer if integration is constant.
A period of zero investment [T — £, T] will then be described by the following 
inequality:
F'{s{0H(0) £  e(tf+r)(‘- T) 7(r)d r < w ; t € \T -  c, T\ (3.44)
If the integration is constant, t  =  6. If the integration is decelerating, (0 — e) — a, 
with a  > 0. The smaller G"(.), the larger will be a. In other words: The length of the 
investment cycle depends positively on the size of G,,(.) and is largest for G"(.) =  0.
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3.5 Sum m ary and Conclusion
This chapter analyzes human capital investment and earnings pattern of temporary 
migrants who are target savers. The main purpose is to investigate in a human capital 
framework the impact of those characteristics, which are likely to differ considerably 
among temporary migrants, on the migrant worker’s earnings situation. The results are 
contrasted with the hypotheses in the literature which are used to explain empirical 
findings of earnings pattern of migrant workers. The analysis provides a variety of 
implications for empirical studies. The model could provide a theoretical basis for 
empirical work if estimating earnings pattern of temporary migrants.
The main findings could be summarized as follows:
(1) Defining changes in the relative shadow price of a further unit of human 
capital in the migrant’s optimization problem as investment incentives, the time the 
migrant intents to stay in the host country, being an increasing function of his saving 
target, provides a positive investment incentive. The longer a migrant wants to stay in 
the host country, the steeper will be his earnings profile. If estimating earnings profiles 
of temporary migrants who are likely to vary considerably in their total duration in 
the host country, this variable should be crucial to explain differences in migrants’ 
earnings profiles. Furthermore, for migrants who only want to stay a short period 
in the host country it may be optimal not to invest at all into human capital. The 
critical time of Stay necessary to make any investment worthwhile is relative longer 
for migrants with average or low ability levels, who are highly sk illed  and easily adopt 
foreign consumption patterns, and who emigrate to a high wage country.
(2) The intention to acquire some stock of human capital provides a positive 
incentive effect. If the migrant not only wants to accumulate some stock of savings, 
but additionally some stock of human capital which is of further use to him after return 
to his home country, he is likely to have a steeper earnings path, although his initial 
earnings position is lower. For empirical research, if estimating earnings equations for a 
population of temporary migrants, the value a migrant attaches to the stock of human 
capital acquired in the host country at the point of return may accordingly have an 
effect on the intercept as well as on slope coefficients.
(3) The more easily a migrant adopts foreign consumption patterns and inte­
grates into the society of the host country, the lower should be his incentive to invest 
into human capital. Migrants who do not easily integrate and who, additionally, are 
constrained by cultural or religious motives or by legal restrictions to adopt foreign con­
sumption patterns, should have relatively steeper earnings profiles. This would support 
empirical findings, indicating that earnings profiles of migrants coming from countries
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with considerably different cultural environments are relatively steep. However, the 
steepness of earnings profiles would then not be explained by the low transferability of 
the stock of human capital upon arrival, as it is often hypothesized.
A higher rental rate on human capital provides a positive incentive effect.
(4) The stock of human capital upon arrival, though shifting the location of the 
migrant’s earnings profile, affects the steepness only by way of the depreciation rate. 
If the depreciation of human capital is equal to zero, a change in the initial stock 
of human capital shifts the earnings profile parallely. The consequence for empirical 
research would be that skill levels, although explaining differences in the intercept term, 
do not explain differences in slope parameters. The level of skills has no incentive effect.
(5) A higher level of ability does not provide a direct incentive to invest into 
human capital, but it lowers the marginal cost of human capital production. High 
ability migrants have steeper earnings profiles and longer investment cycles than those 
with low abilities.
The main conclusion would be that the earnings position of a temporary migrant 
strongly depends on variables that do not have to be considered if analyzing earnings 
of native workers or permanent migrants. For an empirical analysis, this means that 
reliable estimates of earnings equations of temporary migrants require a more detailed 
database than would be necessary when analyzing earnings paths of native workers or 
permanent migrants.
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3.6 A ppendix
Appendix 1: The Impact of the Saving Target on the System  
T h e D ependence  of Â  on T
Assume, for simplicity, the case of constant integration, with G(H(t)) = 71//(<). For j4"(0> 
H m(t) and s*(f) satisfying the necessary conditions (3.6), (3.7) and (3.9), (3.19) implicitly 
determines T  for a given saving target À. It follows by the implicit function rule:
SA  rA + #*(!T)(t0 — 7i) — 7o >
ST  1 (3.45)
and, furthermore:
_ S2T
[Hm(T)(w -  7 i) + rA -  70]2 < °
(3.46)
dA SA 2
Consequently, the minimal time necessary to stay in the country is a strictly concave function 
of the saving target À: T — g(A), g1 > 0, g" < 0.
T h e  D epen d en ce  of A°, A° on A
Aj and A° are the shadow values for a unit of capital and human capital, respectively, in 
t = 0. They both depend in size on the saving target A. Some qualitative results will be 
given below.
Since sm(T) = A¡(T) = 0, it follows from (3.9-c) and (3.19):
Àm(T) = Ç  = rA-(T) + ( w -  7 i)Hm(T) -  70, with A’(T) = À (3.47)
1
Consequently:
À'(T)  = rÂ-{T) + H-(T)(w -  -n) = À'(T) (3.48)
It follows from (3.48):
(3.49)
Since H(T)m = —aH m(T), (3.49) is equal to zero for a — 0. In the case of a positive 
depreciation rate {a > 0), (d \ \ / d T ) > 0, since (w -  ’yi)H{t) -  70 > 0 Vi. It follows from
(3.12) and (3.49):
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d A°2
dT [<r + r]
1 _  e-T(*+r)j * £  + - xQe-T(.+r) (3.50)
Consequently, (dX^/dT) > 0 for a > 0. However, the increase in the shadow value of a unit 
of human capital as a consequence of a change in T in t = 0 is the higher the higher the rate 
of depreciation. It follows:
dX% dX°
I t  „ > n (3-51>a 1 »>0 u l  <7=0
Combining the above results with (3.45) yield:
^ > 0  1
for a = 0 > for a > 0 (3.52)
^ > °  J
Consequently, the size of the saving target will not affect the shadow value of a unit of human 
capital stock for any t (since Ai(t) = e_rtA°) if a — 0. It will, however, positively affect Ai(t)
for a > 0. For any a > 0, the shadow value of a unit of human capital in t = 0 will increase
as a consequence of a change in the saving target. This impact on A° depends positively on 
the depreciation rate of human capital.
Appendix 2: Differences in Ability
Profiles o f Total Investm ent
From (3.21), it follows directly for (6 sH¡b ip):
6- ^ -  = Tr - { C f , + a  (3.53)
d t p  ip r )
The first term in (3.53) is negative. Accordingly, the difference in profiles of migrants with 
different levels of abilities is decreasing over time if the second term is positive. Since the 
derivative of an inverse function is the reciprocal of the derivative of the original function, 
£' = (1 //" )  < 0. It follows that the gap between total investment profiles will narrow over 
the investment cycle if £"}'f "  < — 1.
Profiles of Human Capital Stock
It follows from (3.15) and F(s(t)H(t)) = ipf(s(t)H(t)):
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Furthermore, from (3.6):
^  =  ! / « ( • ) ) (3.S5)
The first term in (3.55) is positive, the second term negative. It follows that, for a zero 
depredation rate, higher abled migrants have a steeper profile of human capital stock. For 
a > 0, the human capital profile of a higher abled migrant is steeper before and after the 
peak point.
In the peak point of human capital stock, H(t) = 0. Accordingly, it follows from (3.15) 
that, for a given level of ability ip, the peak point of human capital stock t' is implicitly 
determined by the following relation:
| 3 ' 5 6 )
It follows by the implicit function rule and the envelope theorem:
i t  /(((■»
The denominator in expression (3.57) is positive, the numerator ambiguous in sign. However, 
it follows from (3.54) that the numerator is positive for small a. In this case, human capital 
stock profiles of higher abled migrants are not only steeper before and after the peak point, 
but they peak at a later t. (Such a case is illustrated in figure 2).
Profiles of Investm ent
The change in the fraction of human capital invested into the production process as a result 
of a change in ability is given by
MO - f »  C U W
6xl> ~  H( t )  H { t y  [ }
Since (SH(0)/6ip) = 0, the second term disappears for t = 0. It follows that (6s(0)/6ip) > 0.
Accordingly, the fraction of human capital reinvested into further production in t = 0 will be 
the higher, the higher the level of ability. However, the second term in (3.58) is increasing 
over time. Accordingly, the difference in investment profiles of migrants with different levels 
of abilities will diminish over time. Whether profiles of migrants with different abilities will 
coincide at some t depends on the properties of the production function. Note that, if the 
production technology is such that / ,(x)limT_o —*oo, s(t) = 0 only for t = T. Profiles will 
coincide at the end of the duration cycle (exactly, in t = T), which is then identical to the
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investment cycle. Since a Cobb-Douglas type of technology has the above property, figure
(4) illustrates such investment profiles for migrants with different ability levels. However, if 
/'(x)lim x_o —*-c, the duration of the migrant may well be longer than his investment period. 
Furthermore, the length of the investment cycle is then depending on the ability level. This 
aspect is analyzed below.
Profiles of M easured Earnings
Inserting the optimal sm and H* into (3.4) and differentiating with respect to 4' yields: 
i y ( 0  _  ... f* L » ( M l « , /  w  ^  1 . t t’2
* + « 5 0 ?  <3-59>6 ip JQ L ‘»KOV’2.
The kernel of the integral is positive for t > 0, the second term is negative for t < T. Ac­
cordingly, (6Y(0)/6 ip) < 0. At the beginning of the investment cycle, higher abled migrants 
have lower measured earnings. Earnings profiles will cross over at t \  with (SY(t ' )/6 1/>) = 0. 
Since (6Y(T)/6ip) > 0 (because the second term in (3.59) will eventually vanish at the end 
of the investment cycle), there will accordingly be a crossover point for some t > 0. If the de­
preciation rate is equal to zero (<r = 0), it follows from the strict monotonicity of the earnings 
function that the crossover point is unique. Note again that, depending on the production 
technology, the duration cycle may or may not coincide with the investment cycle.
A bility Level and Length of Investment Cycle
Let t" characterize the end of the investment cycle. Consequently, s(t") = 0. It follows by 
the implicit function rule:
dlT_
dip
6 »
6
S j
S t
(3.60)
(6s / 6ip) is given by expression (3.58). However, for s—>0, (3.58) can be written as:
6 s
6 ij> H
(3.61)
For expression (3.61) is greater than zero. It further follows for 6s / 6t:
6 s
St t—t'
rl w j.
H < 0
(3.62)
Accordingly, an increase in the level of ability will increase the length of the investment cycle: 
higher abled migrants do invest over a longer period into their human capital than do lower 
abled migrants.
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Appendix 3: Differences in Purposes after Return 
Profiles o f Human Capital Stock
If the constraint that requires that H(t)> H becomes binding, r)A(T) > 0. It follows:
<»(<) r > rT . »  <1(0 . i  > 0  : <?cnA >o
w m  Jo l ( l ) s 'V (J ’) (  = 0  : ,,A ( T )  = 0 }
Accordingly, the stock of human capital is higher for all t if the migrant intends to accumulate 
a certain stock of human capital higher than the stock of human capital he would accumulate 
anyway: H(T)F < H, with H(T)F: stock of human capital acquired in the unrestricted 
problem. The change in the growth of human capital stock as a result in a change in tja{T) 
is given by the following expression:
6 H ( t )  w 6r,{t) SH{ t )
6v*(T) V2(t)6vA{T) ¿VA(T) 1 '
For a migrant with further intentions after return the human capital profile will be steeper 
before and after the peak point. The peak point of human capital stock will be later for this 
migrant if a is sufficiently small:
e i  __r 'l T ' t  w  __ _  S H ( t ' )
s t  _ F  r  vs(t,) si)*(T) ^ ,3 6 .*
Profiles o f Investm ent
The change in the fraction to be reinvested as a reaction in changes in rfA(T) is given by:
M <) - f 'r T O g ^ )  .
dT
—  (3.66)
6r^(T) H(t) H(t)*
It follows from (3.66) that (6 s(0)/6t}a (T)) > 0. The migrant who want to accumulate a 
stock of human capital higher than the one he would accumulate anyway will invest a higher 
fraction of human capital into further production in t = 0. However, since the second term 
in (3.66) is negative and increasing over time, this difference will diminish.
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Appendix 4: The Sufficient Conditions
It remains to show that the necessary conditions are also sufficient for an optimum. While 
the standard approach in a fixed time problem to show optimality of an admissible pair,31 
that satisfy the necessary conditions, is to verify that the Hamiltonian exhibits certain con­
cavity properties,32, the construction of sufficiency conditions is more difficult for free final 
time control problems. A sufficiency theorem for free final time problem is provided by Seier- 
stad (1984-b). The basic idea is to require a pair (i*,«*) not only to be optimal for one 
specific i, but to maximize the value function among all optimal fixed final time solutions 
over the period considered. However, such sufficiency conditions are likewise not applicable 
to minimal time problems. An admissible pair for a minimal time problem is optimal if there 
exists no other admissible pair, fulfilling the necessary conditions and the target conditions 
(i.e. some endpoint restrictions on the state variables) in a shorter time period and if the 
above mentioned concavity properties of the corresponding fixed time horizon problem are 
fulfilled. While the latter can be proved quite easily by employing the standard concavi­
ty conditions for the Hamiltonian, it is quite difficult to find general conditions to ensure 
the former requirement. A sufficiency theorem is provided by Seierstad (1984-a) (see also 
Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987)). Although the condition imposed on the optimal solution 
is rather restrictive and it’s formulation not intuitively obvious, it seems applicable for the 
above maximization problem. The intuition of the condition will be given below. It will then 
be shown that the condition holds for the problem on hand.
Consider a minimal time problem, with x, A, u being vectors of state- costate- and 
control variables, respectively. Assume that an admissible pair (x~(t),u‘(t)), defined on the 
interval [0 ,T], satisfies the fixed final time sufficient condition for some adjoint function X(t). 
It follows that33
[ T u-{T))dT -  [ T f°(x(r), u(r))dr = A > A *(t)(x(T ) -  x'(T))  (3.67)
Jo Jo
where f°(.) is the objective function and (x(t), u(t)) is any admissible pair. Note that, in a 
minimal time problem, A  = 0. Since a minimal time problem is only meaningful if at least 
one state variable has to hit a certain target, assume the endpoint restriction x(t) > x, with
s lLet a: be a vector of state- and ti be a vector of control variables. An admissible pair (x, u) is one 
which satisfies the system of differential equations for the state variables, any boundary conditions on 
the control variables and the endpoint restrictions on the state variables.
32Mangasarian (1966) shows that the necessary conditions are also sufficient if the Hamiltonian 
is concave in state- and control variables. Arrow and Kurz (1970) proposed a generalization of the 
Mangasarian result. They show tha t it is sufficient that the Hamiltonian, maximized with respect to 
the control variables, is concave in the state variables.
33This result is derived in Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1977).
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x > x(0) and t the optimal endpoint. From the transversality conditions it follows for the 
optimal solution specified above:
(x'(T) -  x)Am(T) = 0 (3.68)
For A(T) ^  0, it follows that x*(T) = x. Now, assume there exists a t \  with t* < T and 
x(f') > x. Let the corresponding pair (x,u) be defined on [t',T). The core idea of the 
sufficiency condition provided by Seierstad (1984-a) is now to show that, if (x*,u*) fulfills 
the sufficient condition for the fixed time horizon problem with endpoint T, there exists no 
pair (x,u) for which x(^) > x, with t' < T.
This is ensured if the pair (x, u), defined on [i', T), has the property that:
f(r)A*(7’) > 0, r e ( i ' r )  (3.69)
it» .
with strict inequality in at least one r. To see this, note that f (, x(r)A’(T) = x(T)A*(T) -  
x(i')A*(T) > 0. Consequently, x(T) > x. Furthermore, for A"(T) 0, x m(T) = x. Accord­
ingly, it follows that A*(T)(x(T) — x*(T)) > 0, which contradicts (3.67). As a result one can 
state that, if the pair (x*,u*) fulfills the fixed time sufficient conditions for an optimum on 
[0,T\ and if (3.69) is fulfilled Vi' € [0,T], then (x*,u*) is optimal.
Applied to the problem above, sufficiency of a solution defined on the interval [0, T1] is 
ensured if the optimal pair of control- and state variables fulfills the necessary conditions and 
if the Hamiltonian, maximized with respect to the control, is concave in the state variables 
(Arrow and Kurz (1970)). For the control s' fulfilling conditions (3.6), (3.7), and (3.9), the 
quadratic form of the Hamiltonian is given by:
d7H = -A ,71G"(.)dH2 (3.70)
Consequently, the Hamiltonian, maximized with respect to the control variables is either con­
cave or strictly concave, depending on whether the integration function is linear or decreasing 
in the stock of human capital, H, respectively. The solution [Am, H’,sm, T], fulfilling the nec­
essary conditions, with A ' > A , is accordingly optimal in the fixed final time problem defined 
on [0 ,T]. It remains to check whether condition (3.69) holds for all t' 6  [0,T], The target 
of the problem is to require that A(T ) > A, with H(T) free. It follows that A*(T) = Ai(T). 
Now, for any tf £ [0,T], expression (3.69) is given for the problem on hand:
A*(T) A { t )  , with t € (*', T) (3.71)
Let A(f)  > A. fYom the optimality conditions it follows that s(t') = 0 and, consequently, 
j( r )  = 0, Vr € (t'y T). Therefore:
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À(t) = tA{t) + wH{t ) - 7o -  1 xG{H{t)) > 0 Vr €( <#, r )  (3.72)
(3.71) implies that A(T) > A"{T) > Â. It is directly obvious from the above explanations 
that this contradicts the sufficiency conditions for the fixed final time problem. Consequently, 
the solution (Am(T),H*(T),sm(T),T)  is optimal.
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3.7  Figures
FIG. 1 : TOTAL INVESTMENT.
FIG.2: HUMAN CAPITAL
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F I G .9: MEASURED EARNINGS
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FIG. 12: MEASURED EARNINGS
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Chapter 4
M igration, Savings and 
U ncertainty
4.1 Introduction
A major form of intra-European migration and migration into Europe, but also of intra- 
Asian migration and migration between Asia and countries of the Middle East, is ”guest 
worker” , or, more generally, return migration. The impact of this form of migration 
on the economies of both the labor-exporting country and the labor-importing country 
differs in many aspects from that of permanent migration. In contrast to permanent 
migrants, temporary migrants invest a large proportion of their earnings either into 
savings in the host country, or they transfer it to their home country, where it is 
then saved or used to support family members. Both the amounts of money that 
are transferred back home and that are saved in the host country have important 
implications for the economies considered. For the emigration country, transferred 
money is a major balance of payment support.1 For the immigration country, transfers 
contribute largely to the balance of payments deficit.2 On the other side, savings
'In 1973, transfers from Turkish and Yugoslav workers in Germany amounted to over twice the 
total exchange obtained through exports of goods from these countries to Germany (Iliemenz and 
Schatz, 1979, p.l). Over the period from 1960 to 1984, transfers of Greek workers from Germany to 
Greece amounted to 16% of Greece’s capital goods exports over that period {Glytsos, 1988, p.525). 
Transfers from Thai workers in the Middle East in 1981 were equivalent to about 6% of the total value 
of exports from Thailand in that year (Pitayanon, 1986, p.273). Remittances of Pakistanis from the 
Middle East finance some 86% of Pakistan’s trade deficit (Robinson (1986)).
3For instance, transfers of migrant workers from Germany to their home countries amounted to 
40% of the total deficit of the German account of services and transfers with foreign countries (Monats- 
berichte der deutschen Bundesbank, 1974, p-22).
94 CHAPTER 4. MIGRATION , SAVINGS AND UNCERTAINTY
of migrants in the host country provide a substantial part of the domestic savings 
of immigration countries and contribute to their capital formation (Macmillan, 1982, 
p.251)3.
Despite the importance of migrant’s consumption- and savings behavior, there 
has been surprisingly little theoretical research on this topic. One difficulty when 
dealing with this subject is that earnings not used for consumption in the host country 
are not necessarily saved; they are partly used to support family members in the home 
countries. On the other side, earnings that are transferred to the home countries are 
not entirely consumed, but to a large part invested into savings. There is a confusing 
use of concepts in the literature: While official data usually refer to all foreign exchange 
of migrants to the home countries as remittances, it would be wrong to conclude that 
all such transfers are completely consumed by family members. A large part of these 
transfers are saved in the home countries.4 On the other side, it would be similarly 
wrong to interpret all earnings that are not consumed as savings, since a part of it 
is used for the support of family members. Following Paine (1974), remittances will 
here be used in the more narrow sense of earnings that are used to support family 
members. Savings are then all earnings that are saved at home and abroad5. The 
strict differentiation of income that is not consumed in the host country into savings and 
remittances is important for analytical purposes. While remittances are best analyzed 
in a family context (see, e.g., Lucas and Stark (1985)), for the analysis of savings 
behavior an individual approach seems more appropriate.
One aim of this study is to explain why migrant workers have a different savings 
behavior than native workers. The analysis isolates two motives which are likely to 
explain to some degree differences in the savings rates of migrants and natives: life cycle 
motives and precautionary motives. The extent to which life cycle motives account for 
the excess savings of migrants, relative to comparable native workers, is shown to 
depend on the wage differential and the relative price level between host- and home 
country, the migrant’s preference for consumption at home, and the desired length of 
migration. The analysis further reveals that the extent to which precautionary savings
3Jones and Smith (1970) report that the local savings rate (earnings that are invested into savings 
in the host country) of migrant workers in Great Britain in 1965 was about 2% above UK average. 
For France, the average local savings of foreign workers in 1970 was 50% higher than those of a French 
person with the same income (Granier and Marciano, 1975).
4Monatsberichte der deutschen Bundesbank, 1974, p. 275
5According to Paine (1974, p. 103), only survey data allow for such a differentiation. For Turkish 
workers abroad, Paine calculates for 1971 an average saving rate of 36% of total income. A further 
11% was used to support family members. These numbers indicate that savings net of remittances 
are still surprisingly high.
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of migrants are higher than those of comparable natives depends on the migrant’s utility 
structure, the perceived degree of risk of the labor markets of host- and home country 
and the correlation between the effects of some events on the economies considered.
A further focus of the analysis is the impact of uncertainty about future income 
streams in both, host- and home country, on the desired length of migration and, in the 
limit, on the migration decision itself. The results show that no general conclusions are 
possible. Contrasted with a certain environment, uncertainty influences the migrant’s 
choice. However, i t ’s effect depends not only in size, but also in sign on the migrant’s 
utility structure, on the riskiness of the host country labor market, relative to that of 
the home country, and on interdependencies between the effects of external shocks on 
both economies.
The next section will first introduce the theoretical framework. It will then be 
shown how the wage differences in home- and host country, preferences for consump­
tion at home as well as uncertainty with respect to future earnings may influence the 
migrant’s savings behavior. As a point of reference, migrant’s savings behavior will be 
compared with that of native workers. The second part of the analysis concerns the 
impact of uncertainty on the migrant’s decision to migrate and on the length of his 
stay abroad. Results are then illustrated with a numerical example.
4.2 Saving and M igration D ecisions
Let the migrant worker be confronted with the following decision problem: At some 
point in time, he has to decide whether he wants to migrate to a potential host country 
and for how long. He further has to decide about his future path of consumption. 
An important motive for migration would be a higher rental rate on a unit of human 
capital stock in the potential immigration country. The worker would then migrate 
when the economic advantages of doing so outweigh the cost of migration, or, following 
Sjaastad (1962), when the present value of the migration decision is positive. This is 
also the classical explanation for labor mobility: As Hicks (1932, p.76) pointed out, 
” ...differences in economic advantages, chiefly differences in wages, are the main causes 
of migration.” However, it implies that the worker’s objective is only to maximize 
lifetime income: his decision would solely be influenced by monetary aspects. Should 
this be the case, and once having decided to migrate, is there any reason for the worker 
to return to his home country? In other words, is such a simple model capable to 
explain temporary migration? Obviously not, or only under certain assumptions on 
the process of human capital accumulation, and the evaluation of human capital, in
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both countries.6
A simple extension of the model would be to let the potential migrant maximize 
lifetime utility from consumption, given a lifetime budget constraint that depends on 
the migration decision. When the migrant prefers to consume at home than abroad 
(because of other arguments that are complementary to consumption, like being to­
gether with his family and friends, living in a used environment, enjoying the climate 
etc.), his optimal decision may now be to migrate only temporarily, although the value 
of the stock of his human capital is higher abroad.7 The reason for this is that, since 
his lifetime is finite, each unit of time spent abroad increases his lifetime utility by 
raising his total consumption possibilities, but it decreases lifetime utility by reducing 
the time available for consumption at home.
4.2.1 The Basic M odel
Let the lifetime horizon of the migrant be equal to T  =  1 and assume, for simplicity, 
that the worker is productive over his entire life cycle. The migrant will have to choose 
the time t he wants to stay in the host country, thereby determining the time (1 — t) 
he will afterwards stay in his home country. The migrant’s objective is to maximize 
utility from consumption. Let his lifetime utility function be additively separable with 
respect to home- and host country consumption, with the subutility functions being 
increasing in consumption, strictly concave and continuously differentiable. Assume 
that the rate of time preference and the interest rate are both equal to zero. This 
does not change any qualitative results of the analysis that follows, but it implies that 
the flows of consumption in host- and home country are both constant. The migrant’s 
lifetime utility may be expressed in the following simple form:
V(c?,cF) = t u l (cI) +  (1 -  t)uE(cE) (4.1)
where u1 and uE are the subutility functions in the immigration- and the emigration 
country8, and c1 and c5  are the respective constant flows of consumption. A higher 
preference for consumption at home corresponds to a higher marginal utility from 
consuming an equal consumption flow k in the home country: u'E(k) > urI(k).9
6This is outlined in Appendix 2.
7The trade off between higher wages in the host country on the one side, and a higher preference 
for consumption at home on the other side was firstly formalized by Djajic and Milboune (1988).
immigration- and emigration country will be alternatively referred to as host- and home county.
9t iV )  ***1 could likewise be expressed as u(c},G) and u(cE, F), where G and F are indices,
representing environmental factors like family, friends etc. When G and F are complementary to c1
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Total future earnings in host- and home country are given by yl (i, z) and yE(t, z), 
where x  and z are random variables with known joint density function f ( x , z ) .  These 
random variables could be interpreted as indices which reflect the impact of uncertainty 
on future incomes in host- and home country.10 The variances of x  and z will be 
denoted by and <r2, respectively, and the covariance between both by axz. The 
following assumptions seem to be natural:
y\  > 0; y f  < 0 ; yi > 0; y f  > 0 (4.2)
This simply implies that total earnings accumulated in either country are the higher 
the longer the migrant will stay.11 If interpreting x  and y as indices of labor market 
conditions, the signs of the last two terms are self explaining: the more favorable the 
state of the world, the higher will be total earnings, keeping t constant.
The migrant’s budget constraint is then given by the following expression:
t pc1 +  [1 -  t] cE +  rj =  y^ tyx)  +  yE{t,z) (4.3)
where p is the price level in the host country, relative to that in the home country, and 
tj are fixed costs of migration. Rewriting (4.3) yields:
cE = [y1 (t ,x) + yE(i, z) - 1) - 1 pc1] (4.4)
Inserting (4.4) into (4.1) and adopting the von Neumann - Morgenstern hypothesis of 
expected utility maximization, the individual will solve the following problem:
<j>(cI,i)  = iMixE(V(cI ,cE)) (4.5)
t*1
Accordingly, the migrant will choose the level of consumption abroad, c1, and the time 
t to stay in the host country so as to maximize expected lifetime utility.
Since any uncertainty will not be resolved before t and c1 are chosen, the following 
restriction has to be imposed on the migrant’s total consumption in the host country:
and c®, respectively, (in the sense of Pareto and Edgeworth, see Hicks (1979), p.44), and if additionally 
F >G, then u'E(k,G) > «'*(*, F ). For simplicity, the indices G and F are suppressed here.
10For instance, when risk affects income in a multiplicative form, then y1 =  y! (t) x and yE =  yE(t) z, 
where and are total incomes in home- and host country as functions of I.
11 Because lifetime is finite and t signifies the time being in the host country, an increase in t will 
increase ¡ / ( .) ,  but it will decrease y ^ . ) ,  since less time is available for the accumulation of earnings 
at home.
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tpc1 <  [ /(* ,* )  +  yE{t,z) -  v] (4.6)
where x  and z are the minimum levels of x  and 2 . Relation (4.6) simply states that 
total consumption in the host country has to be lower than total lifetime earnings when 
the most unfavorable states of the world should realize.
The first order conditions for an interior maximum are given by:
<t>t = £ [« V )  “  + E =  0 (4 .7 -a)
< j^ =  E[u,I{cI) — pu'E(cE)\ =  0 (4.7-b)
Relation (4.7-a) implicitly determines the optimal length of stay in the immigration 
country. The optimal t will be chosen so as to equalize the expected marginal loss in 
overall utility of staying one unit of time longer in the host country with the expected 
marginal gain of staying one unit longer abroad, both measured in units of utility.
Expression (4.7-b) simply states that the expected marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption at home and abroad has to equal the relative price level.
Type 1 an d  Type 2 U n ce rta in ty
Income uncertainty that affects the migrant’s decision problem may be due to unfore­
seeable future events that influence labor markets, and therefore earnings, of host- and 
source country. It may also be due to imperfect knowledge about the labor market 
conditions in the host country. Both types of uncertainty have different characteristics 
and may have different consequences for the migrant’s decisions. The first kind of un­
certainty will further be referred to as type 1 uncertainty. The latter type is denoted as 
type 2 uncertainty. The analysis below relates solely to type 1 uncertainty. Implications 
of type 2  uncertainty will be pointed out later.
Some examples for type 1 uncertainty would be unforeseeable changes in raw 
material prices, like an oil crisis, wars, worldwide economic downturns, political unrest 
etc. For this type of uncertainty, it seems appropriate to assume that, the longer the 
migrant intends to stay in either country, the stronger will be the impact of some shock 
on his total income to be accumulated in that country. Formally, this can be expressed 
by assuming that y(x > 0 and yfx <  0.12 In other words, marginal total income at home
12Note again tha t an increase in t decreases the time being in the home country, so th a t y( < 0.
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and abroad, which are earnings per unit of timé, increase in x  and z  respectively.13 This 
is what Levhari and Weiss (1974) call increasing risk and implies that the variability 
of total income, accumulated in either country, increases with the time being in that 
country. Increasing risk would correspond to a multiplicative specification of the effect 
of uncertainty on earnings, as it is usually assumed in the literature on uncertainty 
and investment into human capital (see, for example, Eaton and Rosen (1980), Kodde 
(1986)).
The D eterm inistic Case
Reconsider the migrant’s optimization problem in a deterministic world. Assume, 
therefore, that x  and z are known to be equal to their expected values: x =  E(x)  = x 
and z — E(z)  =  z. It then follows for (4.7-a) and (4.7-b):
[uE(cE) -  « V ) ]  = (4.8-a)
u 'V )  =  pu'E(cE) (4.8-b)
The system (4.8-a), (4.8-b) determines the optimal time to be spent abroad, i°, and 
the optimal level of consumption in the host country, c/0. For an equal price level in 
both countries (p =  1), and expressing a higher preference for consumption at home 
by a higher marginal utility of a constant flow of consumption k in the home country,
u,E(k) > u '^k) ,  it follows from (4.8-b) that the optimal level of consumption at home 
is higher than the optimal level of consumption abroad: c^ 0 > c/0. Throughout the 
analysis, it will be assumed that the migrant has a higher preference for consumption 
at home, which ensures an interior solution for the time spent abroad (corresponding 
to temporary migration). It follows then from (4.8-a) that he will decide to migrate 
when the increase in lifetime utility from staying one unit longer abroad is at least as 
high as the decrease in lifetime utility by being deprived of the possibility to consume 
during this unit of time at home.
For completeness, consider the case where the migrant is indifferent between 
consumption at home and abroad. This would correspond to u'‘(k) being equal to 
u>E(k), and, consequently, c70 =  c^ 0 and u/ (c/0) =  u^c®0). The migrant’s decision will 
now depend solely on earnings prospects at home and abroad -  the classical explanation 
for migration. For an equal price level in both countries (p — 1), and indifference 
between consumption at home and abroad, (4.8-a) reduces to
13This includes the possibility of unemployment. Marginal total income would then correspond to 
eventual unemployment benefits.
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« ' V % /  + yf] = o (4.9)
Migration may now be permanent, temporary, or the migrant may be indifferent be­
tween migrating or not migrating, depending on whether, for all t 6  (0 , 1), (y{+yf) > 0 , 
(ift +  y f )  <  0, or (y{ + y f )  =  0, respectively. An interior solution evolves when there 
exists a t°, t° € [0,1], for which (y{ + y f )  =  0. In Appendix 2 it is shown that this may 
well be the case when human capital, accumulated in the host country, is only earnings 
effective in the home country. In this special case, temporary migration may evolve in 
a deterministic environment, although the migrant is indifferent between consumption 
in either country and although he bases his decision on purely monetary criteria.
4.2.2 Savings of Migrants and Natives
There are a variety of explanations why individuals accumulate savings. People may 
save because life time profiles of income and desired consumption do not coincide. Sav­
ings are thus a means to transfer consumption over time. Savings of this kind are said 
to be due to life cycle motives. A further reason to save are precautionary motives. 
Precautionary savings axe induced by uncertainty about future income streams. Indi­
viduals save to have funds for future contingencies. Savings may also be due to bequest 
motives. Savings would here be a means to provide capital for children or other heirs.
The following analysis will concentrate on the first two motives. It will be shown 
that both, savings that are due to life cycle motives, and savings that are due to pre­
cautionary motives, may differ considerably between migrant workers and comparable 
natives.
Life C ycle M otives
In simple intertemporal models, savings that are referred to as life cycle savings occur 
when the individual’s rate of time preference differs from the interest rate. Individuals 
save or desave, depending on whether the rate of time preference is smaller or larger 
than the interest rate. In the present model framework, the interest rate and the 
rate of time preference are both assumed to be equal to zero. Accordingly, there is 
no difference between both rates which could induce savings. Since the purpose is to 
compare savings of migrants and natives, this restriction translates into the assumption 
tha t savings induced by such a difference are equal between migrants and natives. What 
remains are life cycle savings that accrue because profiles of lifetime income differ from
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profiles of lifetime consumption. It will be shown that this may be major reason why 
migrants have a different savings behavior than native workers.
Consider a migrant worker who’s decision problem is characterized by the above 
optimization problem. His earnings prospects abroad are higher than those at home. 
However, he prefers to consume at home rather than abroad. His savings in the host 
country that are due to life cycle motives consist then of two components: first, holding 
the flow of consumption constant over the life cycle, he will save because earnings are 
higher abroad than at home. Secondly, holding the income stream constant over the 
life cycle, he will save because desired consumption is higher at home than abroad.
Before formalizing these arguments, a native reference group has to be charac­
terized. Define therefore a comparable native as one who maximizes lifetime utility 
over the same horizon T  and who has the same path of human capital accumulation 
as the migrant worker. Furthermore, since the native lives in his home country, let 
his lifetime utility function be equal to the subutility function of the migrant worker 
in the emigration country. Assume, for simplicity, that both migrant and native have 
a constant stock of human capital over the horizon T. Denote earnings per unit of 
time in the emigration- and the immigration country by wE and w1, respectively, with 
wE < w1. Accordingly, migrant and native receive equal earnings in the immigration 
country. The total savings rate s is given by:
w1 
S T
w1
How would this savings rate differ between native and migrant, when both were ob­
served at the same point in time during the migrant’s stay abroad? The lifetime budget 
constraint of the native worker corresponds to t w1 + [1 — t] tv1 =  c1. Given his utility 
function V N — t u/ (c/ ) +  [1 — f] u/ (ci ), he will choose a constant c1 over his life cycle 
that is equal to w1. Consequently, his savings rate is equal to zero.14
The migrant’s budget constraint is, according to (4.3), given by t w I + [ l—t]wE = 
t c 1 +  [1 — ijc^ . Neglect any fixed costs of migration (tj =  0). The migrant’s savings 
rate sM consists then of two components, savings that are due to discontinuities in his 
life cycle income stream (ij^) and savings that are due to discontinuities in his stream 
of desired consumption (s$*):
SM = s”  + s ^  = ^ - ^ [ l - t ) + C— ^ - [ l - t ) =  (4.10)
wI Wt w
14Remember tha t savings that are due to differences in interest rate and rate of time preferences 
are excluded by assumption.
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The rate s ^  is positive whenever w1 > wE\ in this case, future earnings will decrease. 
Life cycle earnings of the migrant are lower than those of the comparable native, 
although they both have equal earnings in the immigration country. The prospect of 
lower future earnings would then induce the migrant to accumulate savings.15 The 
share of s ^  in the total savings rate depends on the size of the wage differential and 
on the length of the desired migration period.
Additionally, migrants may save because they have a preference for consumption 
at home. The corresponding savings rate is given by s^1. Savings are accumulated to 
allow for an increase in the flow of consumption upon return. The share of s in the 
total savings rate depends on the extent of migrant’s preference for consumption at 
home and, again, on the length of the time abroad. The size of depends additionally 
on the price level abroad. Should the price level be higher in the immigration country 
than in the emigration country (p > 1), it follows from (4.8-b) that the migrant would 
further reduce consumption abroad, relative to consumption at home. Consequently, 
a higher price level in the immigration country would reinforce the size of .
Consequently, when migration is intended to be temporary,16 life cycle motives 
may induce migrant workers to have savings rates that are higher than those of com­
parable native workers. The total rate of savings of a migrant worker is the higher, the 
larger the differential between wages at home and abroad, the stronger the preference 
for consumption at home and the higher the relative price level abroad. The savings 
rate decreases with the length of migration.
Precautionary M otives
The second explanation for a different savings behavior between migrants and natives 
are precautionary motives. In what follows, the migrant’s optimal savings- and con­
sumption decision in the host country under small uncertainty about future income 
will first be compared with that under certainty. It is then shown that precautionary 
savings of migrant workers are likely to be higher than those of comparable native 
workers.
Let t° and c/0 be the optimal length of stay and the optimal level of consumption
18This is essentially the motive for savings th a t is analyzed by Galor and Stark (1990). For wages 
being lower in the home country, Galor and Stark illustrate in a two-period model that migrants 
savings in the first period are the higher, the higher their return probability in the second period.
lsThe analysis would also include the case where migration is desired permanent (because a prefer­
ence for consumption abroad), but is restricted being temporary (because legal restrictions, like e.g. 
in Switzerland). In this case, would be negative.
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in the host country, when x  and z are known to be equal to their expected values 
x  =  E(x)  and z =  E(z). In other words, t° and c10 solve (8 ). To compare the 
optimally chosen level of consumption in the deterministic case, c/0, with that chosen 
under small uncertainty, expand (4.7-a) around x =  x  and z = z. Neglecting terms of 
order higher than 2 , and assuming that yE and y1 are linear in x  and z, respectively, 
this results in the following expression (derivation see Appendix 3 ):
£ V V )  -  u'E( ^ ) )  *  “”* ('* ) + »')] (411)
where E°(.) =  £ (.)  when z — z and x = x. It follows from the second order condi­
tions that <j>ci ci <  0 (see Appendix 1). Accordingly, d ¡ ^ (u '^ c 1) — u,E(cF))ldc1 < 0. 
Therefore, the optimally chosen level of consumption in the host country under small 
uncertainty is smaller or larger than that chosen in the certainty case, depending on 
whether the term on the right hand side of (4.11) is negative or positive, respectively. 
Since Var(yE -f y1) will always be positive, the sign of the term on the right of (4.11) 
depends on the sign of uwE(c®), indicating the change in the attitude towards risk 
when cF changes. When umE(cP) =  0, the optimal level of consumption is not affected 
by uncertainty. This is, for instance, the case for a quadratic utility function.
However, for u",E(cF) > 0, it follows from (4.11) that c!o > cl , where c1 is the 
optimal level of consumption when small uncertainty about income at home and abroad 
is present. It is easy to show that u",E(cF) has to be positive when absolute risk aversion 
is decreasing and the utility function is additively separable (see Leland (1968))17 If 
the migrant’s utility structure exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, he would, 
under small uncertainty, accumulate precautionary savings and increase the level of 
consumption in the home country even if he were indifferent between consumption 
at home and abroad. The interesting question that arises is whether precautionary 
savings of migrant workers differ from those of comparable natives.18
It is obvious from (4.11) that the impact of uncertainty on the savings decision 
depends on the size of Var(yE +  y l ), the variance of lifetime income. Var(yE +  y1) 
may be rewritten as:
1?For an extensive discussion of the properties of the third derivative of the utility function and its
impact on savings behavior, see also Mir man (1971) and Sandmo (1971).
18Since the analysis of precautionary savings requires at least a two-period framework, assume, as 
before, that the life of the comparable native is divided into two periods of unequal length, period 1 
corresponding to  t  and period 2 to  (1 -  t). Comparisons of savings of migrant workers with those of 
natives refer then to  the first period.
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Var(yE +  y1) =  Var(yE) +  V a r t f )  +  2 Cou(y£ + / )  =  [y'2a* + y f la\ +  2pyIxy fa xaI]
(4.12)
Accordingly, the variance of the migrant’s lifetime income consists of the variance of 
total incomes in the host- and in the source country, both depending positively on the 
time spent in either country, and on the covariance between both. The degree of risk 
exhibited by the respective labor market may be measured by erf, i =  z ,x .  Assume 
first that the random variables x  and z are uncorrelated.
The variance of lifetime income of a migrant worker, and, accordingly, his pre­
cautionary savings, may then be higher than that of a comparable native worker for 
two reasons: the variance of income to be accumulated in the host country is higher 
than that of the native worker, or/and the variance of income to be accumulated at 
home is higher than that of the native worker, both evaluated over the same period 
length t.
First consider Var(yJ), the variance of total income to be accumulated abroad. 
Evaluated for the same t, Var(yI ) is higher for migrant workers than for comparable 
natives if migrants perceive the host country labor market as more risky than native 
workers. It is likely that this is the usual case. For instance, in many immigration 
countries migrant workers do not have the same rights in the labor market or the same 
benefit entitlements than native workers. Furthermore, discrimination may prevent 
migrant workers from having the same opportunities to stay in the job, or to find a 
new job, especially during economic downturns. The variance of lifetime income for 
a migrant worker would then be higher than that of a native worker, given that the 
variance of income in the home country over the remaining period [1 — f] is not lower 
than that of the respective native worker over that period.19
Secondly, higher precautionary savings of migrants may be induced by the desired, 
temporary nature of migration. If the migrant stays only temporarily in the host 
country, and, after return, enters the labor market of the home country, the variance 
of his lifetime income depends on the riskiness of the home country labor market. 
Emigration countries are often characterized by poorly developed benefit systems.20
19The variance of total income to be accumulated in the host country should be particularly high for 
illegal migrants. They usually do not have the right to claim any benefit support in the host country. 
Furthermore, their illegal status prevents them  from appealing to  any labor market law tha t concerns 
minimal wages or job  security.
30Although institutionally established benefit systems are often less developed in potential emi­
gration countries, it would be wrong to  conclude tha t migrants are always better off in immigration 
countries. Less economically developed emigration countries have very often a well-functioning, non­
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They usually exhibit fairly high rates of unemployment, low stability and are sometimes 
highly sensitive to economic shocks. Therefore, the variance of the migrant’s income 
to be accumulated after return may be high, thus further increasing the variance of 
lifetime income, respective to that of a comparable native worker.
Furthermore, the correlation between the effects of some shocks on the labor 
market of emigration- and immigration country may well be positive or negative. In 
this case, not only the variances of yE and y1, but also the covariance between yE and 
y1 determines the size of Var(yE +  y1). A positive correlation between total incomes 
to be accumulated at home and abroad would signify that the same type of event has 
either a positive or a negative effect on labor markets and earnings in both countries. 
A negative correlation would correspond to opposite effects on labor markets in the 
two countries.
Assume, for instance, that the emigration country is a net importer of some raw 
materials, e.g. crude oil, while the immigration country is a net exporter. A rise in 
oil prices would then have a positive effect on the economy of the immigration country 
and a negative effect on the economy of the emigration country. On the contrary, if 
both economies were net importers of crude oil, a rise or fall in oil prices would affect 
both economies similarly.
The correlation of the effect of such an event on labor markets and, accordingly, 
earnings is captured by the correlation coefficient p in (4.12). When p — 0, total 
incomes in the two countries are uncorrelated. Should p < 0, some shock would have 
opposite effects on the two economies. This allows the migrant to hedge against risk. 
For a negative correlation, there exists an optimal level of consumption and an optimal 
length of time abroad so that all risk would be removed from the migrant’s decision 
problem. Accordingly, the correlation between the effects of some random shocks on 
the labor markets, mirroring characteristics and interdependencies of the economies 
considered, may weaken or reinforce the size of precautionary savings.
Consequently, when the utility structure of migrants exhibits decreasing absolute 
risk aversion, migrants are likely to accumulate precautionary savings that are higher 
than those of comparable natives. The size of savings that are due to precautionary 
motives depends on the perceived riskiness of the host country labor market and the 
home country labor market, determining the variance of total earnings in either country, 
and on the length of migration. It further depends on the correlation of the effects of 
some shock on labor markets in both countries.
institutionalized benefit systems that is based on kinship and family. While the migrant worker may 
rely in his home country on family support in the case of unemployment or illness, he may end up 
with no benefits a t all, if the host country benefit system discriminates against foreigners.
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4.2.3 Uncertainty and Migration Decisions
Uncertainty does not only influence migrant’s savings in the host country, as was shown 
above, but also his optimal length of stay abroad and, when analyzed around t° =  0 , 
the migration decision itself. To investigate the effect of income uncertainty on the 
optimal choice of t, denote t° and c/0 as those realizations of t and c1 which solve the 
migrant’s decision problem when x and z are known to be equal to their expected 
values. Expanding (4.7-a) around x — x  and z =  I, and assuming that y 1 and yE are 
linear in x  and z, respectively, results in the following expression (for the derivation 
see Appendix 3):
E ° [ u V )  ~  «(e®)] +  E° u'E(cE)
\dc*
dt [1 -* ]
A1 =  r ;  '
j  j
u"'E{cE) ^ -  +  u"E(cE)at
»  A 1 +  A 2 =  A (4.13) 
[Var(yB - t y 1)]
A2 =
2[1  - t ] dt
Var(yE +  y1)
where E° again indicates that the expectations are evaluated at x  =  x  and z — z. For 
<j>tt < 0 (see Appendix 1), the term on the left decreases in t. As a result, the optimally 
chosen level of t under small uncertainty, i, is smaller or larger than that chosen in the 
deterministic case, t°, depending on whether A is smaller or larger than zero:
t < 0
Uncertainty affects the optimal choice of t directly and indirectly. Directly because the 
migrant is risk averse. Indirectly because a change in t changes the variance of total 
lifetime earnings, and, by way of altering c®, changes the attitude towards risk. The 
direct effect of risk aversion and the indirect effect via a change in the degree of risk 
aversion are captured by A1. The indirect effect via a change in the variance of total 
lifetime income is captured by A2.
Consider first A 1: since V arfy1 +  yE) > 0, the sign of A 1 depends on the sign of 
It further depends on the magnitudes of u'"E(cF) [dc^/dt] and u"E(cE). For a 
given variance of total lifetime income, u"E{cP) captures the direct effect of uncertainty
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Table 4.1: \  ^ V c r t f  + yE)
C orr 0 <  t° <  1 t° = 0
p = - 1 \Vx -  y f  0z] \ylt ox -  yE <*z] ° z yf[yft -  y]xt ax] 
>or<o >o <o
> o r< o
/> =  0 [ylvlt ol + y fy fto l}  y f  yE
>0 <0 <0  s----------- --------------- -
>or<o
P =  1 [yi Ox + y f  oz] + [y!zt a x + y f  a z] a t  yf[y!It ax + y f  az\
>o >or<o >or<o
>or<o
on the choice of t. The term umE(c?)[dcF /  dt\ represents the indirect effect by a change 
in the attitude towards risk, caused by a change in desired consumption at home, cE, 
that results from a change in t.
Given the structure of the problem, decreasing absolute risk aversion would imply 
that u'"E{<?) > 0. Accordingly, for dc?jdt =  [y( +  y f  — cl + c5] > 0, an increase in t 
would, by way of increasing the flow of consumption in the home country, increase the 
willingness to accept some given risk and influence the length of migration positively. 
However, since the direct effect is negative (u"E(cF) < 0), the sign of A1 is ambiguous.
The second indirect effect is induced by the impact of a change in t on the variance 
of total lifetime income. This effect is captured by the term A 2. Since u"E(cE) < 
0, the sign of A2 depends on the sign on dVar(yE +  y!)ldt. When, for some i°, 
dV ar(yE + yI )/dt < 0, an increase of the time being in the host country will reduce 
the variance of total lifetime income. This would be the case when, for instance, the 
labor market of the home country is very risky, relative to that of the host country.
Consequently, risk aversion would then induce the migrant to increase the length 
of stay abroad. This can directly be seen from (4.13): For dVar(yE +  y ^ /d t  < 0, and 
unE(cP) <  0, A 2 >  0. Accordingly, should A 1 > 0, or (A 1 +  A2) > 0, it follows that 
t > t ° .
The sign of dVar(yE +  yT)/dt depends on the degree of risk in the respective 
labor markets, as represented by as and <r„ and on the correlation between the random 
variables z and z. For p — — 1, p =  0 and p =  1, the first column in table 4.1 presents
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[1/2] d V  + y !) j  dt when the solution of the deterministic problem is an interior one
(0 < t° < 1). The second column of table 4.1 gives dV ar(yE + yJ)/dt when the solution 
of the deterministic problem would be t° =  0 (i.e. the objective function reaches it’s 
maximum for i° =  0). W ithout further specification of y1, yE and the distribution 
of x  and z  as well as the migrant’s utility function and the income functions in both 
countries, it is ambiguous whether A 2 will tend to have an increasing or a decreasing 
effect on the time spent abroad, compared with what would have been chosen under 
certainty. In other words, depending on the migration situation and the preference 
structure of the migrant worker, uncertainty may have a positive or a negative effect 
on the time the migrant intends to stay abroad.
The effect of A 2 is more definite when the migration decision itself is considered. 
Neglecting the effect of A1, column 2 of table 4.1 shows that uncertainty with respect 
to future income would induce the migrant to migrate, even if he would not do so under 
perfect foresight, when x  and z  are negatively correlated or not correlated. This is due 
to the purpose of the migrant to hedge against risk or to diversify risk, respectively.
However, when x  and z  are positively correlated, the effect of A2 on the migration
decision is again ambiguous.
An Exam ple
A simple numerical example may help to illustrate the above arguments. Assume the 
migrant’s utility structure to be of the following simple form:
u(c/ ) =  Gci0,5; u((^) = F  cE0S
where F  and G are indices which capture environmental arguments, like family, friends 
etc. The utility function has the property that u'" > 0. Let F > G, and normalize by 
setting G =  1 .
Assume that total earnings in host- and home country, y1 and yE, are linear in x 
and z, as well as in t and [1 — i]:
y1 = w1 t x ;  yE =  wE [1 — i] z
Again, w1 and wE denote earnings per unit of time in immigration- and emigration
country.
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Assume some numerical values. Suppose that ivE =  1, w1 =  2 and F = 2. 
Acordingly, wages in the host country are double as high as in the home country. 
Further, let the price level between host- and home country be equal (p = 1 ), and set 
the fixed costs of migration to zero (tj — 0 ).
When the random variables z and z are known to be equal to their expected 
values, and expectations are equal to unity (E (x ) =  E(z)  =  1), the optimal flows of 
consumption at home and abroad and the optimal length of migration are given by the 
following numbers:
Consequently, the migrant would intend to spent 1/6 of his future life abroad. His 
consumption per unit of time abroad would only be 1 /4 of what he plans to consume 
in his home country. His total savings rate sM, consisting of and s!f, is given by:
sM =  3”  + s?  =  0.416 + 0.416 = 0.83
In this simple example, the migrant would intend to save 83% of his wage income.
Consider now the case of uncertainty. Let the random variables x and z have 
means of unity, variances ax and <t\  and covariance ax az p.
Three situations will be examined. In situation 1, the migrant perceives the labor 
market of the home country as riskier than that of the host country. In situation 2, 
the opposite is the case: the migrant considers the host country labor market as riskier 
than that of the home country.21 In situation 3, the host country labor market is 
likewise riskier than that of the home country, but the difference in the degree of risk 
is smaller. The following values will be assumed:
• Situation 1: ax =  0.5; <r* =  0.8
• Situation 2: ox — 0.9; ax =  0.3
• Situation 3: <tx =  0.8; <7,  =  0.5
21 Note tha t the labor market of the host country may exhibit a different degree of risk for the
migrant than for the native worker. The degree of risk depends on the extent to which the foreign 
labor market is discriminative against migrant workers, the migrant’s legal rights to claim benefit 
support in the case of unemployment, illness etc.
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Table 4.2: Some Qualitative Results
Corr dVariy1 + yE)/dt A1 A2 A1 -I-A2
Situation (1) (2 ) (3) (1) (2 ) (3) (1) (2 ) (3) (1) (2 ) (3)
p=  1 (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (-) (") (-) (+) (-) (-)
p = 0 (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (") (-) (+) (-) (+)
p = - 1 (") (+) (") (+) (+) (+) (+) (-) (+) ( + ) (-) (+)
In all situations, the migrant will accumulate precautionary savings, since u'"(.) > 
0. For the assumed utility structure, the effect of uncertainty on the desired length 
of migration depends on the riskiness of the two labor markets, as well as on the 
correlation between the effects of some event on them. Table 4.2 presents qualitative 
results for dV ar(yJ + yE)/dt, A 1, A2, and A1 +  A 2.
In situation 1, a further stay abroad would increase the variance of lifetime income 
for p =  1 . It would decrease the variance of lifetime income for p =  0 and p =  — 1. 
In situation 2, an increase in the t increases the variance of lifetime income for all 
p's. In situation 2 , the variance rises likewise, except for p =  —1 . The direct effect of 
risk aversion and the effect of a change in the degree of risk aversion on the optimal 
length of migration, as represented by A 1, is positive in all situations and for all p's. It 
therefore affects the desired time abroad positively. However, A2, which captures the 
effect of a change in the total variance of lifetime income on the optimal t , is negative 
in situation 1 for p =  1. It is negative for all correlations in situation 2. In situation 
3, it is again negative for p =  1 and p =  0, but positive for p =  — 1 . Summing up A 1 
and A2, the total effect of uncertainty in situation 1 would be to increase the length of 
the migration period, compared to what would have been chosen under certainty. In 
situation 2 , uncertainty has a decreasing effect on the desired length of stay abroad. 
Finally, in situation 3, the effect is negative for p =  1 and positive for p =  0 and 
p =  - 1 .
This exercise should have demonstrated the main result of the analysis in section 
4.2.3: income uncertainty affects the migrant’s desired length of stay and, in the limit, 
the migration decision itself. However, the effect is not conclusive without specifying 
the migrant’s optimization problem explicitly. Depending on the migrant’s preference 
structure, the specification of the income functions and the distribution of and corre­
lation between the random variables x  and z, uncertainty may increase or reduce the
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desired time in the host country, relative to that chosen under certainty.
4.2.4 T y p e  2  Uncertainty
So far, only the impact of type 1 uncertainty has been analyzed. Additionally to type
1 uncertainty, type 2 uncertainty may influence the migrant’s decision problem.
With type 2 uncertainty, the potential migrant is before migration uncertain about 
how the foreign labor market evaluates his abilities and his stock of human capital. 
However, once arrived in the foreign country, he will gather information about the 
requirements of the labor market and thereby reduce uncertainty.
Uncertainty that is due to imperfect information is likely to play a minor role 
when there is an established and long-lasting migration relation between target- and 
source country. Returners may have thoroughly informed new potential migrants about 
the immigration country.22 However, for the first wave of migrants, type 2 uncertainty 
may play a major role in the decision process. Which kind of uncertainty finally dom­
inates, depends on the migration situation under consideration. Although both types 
of uncertainty are likely to affect the migrant’s optimization problem simultaneously, 
the effect of type 2 uncertainty on the decision variables will be analyzed separately.
Since type 2 uncertainty only affects earnings abroad, assume earnings at home 
as certain. Define £ as the random variable that reflects uncertainty which is due to 
imperfect knowledge about the foreign labor market. Let g{£) be the known density 
function of £, with variance Future income abroad is then given by yl {t,i) .  Given 
that the stock of knowledge about the foreign economy rises while the migrant stays 
abroad, an increase in t should reduce uncertainty that is due to imperfect knowledge.
It therefore seems to be reasonable to adopt the assumption of decreasing risk y[  ^ < 0.
Consider first precautionary savings: the variance of total lifetime income, Var(yE+ 
y1), reduces to 2 <r2, which is always positive. Accordingly, uncertainty that is due to 
imperfect knowledge would likewise induce the migrant to accumulate precautionary 
savings.
To analyze the effect of type 2 uncertainty on the length of migration, one has 
to evaluate A 1 and A2. The sign of A1 is again ambiguous. The sign of A 2 depends 
on dV ar(yE +  y ^ /d t ,  which reduces to d V a r iy ^ /d t  =  y{(T^y[t. This term is always 
negative since y£ decreases in t. Accordingly, and neglecting the effect of A 1, the 
effect of A 2 alone would then always be to increase the time to be spent in the host
23An example would be migration of turkish workers to Germany during the early seventies, after 
the two countries have had an established migration history of nearly two decades.
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country. This is a direct result of decreasing risk when uncertainty is due to imperfect 
information.
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4.3 C onclusion
The aim of the above analysis was twofold: First, to analyze the motives that may 
be responsible for the surprisingly high saving rates of migrant workers. Secondly, to 
investigate the impact of uncertainty with respect to future incomes on the migration 
decision and the length of time the migrant intends to stay abroad.
The analysis isolates two motives which may explain to some extent why tempo­
rary migrants often have savings that are considerably higher than those of comparable 
native workers: life cycle motives and precautionary motives. Savings that are due to 
life cycle motives are likely to be higher for migrants than for native workers. The 
difference between saving rates is the greater, the larger the wage differential between 
home- and host country, the stronger the migrant’s preference for consumption at home 
and the higher the relative price level in the immigration country. It decreases with 
the length of migration.
The migrant may further accumulate precautionary savings. For uncertain fu­
ture income flows in home- and host country, the magnitude of precautionary savings 
depends on the size of the variance of future income. It is shown that this variance is 
likely to be larger for migrants than for native workers. In particular, precautionary 
savings are likely to be higher for migrants when foreigners can not claim the same 
rights in the labor market of the immigration country than native workers, when the 
labor market of the host country discriminates against foreign workers, when the mi­
grant has an illegal status, and when the labor market of the home country exhibits a 
high degree of risk and instability, leading to a high variance of income to be accumu­
lated after return. These effects are reinforced by a positive correlation between the 
impact of some random shocks on the labor markets considered, and weakened by a 
negative correlation.
The effect of uncertain future income on the migration decision and the length 
of the migration period is inconclusive. It depends on the specification of the utility 
structure and the income structure of the migrant. It further depends on the perceived 
degree of risk exhibited by both labor markets and the correlation between the impact 
of random shocks on labor markets in both countries considered.
Uncertainty affects both the decision to migrate as well as the desired length of 
stay. The analysis shows that this effect is generally ambiguous, not only in size, but 
also in sign. Accordingly, conclusions for one migration situation, and for one type of 
migrant may be inappropriate when another migration situation and another type of 
migrant worker are considered.
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4.4 A p pend ix
A ppendix 1: The Sufficiency Conditions
Let ^(c1 , t ,x ,z )  = tiii (ci ) + [1 -  i ju ^ c ^ )  for any x, z defined over the range (x,x) and 
(z ,z ), where x, z and x, z are the lower and upper limits of the distributions of x and z, 
respectively. Then it follows for ipci ci :
V’jj ci is definitely negative, iht is smaller than zero for yl and yE being concave in i. However, 
when y1 and yE are convex in t, as it would be the case when human capital accumulation is 
allowed for (see Appendix 2), then xj)tt < 0 iff |[1 — t]u,,E (cE)[dcE/ dt]2 — u'E(c?)[dcE/ dt]\ > 
\tt'(cE)[y{t+yft]\. That this is the case will be assumed throughout the analysis. Furthermore, 
V’i(j  = —p tu ME(cE)[dcE/dt]. It follows that ij>tt > Vfe/- Since ip is concave in c1, t for 
all i ,  z, the same must be true for <t> = E ( V ( ce ,c7)).
A ppendix 2: Changes in the Stock of Human Capital
The functions of total income abroad and at home, y1 and yE, may well be nonlinear in 
t. To see this, consider the deterministic case and denote by y!(t) and yE(t) total earnings 
accumulated at home and abroad, respectively. Let v1 be the rental rate on one unit of human 
capital stock abroad and vE be the rental rate on one unit at home. Assume the accumulation 
of human capital as exogenous and as independent of whether the migrant stays abroad or at 
home. Denote the stock of human capital in t by h(t), with h'{t) > 0,h"(t) < 0. The strict 
concavity of the human capital stock is in line with human capital theory and compatible 
with empirical evidence [see chapters 2 and 3]. Denoting t as the point of re-migration, total 
lifetime earnings are then given by w:
Specify, for instance, h(t) as [h(t) = 7  + <0-5]. Inserting in (4.16) and solving yields:
i ei  =  t  « " V )  + j p 2 u"E (c E ) (4.14)
and for i>tt
iHt = [1 -  t] «"£ (c£ ) -  u,E(cE) ^  + u,E(cE) [y{t + yE) (4.15)
(4.16)
(4.17)
Each additional unit of time spent abroad increases lifetime earnings by wt = y} + yE:
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wt = [t>J -  vE] [7 + i05] (4.18)
Equation (4.18) is positive for v1 > vE. The profile of w is then a strictly convex function of 
t:
wtt = 0.5[t/ -  vE]t~0’5 > 0 (4.19)
An interesting case to consider is now the following: the migrant accumulates human capital 
while being abroad. In the host country, he does not receive a higher pay for this additional 
human capital. It increases, however, his potential earnings in the home country. In other 
words, the additionally acquired human capital is only earnings effective back home.
Such a situation could occur if the migrant has no occupational choice in the host
country, or he may by purpose accumulate human capital that is only of use later in the 
home country. In such a situation, migration may be temporary, although the migrant is 
indifferent between consumption at home and abroad and although initially wages are higher 
abroad.
To see this, assume the extreme case: let the migrant accumulate human capital abroad, 
but only get paid for this additional stock of human capital back home. For the above 
specification of the human capital function, lifetime income is then:
For this specific example, migration would be temporary if there exists a i 6 [0,1] that solves 
wt = 0 , i.e. when -  vF]/vE}2 = t* and 0 < tm < 1.
A ppendix 3: Derivation of equations 11 and 13.
A second order expansion of (4.8-a) around x = E(x) = x and z = E(z) = z, and neglecting 
higher order terms, yields:
(4.20)
and
wt = a! + »f = 7 (vi - t,E] -vE f0'5 (4.21)
118 CHAPTER 4. MIGRATION, SAVINGS AND UNCERTAINTY
where all derivatives are evaluated at x = x and z — z. When assuming that y1 and yE are 
linear in i  and 2 , respectively, (4.22) simplifies to:
e ° K V ) - «^(c®)] * iT - t p U' "^^* 2 a*+y* 2 y I * y*
(4.23)
Expanding Var^y1 + yE) around the mean values of x and 2 yields (for linear risk):
V a r t f + y 5 ) = Var(yI)+Var(yE)+2Cov{yI ,yE) as [yIx ol + y f 2o] + 2pyIx y f o xoz] (4.24) 
Substituting into (4.23):
E V V )  -  *'E(^ ) )  *  * 'V ° )  -  «'£ ( ^ ° )  -  \  u'"E(cE> lVar(yE + *')] (4-25)
Since the first order condition of the deterministic problem requires that u '^c10) — u'E(cE0) —
0, (4.11) follows directly from (4.25).
The derivation of (4.12) follows the same lines:
£ > V )  -  «£(cE)J + E° |«'£ (cE) ^ [ l  -  <] «  « V ° )  “  uEic10) + 
I*” *]
*'E(cE) =3r f1 "  *1[«*(«•) t  i * - « f - f l + 5  s p
- t t£ (c>] [1 -  ¿]2 + I  ^  [u,£(cE) II -  i] -  [2 -  z)2
*T7J~z \ f E(°E} ix “  *1 f2 ~ rfl dir (4-26)
where c5 = ^  [ /  + y5 -  t e1 -  17] and ^  [y/ + y f -  c1 + cE)
After some tedious calculations, (4.26) simplifies to:
EV ( c J) -  uE(cE)} + E° |tt'£ (c£ ) ^  [1 -  i ] J  a  ¿ (a 10) -  uE(cE0) +
u ,"E i c E +  [yl2 a l  +  y E 2a 2 +  2 y lx y i0 x i]
+ p - ^ j  u"(c)[yi vlsl + yf yEt°\ + ly^yf + yEvl W M ? )
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I t  follows from  (4.24):
V a r (y E + y ! ) = 2 [y* y '(<72 +  y f  yE a 2z +  [ y ^ y f  +  (4-28)
A gain , i t  follows from th e  first order conditions of the  determ inistic problem  th a t u / (c /0) +  
uE {cE0) + u ,E(cE0) [“¡ r j  [1 — t] =  0. C onsequently, su b stitu tin g  (4.28) in to  (4.27) yields
(4.13).
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Chapter 5
D o We Stay or Not? R eturn  
D ecisions o f Temporary M igrants.
5.1 Introduction
Return migration1 was, and is a widely observed phenomenon. This is true not only 
in Europe and between European and extra-European countries, but also in Asia as 
well as between Asian countries and countries of the Middle East. Migration decisions 
of return migrants are induced mainly by economic motives. Return migrants do not 
initially have a strong desire to live in the target country for other than economic 
reasons.
The target countries of return migration are generally characterized by an excess 
demand for labor in at least some segments of the labor market. This labor can not be 
supplied by the local workforce either in the quantity requested, or at adequate prices, 
or both. The emigration countries usually exhibit an excess supply of labor and/or 
wage rates that are far below those offered in the target countries.2
Economic theory has little to say about return migrants. There are a number of 
open questions. First of all, why do return migrants initially intend to return? And
'T h e  term return migration will here be used to characterize a situation where migrant workers 
return, or, a t least, initially intend to return to their country of origin after a significant period abroad.
2ln the 50’s, 60’s and 70’s, the labor requirements of Western Europe’s industrial economies and 
poverty as well as unemployment in Southern European countries and in Turkey induced an immi­
gration boom from the periphery countries into the core of Europe. At present, a similar situation 
can be found between Asian countries, like Thailand, and the Gulf states. It is likely that return 
migration will s ta rt in the near future between Europe’s Eastern countries and industrialized Western 
economies.
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why, after living for some time in the host country, some do return, and others would 
like to stay permanently? Are there measurable characteristics that help to distinguish 
between those who want to return, and those who want to stay? And why do some 
migrants stay longer than others?
Answers to these questions may help policy makers to control return migration 
and to target eventual incentive programs more efficiently. Migration policy could be 
designed to influence the migrant’s decisions so as to correspond deliberately to the 
targets of policy makers. The understanding of the migrant’s decision process is an 
important presupposition for the construction of effective migration policies.
This paper will try to give answers to some of the questions raised above. Section
5.2 develops a theoretical model of return migration. The model implies that the time 
a migrant worker intends to further remain in the host country (and, in the limit, the 
decision whether or not to return at all) depends essentially on 4 factors: the earnings 
situation in the host country relative to that in the home country, the perception of 
environmental factors (social relations, climate etc.) abroad relative to that at home, 
the remaining lifetime horizon, and the stock of savings accumulated so far. In section 
5.3, the qualitative implications of the theory are empirically tested, using micro data 
on temporary migrants to Germany. The data set contains information about the 
intention of the migrant whether to stay permanently in Germany or not. For those 
who do not wish to stay permanently it includes information about the number of years 
migrants want to stay before returning home. The empirical analysis follows two steps: 
first, logit models are estimated, differentiating between the subsample of those who 
want to return and those who want to stay permanently. Secondly, and restricting the 
analysis to those migrants who want to return, a duration analysis is performed on the 
migrant’s intended further duration in the host country.
The study provides some insight into the dependence of migrants return proba­
bilities and intended spells of further duration on measurable characteristics.
5.2 T heory
The classical argument to explain migration is the following: neglecting any fixed 
costs of migration, a worker has an incentive to migrate when, given his stock of 
human capital, his potential earnings are higher in the host- than in the home country. 
Therefore, if earnings differentials were the only determinant for migration decisions, 
migrants would only return when the economic situation changes so that earnings at
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home will significantly increase relative to those of the host country.3 However, since 
return migration is a phenomenon that can be observed even without such changes 
of economic situations in the countries concerned, migrants are obviously not only 
maximizers of lifetime income. Without exogenous restrictions on their choice set, 
such behavior indicates that migrants are not simply maximizers of lifetime income. 
They rather maximize a utility function that contains some arguments that may explain 
the temporary nature of migration.
It is a common observation that utility created by the consumption of goods de­
pends not only on the quantities consumed, but also on the environment where such 
consumption takes place. More specifically, it seems to be the case that the environ­
ment where consumption comes about is complementary to the utility created by the 
consumption good itself. The notion environment as it will be used here could com­
prise social relations, subjectively perceived life quality parameters, like climate, social 
regulations etc., family and friends. When analyzing agents’ consumption behavior in 
a relatively stable environment, any interactions between environment and the utility 
gained by the consumption of some good may be neglected. However, when analyzing 
agents who may, involuntarily or by choice, meet their decisions over their life cycle in 
two completely different environments, such interactions should be considered. This 
would be especially the case when investigating migrants who may return to their home 
countries.4 The purpose of this section is to model their migration and re-migration 
decisions.
To formalize the notion environment, define an index N  that summarizes all 
parameters that determine this environment. Let N  be a further argument in the 
individual’s utility function. N  is assumed to be complementary to consumption.5 
Turning to the situation of the migrant worker, let N  = G when the migrant resides
3When real wages are higher in the host country, but prices are lower in the home country, a 
temporary migration may be optimal even when the migrant is a maximizer of lifetime income. Such 
considerations, however, are likely to play a minor part in the decision to return and are not further 
considered here.
4An im portant point seems to be worth emphasizing in this context: the difference between per­
manent migrants (migrants who migrate with the firm intention to stay permanently) and return 
migrants who initially intend to  return but eventually stay forever. The economic behavior of both 
groups in the host country is likely to be very different. A return migrant who in the end stays per­
manently may have had over a long period of his stay in the host country the intention to return. As 
long as he wants to  return, his economic decisions are sensitive to this intention, and it is irrelevant 
whether he finally stays permanently.
5Complementarity is here defined in the sense of Edgeworth and Pareto: Y  is complementary to X  
in the consumers budget if  an increase in the supply o f X  (Y  constant) raises the marginal utility of 
Y  (Hicks (1978), p.42).
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in the home country and N  = F  when he stays abroad. The migrant’s migration- or 
re-migration decision is now based on the wage differential between home- and host 
country as well as on these environment indices.
Whenever G > F  (the environment index is higher in the home- than in the 
host country), and wages are higher abroad, the migrant worker may decide to migrate 
only temporarily. Both, F  and G may, and probably will, change over the migrant’s 
migration history. The longer the migrant stays abroad, the more he integrates into 
the new society, finds friends etc., and the less he feels attached to his home country 
environment. This process of social integration or disintegration is likely to affect 
strongly the size of the environment variables F  and G, and is usually not perfectly 
foreseeable for the migrant worker. The migrant may therefore determine an optimal 
time to stay abroad at the beginning of his migration history, basing his decision on how 
he perceives F  and G at that moment, or he may as well determine an expected path of 
F  and G , E { F ( t )}J and £{(?(<)}J, where T  is the horizon to be considered and t° the 
point of decision making. Should now F  and G change over the migration history in a 
way not previously foreseen by the migrant worker, he will reoptimize and redefine the 
time he further intends to stay abroad. Eventually, a previously intended temporary 
migration may become permanent - and this is an often observed phenomenon.
To clarify these ideas, a formal dynamic model in continuous time will be set up, 
describing the migrant’s optimization problem. After some simplifications, an explicit 
solution for the time the migrant considers as optimal to still remain in the host country 
will be presented. The theoretical model implies qualitative predictions of the impact 
of explanatory variables on the migrant’s decisions. It therefore provides the theoretical 
framework for the empirical analysis in section 5.3.
5.2.1 A Formal Model
Consider a migrant worker who decides at some point of his migration history how 
long he further wants to remain in the host country.6 Assume that he has the following 
simple utility structure:
/  l i . W M D I  = <<<
\  UE =  Ue ^ ( t ) , G ( t ) )  : t > t
with U{ > 0 , t/j > 0 , U{x <  0, U\2 < 0 , U[2 > 0 ,z  =  / ,  E , where /  signifies the 
immigration (host) country and E  the emigration (source) country. The subscripts 1,2
6The migrant will solve the same problem when he has to decide whether or not to migrate.
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indicate derivatives with respect to the first or second argument, respectively. The flow 
of consumption in country i is denoted by c', and F  and G are the respective indices 
for environment as described above, t is the optimal time of return. Note that t is 
endogenous. F  and G may change over time, but they are assumed to be independent 
of the migrant’s decisions.7
To get some analytical results, assume that U is a Cobb-Douglas utility function.
The migrant’s lifetime utility function is then of the following form:
V  =  ( T[<?{t)aF[t)*-x e -pt]A(i) +  [c£ (0 QG (0“ -1 e-pi][l -  A(f)] dt (5.2)
Jt°
where p is the rate of time preference and [T — f°] is the horizon considered. A(<) is a 
switching variable that takes the value 1 or 0, with A(f) = 1 for t < t and A(i) =  0 for 
t >  t. The intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
m  = m  [¡,'(0 -  c'(i)] +  [1 -  A(i)] 1yB(t) -  cE(i)] +  r  A'(f) (5.3)
where y'(t) are earnings per unit of time, evaluated at t, in country i =  / ,  E , and r is 
the rate of interest. K(t)  is the migrant’s wealth at t. Accordingly, K(t)  are savings 
at t. The migrant’s optimization problem consists of the maximization of (5.2) subject 
to (5.3), where he chooses the path of c’, i =  E ,I ,  and the path of X(t). He thereby 
determines the point of return. When the optimal path for A is X(t) = 1 Vi, t E [¿°, 71], 
then the migrant will not return to his home country. Likewise, should it be optimal to 
set A(i) =  0 V/, t € [i°,!T], then the migrant will return immediately.8 In what follows, 
the interior solution will be considered: it will be assumed that there exists a switching 
point of A over the interval [i°, T\.
The problem is a dynamic optimization problem. Setting up the Hamiltonian H , 
application of the maximum principle gives the necessary conditions for cl (t), cE(t), K  (t), A (t) 
being an optimal solution to the problem (together with (5.3)):
2 7  : *(<) =  [« c'W*’ 1 F(()>-"] e-«  (5.4-a)
7This is, of course, not necessarily the case. The migrant may consciously influence (and, therefore, 
control) the adoption to his environment, e.g. by investment into country specific human capital (see 
Chapter 3). At least F  would then be partly endogenous.
8W hen considering this decision problem  before the migrant has migrated, the latter case would 
signify that no m igration were the optim al policy, while in the former case the migrant would intend  
to  m igrate permanently.
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(5.4-c)
- j f r ' - H i ) = - ' ,r( i ) r (5.4-d)
[K(T) -  A'] ir{T) =  0 (5.4-e)
The Hamiltonian is given by:
H  =  [A(f) U ^ i t ) ,  F(t)) +  [1 -  A(f)] UE(cE(t), <?(*))] e~pt +  A t)  ¿ ( 0  (5.4-f)
The costate of the system, indicating the inner value of a change in the stock of savings, 
is denoted by ir(t). (5.4-e) is the transversality condition, where K  denotes the desired 
stock of savings at the end of the planing horizon. Note that, since X(t) € {0, l}, the 
paths of c1,cE and A have a discontinuity at t =  t. Note further that (5.4-c) is only 
defined for t =  t. It follows from (5.4-d):
x(t) =  n(T) er(*~T) =  7reT<‘- r) (5.5)
The optimal paths of consumption abroad and at home are then given by:
c(()' =  F ( t ) I  jfa
[¿ r]
for t < t (5.6-a)
[sir]
for t > t (5.6-b)
Substitution of (5.6-a) and (5.6-b) into (5.4-c), and arranging terms, results in the 
following expression:
± f e r ( t - T ) + p t
a
1 — a
a W )  -  F ( t ) }  =  [s'(i) -  / ( ( ) ] (5.7)
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Solving equation (5.3) gives the following:
K(t°) eTt +  ff0 er(t~a) [j/i (5) — c; (s)] ds : t < t
K ( t)e rt +  J- er^~*) [yE(-s) — <^(5)] ds : t > i
It follows for K(T):
K (T )  =  ert* K(t°)  +  f* cr<f- )  [yJ(s) -  «/(*)] ds eT<T- f> + f  t r(T- a) [y£ (S) - c E(5)] ds
(5.9)
When [G(i) > -FX*)] and J^(0  > yE(i) Vi, then it follows from (5.9) that K(t) > 0
common feature of return migration.
Equations (5.6-a), (5.6-b), (5.7), and (5.9) determine the optimal paths’ of con­
sumption at home and abroad, c® and c1, the stock of savings, I\(t), and the time of 
return, i.
For illustration, the problem will now be simplified to get an analytical solution 
for t. Assume, for simplicity, that the stock of savings the migrant worker intends to 
hold in t =  T, K (T),  is equal to zero: K(T) = 0. Denote the stock of savings at f° as 
K°. Furthermore, set y/ (i) =  w1 and yE(t) =  wE. This assumption implies that the 
migrant considers his wage level, either at home or abroad, as remaining at the same 
level over the whole time horizon considered. In other words, the migrant assumes his 
stock of human capital as constant over his future life. Finally, let the migrant base 
his decision on the current size of F  and G: G(t) =  G and F(t)  =  F. Normalizing 
t° = 0, and setting p =  r  =  0 and a  = 0.5, equation (5.9) simplifies to:
for t < t and K(t) < 0 for t > t. Accordingly, the migrant will accumulate savings 
while being abroad, and he will use up his stock of savings when back in his home 
country. This behavior of migrants is often referred to as target saving and it is a
K°  -I- i[u>J — u>E] +  ¿[c® — c1] +  T  [u)£ — cE] =  0 (5.10)
Note that, under the above assumptions, it follows from (5.6-a) and (5.6-b) that the 
flow of consumption is constant in each country: cF(i) — cE and c!(t) =  c1. (5.7) may 
then be rewritten as:
2 1 G - FT = -  —:------ ;
4 — wE (5.11)
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Denoting the wage differential [ti;7 — uje ] as A and the differential of the environment 
indices, [G — F], as T, and solving (5.6-a), (5.6-b), (5.10) and (5.11) for i, one gets:
r 1GA-u,*n-A-°r
2 A T v ’
The optimal time the migrant intends to further stay abroad is a function of the wage 
differential A, the differential of the environment indices, T, the lifetime horizon T  and 
the stock of savings at t =  0, K°. Totally differentiating (5.12) and rearranging terms 
results in the following expression:
dt =
T w E + K 0' 
2A2
¿A - T G '  
2 r 2
d r
2A
dK°  +
‘A G - T w E' 
2 A r
dT  (5.13)
Accordingly, for T > 0 and A > 0, the time the migrant intends to further remain in 
the host country depends positively on the wage differential A and his future lifetime 
horizon T. It depends negatively on the degree of attachment to the home country, 
relative to that of the host country, as represented by T, as well as on the accumulated 
stock of savings when the decision is taken, K°.
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5.3 Em pirical A nalysis
The data used for the empirical analysis are drawn from the first wave of the German 
Socio-Economic panel (1984). The panel comprises 4500 households of German nation­
ality and 1500 households of foreign nationality. The vast majority of the latter group 
consists of so-called guest-workers, migrants with Spanish, Yugoslavian, Turkish, Greek 
and Italian nationality, who migrated to Germany mainly before 1973.9 This migration 
was meant to be temporary by the German government and, at least initially, by the 
migrants themselves.
The panel contains information about all persons living in a respective household, 
as well as on the household as such. The data used for this analysis stem from the 
subsample of migrant workers, and concern only personal characteristics. The analysis 
is based on a question in the personal questionnaire which related to the foreigner’s 
intention about how long to remain in Germany. Migrants were asked whether they 
would like to stay in Germany forever, or whether they want to return to their home 
countries in either the next 12 months or in some years. Those who replied that they 
intend to return in some years time were further requested to specify the number of 
years they want to remain in Germany.
According to this information, the stock of migrants in the sample can be separat­
ed into two groups: those who want to stay permanently in Germany (452), and those 
who want to return to their home countries after a specific number of years (1282).
Consider these two groups on the basis of the above theoretical analysis. For 
those migrants who would like to stay forever the solution of the optimization problem 
in section 5.2 would be a corner solution (A(i) =  1 Vi, / £ {i°, T}).  On the other hand, 
for those who specify the number of years they would like to stay in Germany before 
returning, the solution of the above optimization problem would be an interior one. 
According to equation (5.13), differences in the number of years a migrant wants to 
remain before returning home are explained by differences in the perceived environment 
at home and abroad, T, individual wage differentials between home- and host country, 
A, the remaining lifetime horizon, T,  and the amount of savings allocated so far, A'0. 
Accordingly, for the latter subgroup the theory provides hypotheses for the qualitative 
impact of a set of explanatory variables on the migrant’s decision. The theory also 
implies that those factors which have a positive effect on the time the migrant decides 
to stay further in Germany should help to differentiate among the two subgroups of 
those who want to stay forever, and those who want to return sometime in the future.
®For some details on guest-worker migration to  Germany, see Mehrlaender (1980) and Chapter 2.
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5.3.1 Estimation M ethods
For the empirical analysis, each of the environmental factors will be characterized by 
a vector of variables available in the data set. The analysis will be conducted in two 
steps:
First, logit models will be estimated to determine the impact of a set of explana­
tory variables on the probability that a migrant will want to return to his home country. 
Secondly, and using only the subset of those migrants who intend to return, a duration 
analysis on the time the migrant still wants to remain in Germany will be performed.
Logit Analysis
The logit specification may be derived directly from the underlying theory. Define a 
dichotomous variable Y  which takes the value 1 when the migrant does not want to
return, and 0 otherwise. Should the migrant meet his decision right at the point of the
interview, then Y  is determined by:
Y  = \  1 lf T ~ l  > 0  (5.14)
[ 0  if T - K O
where t and T  are defined as in section 5.2. Assuming a linear relation between i  and 
a vector of explanatory variables, and introducing an additive random component u , 
one gets:
T - t  = a ' X - u ; X '  =  [1, A*, P , A'0*, 7” ] (5.15)
where A*, P ,  K 0m, T '  are empirical specifications of A, T, K°, T. It follows that the 
probability that a migrant stays is given by:
P (Y  =  1) =  P ( a 'X  -  v > 0) =  F (5.16)
where 6 is used to standardize the random variable u and F is the CDF of u/6. Assum­
ing u/6  to have a logistic distribution with mean 0 and variance 7r /3 , the logit model 
evolves:
' ’P ' - ' l - i S w )  ( 5 - 1 7 )
where the estimated parameter vector is given by 0 =  (a /6 ).
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Duration Analysis
The second step of the analysis relates only to the subsample of those who want to 
return after a specific number of years.
The remaining intended duration of stay in the host country and, afterwards, the 
time back at home may be considered as two states which will sequentially be occupied 
by the migrant worker. At the point of expected return, a transition between these 
two states takes place. Given a migrant population, it is now of interest to investigate 
how these transitions, or, in other words, completions of spells, are distributed over 
time and how they depend on individual characteristics of the migrant. Remember 
that the analysis is performed on expectations of remaining durations, not on actually 
performed durations. Furthermore, the data available are data on the current stock of 
migrants in 1984. The estimates refer therefore to the (possibly selected) population 
of migrants in Germany in 1984, not to the population of migrants entering Germany 
at any one time.
The appropriate analytical tools are provided by the hazard function method, or 
transition analysis. The central concept of these methods is the hazard function £(t). 
Applied to the problem on hand, the hazard £(<) would be defined as the conditional 
probability that a migrant’s intended further duration of stay, r ,  will end in t, given 
that it lasts until t (in continuous time):
y P { t < T < t  + d t \ T>t )  f ( t )  f ( t )
^  * ~  J s > ---------------7t-------------- - T = W ) ~ s U )  (5'18)
In (5.18), f ( t )  is the density function of the random variable r , /•’(£) is the distribution 
function and S(i) is usually referred to as the survivor function. In parametric hazard 
models, F(t)  is known up to a vector of unknown parameters which has to be estimated. 
An estimate of the hazard function is then easily constructable. However, the under­
lying population is, especially in economic applications, not always homogeneous. The 
hazard, although following the same distribution, may vary among individuals with d- 
ifferent characteristics. To take account of such heterogeneity in the underlying sample 
population, the parameters of the distribution may be made functions of a vector of 
explanatory variables, or covariates.
The parametric approach imposes a strong restriction on the hazard: it has to 
follow a certain pattern as predetermined by the underlying distribution. Parametric 
methods axe therefore justified only when the choice of the distribution of r ,  f ( t ) ,  is 
based on some economic theory. Although the deterministic theoretical model of sec­
tion 2 provides some guidance regarding the choice of covariates and their qualitative
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impacts, it does not help to justify any distributional assumptions. Furthermore, para­
metric models impose a smooth shape on the baseline hazard function. This, however, 
contrasts with the lifetable estimates, as depicted in figure 1 .
Therefore, two methods are chosen here that allow the estimation of the impact 
of covariates on the hazard without imposing strong restrictions on the behavior of the 
hazard over time: the proportional hazard model, as proposed by Cox (1972), and the 
piecewise constant exponential model. The latter method, though being parametric, 
is very flexible and should yield results that are similar to those of the non-parametric 
approach.
C ox’s P ro p o rtio n a l H azard  Specification 
A proportional hazard is defined as:
i ( X , t )  =  4‘( X J ) W )  (519)
where X  is a vector of covariates, fi is a parameter vector and £0 is usually referred to as 
the baseline hazard. When X  is time invariant, which will be the case throughout the 
analysis, the proportional hazard specification implies that the quotient of the hazards 
of two individuals with regressor vectors X i  and X 2 is constant for all t and equal to 
<f>(Xu P)/<t>(X2,p).
Cox (1972, 1975) suggested the method of partial likelihood to estimate the un­
known parameter vector in <f>(X,0), without specifying the form of the baseline hazard 
£0(*)• The main idea of this method is that, when no information about the baseline 
hazard is available, only the order of the durations are used to infer the unknown 
coefficients of the covariates.10
The specification chosen here for <f>(X,fi) is: <f>(X,0) =  exp(X'0). When no 
spells are censored (which is the case for the duration data used here), and when the 
completed durations are ordered, t ,  <  r2 <  r3 <  ... < r^ , the partial likelihood may 
be written as a function of the parameter vector /3:
N
Lp m  = n
1= 1
exp(xi0)
X i = i  exP(x'}P).
(5.20)
where the term in brackets is the conditional probability that observation i concludes 
a spell at 7\, given that any of the remaining observations j  > i could have ended a
10The method is described in detail in Lancaster (1990).
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spell at t ,-. The partial likelihood function as depicted in (5.20) corresponds to the 
likelihood function estimated here.
It should be noted that Cox’s partial likelihood method is problematic if more 
than one individual experiences an event in the same time interval (tied ending times). 
As it is obvious from table 5.4 in the appendix, this is the case with the data used 
here. With tied data, the exact calculation of the partial likelihood becomes very 
complicated. Approximate formulas reduce in this case the computational burden. The 
approximation used here is that proposed by Breslow (1974). However, the adequacy 
of such approximations is sometimes questioned.11 To check the validity of the results 
for the continuous Cox model, discrete time models are additionally estimated. The 
method and the results are outlined in the appendix.
Piecew ise Constant Hazards
The piecewise constant hazard specification is based on the exponentially parametric 
model. However, unlike the exponential model, which implies a constant hazard over 
the entire horizon considered, the piecewise exponential model allows the hazard to 
change between predetermined time intervals. The method is therefore appropriate 
when the underlying theory does not justify any distributional assumptions on r.
In the piecewise-constant formulation, the hazard may be written as:
( P(X, t )  =  <f>(X,0)exp(ti); n,_i <  t < n , ; i = l , . . . ,m ; n0 =  0, nm =  oc (5.21)
where m  is the number of time intervals chosen and (n* — n,-_i) is the length of the ith 
interval. Note that the intervals do not have to be of equal length. The baseline hazard 
exp (£,) is constant over the interval [n,-_i,n,-) and determined by the parameters 
which have to be estimated. The specification of the intervals follows from table 5.4 
in the appendix. Data points on the expected duration clump at 5, 10, 15 etc years. 
The intervals for the piecewise constant specification are chosen so as to contain these 
critical numbers. <j>(X'¡3) is some functional form of time-invariant covariates, with 
unknown parameter vector /?. The specification used here is the same as for the Cox 
model: <t>(X’f$) =  exp(X'fi).
In the piecewise constant model, density- and survivor functions have discontinu­
ities at the limits of the respective intervals. For time invariant regressors, the piecewise 
constant hazard is (piecewise) proportional.
u See, for example, Farewell and Prentice (1980).
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The hazard specifications in (5.21) and (5.19) are similar: both are proportional, 
and the baseline hazard in the Cox model, corresponds to the piecewise constant 
baseline hazard exp(£f ) in the exponential specification. The interpretation of the vec­
tor of coefficients is accordingly analogous in both specifications: 0 C =  (6 ln£e)/(6 X )  
and = (6 ln£p) / (6X) ,  where and fF denote the coefficient vectors in the piecewise 
constant and the Cox model, respectively. The estimated coefficients indicate therefore 
the percentage change in the hazard when the respective variable changes by one unit.
Some Remarks
Before proceeding, some remarks on the interpretation and comparability of the results 
in the two steps of the analysis seem appropriate. The logit analysis differentiates be­
tween two groups: those migrants who want to remain in Germany, and those migrants 
who want to return home at some future point in time. However, a migrant who replies 
that he wants to remain in the host country may have made this decision a long time 
before the interview. Therefore, measured characteristics of this migrant at the time of 
the interview are not necessarily those that determined his decision, when this decision 
has been taken in the past and when the relevant variables change over time. In other 
words, the probability of return may not be sensitive to all those factors implied by 
the theoretical considerations above. On the other hand, the number of years migrants 
want to stay before returning should be sensitive to the respective factors as they are 
measurable at the time of the interview. Accordingly, the explanatory value of the 
same set of variables may well differ in the two stages of the analysis.
5.3.2 Data and Specification of Variables
The logit analysis is based on migrant workers with Italian, Spanish, Yugoslavian, Turk­
ish, and Greek nationality, full-time employed, part-time employed or unemployed at 
the time of the interview, who specify whether or not they want to return to their home 
countries. After excluding all observations with missing values in relevant variables, 
the final number of observations used for the analysis reduces to 1734.
The duration analysis is based on the subset of those who intend to return home 
and who specify the time they wish to remain in Germany. Migrants could respond 
that they wish to return in the next 12 months or they could indicate a number of years. 
The duration variable DUR is set equal to one when the migrant wants to return in 
the next 12 months, otherwise it takes the value of the number of years specified. The
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number of observations available for the analysis is here 1094.12 
E nv ironm ent
The environmental differential T is represented by the following set of variables: the 
variable TRANSFER is a dummy variable and equal to 1 when the migrant transfers 
money back to his home country. PARTNER is a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 when the migrant’s partner is living in Germany. Both variables are indicators for 
social links to the home country. HSP and G SP are dummies that are equal to 1 when 
the migrant speaks the home country language or the host country language well or 
very well, respectively. The knowledge of the German language may be an indicator for 
the migrant’s integration potential (or, likewise, his integration) into the foreign society. 
Good or very good knowledge of the host country language could be an indicator for 
the link to the home country environment. The dummies SCHOOL and E d u  assume 
the value 1 when the migrant attended a school in Germany or when he undertook a 
job-specific education in Germany. Finally, the variable Y sm  describes the years since 
migration. This variable may be an indicator for how much the migrant has alienated 
from his home country environment and adjusted to that of the host country.
W age D ifferentials
The second factor that should influence the migrant’s decision is the perceived earnings 
differential between host- and home country.13 Any decision of the migrant is based on 
the subjectively perceived earnings differential, which could be constructable were the 
migrant to have been asked about how much he expects to earn back home. However, 
the only data that are available are earnings in Germany of those who were employed 
at the time of the interview.
To construct an approximation for the individual, potential earnings differential 
of migrant workers, an earnings variable for those who are unemployed has first to 
be created. This could be done by estimating a human capital earnings equation 
for employed workers and using the coefficients of the estimation equation to predict 
earnings of those who are unemployed. However, such a procedure may possibly result 
in a sample selection bias. Therefore, the predictions of earnings for the unemployed 
are constructed by using a two-stage estimation procedure, as suggested by Heckman
1J188 of those migrants who answered that they wish to return (1282) did not specify how Jong they 
want to  remain in Germany. They therefore had to be excluded from the duration analysis.
13Note that, for the m igrant’s decision, only expectations m atter, not possible realizations.
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(1979). The method is outlined in the appendix. Estimation results are given in table 
5.5 in the appendix. The predicted earnings series is then used as an approximation of 
earnings potentials of unemployed migrants.
As a second step, earnings differentials have to be constructed. Data on earnings 
potentials of individual migrants in the home countries are not available, but only their 
earnings in Germany and their nationality. Under some assumptions it is, however, 
possible to construct from these information approximations of earnings differentials.
Denote the earnings of some migrant i with a given stock of human capital in 
Germany as EGi, and the earnings he would receive back home as EHi. Assume that 
when migrant A  from country j  receives earnings in Germany that are xj% higher than 
those of migrant B  from country j ,  then Mr. A  receives back home earnings that are 
likewise X j %  higher than those Mr. B  would receive.14 This implies:
_ E G ,-E H {
*i = EGi (5.22)
Under the assumption that Xj is constant for all migrants from country j ,  the perceived 
earnings differential of some migrant i from country j ,  with earnings EGX in Germany, 
may be formulated as:
{EGi ~  E H {) =  Xj EGi (5.23)
Define a country index k, k =  1 , ..j, ..n, and a dichotomous variable where <4 equals
1, should some migrant’s home country be k ^  j , and 0 otherwise. Assuming linearity, 
the effect of the wage differential may be formulated as:
fix Xk EGi +  0k ¿k EGi (5.24)
The coefficient fli captures the impact of the wage differential, perceived by migrant t 
from country fc, on his decision. However, a perceived wage differential of the same size 
may affect two migrants differently, when they come from different countries. Reasons 
for this could be different costs of living in the two emigration countries, additional 
payments, tax systems, working conditions etc. The impact of this second effect is 
represented by the coefficient /?*.
14In other words, earnings in either country are a linear function of the stock of human capital. 
Assume th a t the stocks of human capita] of Mr. A and Mr. B are given by Ha and H g, respectively, 
with Ha >  H b - Assume further that the rental rate on a unit of human capital in the host country 
is given by rG and tha t in the home country by Vs . Then (5.22) implies that rH HA/ r a HA = 
r11 H g /r a H g  =  constant for each pair of countries C ,E .
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For the empirical analysis, country j  will now be defined as base country. It 
follows for Xk'. Xk = Xj -f (xk — xj).
Inserting this into (5.24):
/?i Xj EGi  +  [/?* Xk dk + A  (xk — xj)] EGi  =  {ij EGi  +  d* EG,  (5.25)
Relation (5.25) is constructable when only dummies on migrants nationalities are avail­
able. However, without information on x, the structural coefficients & and are not 
identifiable. The sign of the coefficient £2k therefore depends on the difference in wage 
situations in country j  and country k, and, furthermore, on the difference in the reac­
tion between migrants from country k and the base country j .
Tim e Horizon
Equation (5.13) implies that the length of the time horizon T  has a positive impact on 
the expected duration. A natural approximation for T would be the age of the migrant 
worker. The theory suggests then that an increase in age should have a negative impact 
on t.
Labor Market Situation
To capture the impact of the migrant’s labor market experience, two variables are 
included in some specifications: UNEMP is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the 
migrant is unemployed, and UNEMP 10 is a dummy that is equal to one when the 
migrant was unemployed at least once over the last 10 years.
Additionally, control variables are included for sex and marital status: the vari­
able M ALE equals one when the migrant is male, and the variable MARRIED equals 
one when the migrant is married.
Table 5.1 presents characteristics of the total sample population and of the sub­
samples of those who intend to stay and who intend to return. The last line indicates 
that 74% of the sample population intends to return home sometimes in the future.
An average of 14.5 years since migration signifies that the stock of the migrant 
population resides in Germany for a considerable amount of years. Columns (2) and 
(3) show that stayers are, on average, more than one year longer in Germany than 
returners. Average gross earnings of those who want to stay are slightly higher than of 
those who want to return. A higher percentage of migrants who intend to stay is male
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Table 5.1: Sample Characteristics, 1984. Whole sample and subsamples of those who 
wish to stay and who wish to return
VARIABLE Whole Sample Wish to Stay PPisA to Return
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
M o nth ly  G ro ss E a r n in g s  (DM ) 2413 728 2477 758 2391 719
Y ears  sin c e  M ig ratio n 14.4 5.1 15.41 5.5 14.22 4.91
A ge 38.86 10.9 38.39 10.9 39.02 10.9
M ale 0.67 0.46 0.72 0.44 0.66 0.47
M a r r ied 0.82 0.38 0.76 O.42 0.84 0.36
T ra in in g  in G e r m a n y 0 .12 O.SS 0.14 0.85 0 .1 1 0.32
S ch o o ling  in  G e r m a n y 0.17 0.87 0.2 0.39 0.16 0.36
G oo d  o r  V ery  G o o d  G e r m a n 0.41 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.37 0.48
G o o d  o r  V ery  G o o d  M o t h e r  T o n g u e 0.92 0.26 0.88 0.88 0.94 0.23
T r a n sfe r s 0.44 0.49 0.29 0.45 0.49 0.50
P a r t n e r  in  G e r m a n y 0.76 0.42 0.74 0-44 0.77 0.42
U n e m pl o y e d  l a st  10 y e a r s 0.29 0-45 0.29 0.45 0.29 0.45
U n e m pl o y e d 0.093 0.29 0.080 0.27 0.098 0.30
S a m ple  S ize 1734 452 1282
SOURCE: Socio-Economic Panel, wave 1, 1984.
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and a lower percentage is married. Transfer of money back home is considerably more 
common in the subsample of returners: 49%, compared with 29% in the subsample of 
stayers. More than half of those who want to stay speak the German language well or 
very well, compared with only 37% of those who wish to return.
5.3.3 Results 
Logit Analysis
The results of the logit specifications are given in table 5.2.15 The dependent vari­
able equals one when the migrant intends to return, and 0 otherwise. The estimated 
coefficients indicate the impact of the respective variable on the probability that the 
migrant wants to return home.16
The impact of earnings are captured by the variables GEARN and GEARNK, 
k =  T ,S , G, I ,  where the capital letters indicate Turks, Spaniards, Greeks, and Italian- 
s, respectively. The base group are Yugoslavians. The interpretation of the estimat­
ed coefficients as the impact of earnings differentials corresponds to the assumptions 
above. Since in 1984 wages in all industrial and agricultural sectors were lower in the 
respective emigration countries than in Germany17, the quotient x should be positive 
for all countries considered. It follows for the Yugoslavian base group that an increase 
in earnings in Germany and, according to the above assumptions, a rising wage differ­
ential should have negative effects on the return probability. This is compatible with 
theoretical considerations. The impact of a given earnings differential on the return 
probabilities of migrants from the other 4 countries is easily calculable by summing up 
the coefficients on GEARN and GEARNK. According to (5.25), the resulting expres­
sion is equal to (& +  djt) x k, where corresponds to the difference of the impact 
of some given differential between a Yugoslavian worker and a worker from country 
k. Referring to the results in column (2), this coefficient is positive only for Greek 
nationals. However, this does not mean that Greek nationals are acting contrary to 
what the theory would imply. As indicated above, the individual return probability is 
not necessarily very sensitive to the explaining variables, when these variables change 
over time and when the decision to return has been taken sometime in the past. This is 
definitely the case for earnings differentials. It should further be kept in mind that the
18The results of the logit analysis were obtained by using W. B. Greene’s LIMDEP  and the results 
of the transition analysis by using TDA, written by G. Rohwer.
16In what follows, this probability will be referred to as return probability. Note, however, that it 
is in this context the probability of expected return.
1Tsee, e.g., Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1988.
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interpretation of the coefficients as the sensitivity of return probabilities on changes in 
earnings differentials underlies quite restrictive assumptions.
All variables representing the environmental differential have the expected sign 
and are mostly significant. The negative coefficient on the variable Y sm  indicates that 
the return probability of a migrant worker decreases with the number of years he resides 
in Germany. Furthermore, the probability of return is lower for those who speak a good 
or very good German ( G s p ) , and whose partner is living in Germany ( P a r t n e r ). On 
the other side, a good or very good knowledge of the home country language (H S P ) 
increases the return probability, as does the circumstance that the migrant transfers a 
part of his earnings back home (TRANSFER).
Keeping everything constant, and setting the return probability to the average 
sample return probability p — 0.65, the results in table 5.3.3 indicate that males have 
a return probability which is about 7 percentage points lower than that of females.18 
A reason for this result may be that male immigrants integrate more easily into the 
foreign society. Males may further be more concerned about their economic future than 
females and, accordingly, evaluate economic stability and working conditions higher 
than females.
The coefficient on the variable AGE should denote the impact of the remaining 
lifetime horizon on the migrant’s return probability. AGE is, however, only significant 
in the first model specification (column 1). Upon introducing environmental variables 
(column (2) and (3)), AGE becomes insignificant, indicating that this variable only 
captures environmental factors, but not the impact of the remaining lifetime horizon 
on the migrant’s decision. This is not surprising. As for earnings, age changes over time, 
so that the migrant’s age at the time of the interview may contain little information 
about the impact of the lifetime horizon on the decision to stay when this decision was 
actually taken.
Column (3) presents results when dummies for the past and current employment 
situation are introduced. Having been unemployed at least once during the last 10 
years (UNEMPlO) has no significant impact on the probability to return. However, 
those who are unemployed at the time of the interview (UNEMP) want to return with 
a significantly higher probability than those who are in the work force. This effect is 
relatively large: again evaluated at p = 0.65, and keeping everything else constant, the 
return probability of unemployed migrants is 2 0% higher than that of their employed 
colleagues. This result contradicts the common view that migrants take advantage of 
the favorable German benefit system and would therefore rather prefer to be unem-
18It follows from the logit specification (5.16) tha t dp/dx  =  p(l — p)9.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Table 5.2: Logit Analysis, Return Decisions
Var ia bl e  ( 1 ) (2) (3)
C o n sta n t 1.35 1.73 1.79
(5.05) (3.35) (3.38)
E arn - 0.22 -0.25 -0.29
(-2.32) (-2.58) (-2.89)
E a r n t 0.25 0 .2 1 0.20
(4.06) (3.27) (3.09)
E arng 0.38 0.35 0.35
(4.87) (4.24) (4.23)
E arns 0.18 0.14 0.13
(2.46) (1.82) (1.76)
E arni 0.10 0.14 0.14
(1.57) (2.13) (2.08)
Y sm -0 .077 -0.061 -0.062
(-5.38) (-4.02) (-4.06)
A ge 0.017 0.007 0.006
(2.64) (0.88) (0.749)
M ale -0.24 -0.34 -0.31
(-1.65) (-2.29) (-2.04)
M arr ied 0.53 0.40 0.43
(3.43) (2.35) (2.55)
E du 0.044 0.019
(0.2 1) (0.09)
S chool 0 .2 1 0.19
(0.94) (0.84)
G sp -0.47 -0.46
(-3.67) (-3.56)
H sp 0.74 0.74
(3.69) (3.69)
T r a n sf e r 0.85 0.89
(6.53) (6.80)
Pa r t n e r -0.77 -0.77
(-2 .2 1 ) (-2 .20)
U n e m p IO -0 .10
(-0.74)
U n e m p 0.58
(2.45)
Log — Likelihood -951 -907 -904
No. o f  Obs. 1734 1734 1734
Return 1282 1282 1282
Stay 452 452 452
SOURCE: Socio-Economic Panel, wave 1, 1984. 
Note: t-ratio6 in parenthesis. Coefficients of 
earnings variables are multiplied by 1000.
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ployed in Germany than returning home.
Duration Analysis
The estimated coefficients on the covariates for the duration models are reported in 
table 5.3. Note again that this analysis is performed only on the subsample of those who 
intend to return home, and who additionally specified the number of years they still 
want to remain in Germany. Furthermore, note that the analysis relates to expected 
future durations of a stock of migrant workers in 1984, not to completed durations.
Both duration models are of the proportional hazard form. Therefore, the coeffi­
cients can be interpreted as the constant proportional effect of the respective variable 
on the conditional probability of completing a spell. In other words, the coefficients 
indicate the percentage change in the hazard, when the respective variable changes by 
one unit.
A global goodness-of-fit test as proposed by Moreau, O’Quigley and Mesbah 
(1985) was performed to assess the validity of the proportional hazard model. The 
basic idea of the test is to check whether the effect of the covariates, which under 
the proportional hazard assumption is constant and measured by 0, varies as a step 
function between time intervals. To test the null hypothesis of a proportional hazard, 
Moreau, O’Quigley and Mesbah propose a score test. Under the null hypothesis, the 
appropriate test statistic is asymptotically distributed, with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of parameters.19 The same definition of intervals as for the piecewise 
constant formulation is used, except for the last interval.20 The test statistics for the 
small and the large model specifications (Columns (3) and (4) in table 5.3) are then 
given by 55.31 (45) and 85.66 (85), with degrees of freedom in parenthesis. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis of the validity of the proportional hazard specification can not be 
rejected in both cases.
The first two columns in table 5.3 report the results of specifications of the piece- 
wise constant model.21 Column (3) and (4) present estimated coefficients of the Cox 
models. As could be expected, the coefficients of the respective specifications for the 
Cox models and the piecewise constant models are similar in size.
19Since it is supposed th a t the effect of covariates differs between intervals, the number of parameters 
equals the number of covariates times the number of intervals chosen.
^S ince the last interval contains not enough observations, the test breaks down when performed 
over all intervals. Therefore, the l u t  two intervals we merged to one interval.
21 Coefficients of the piecewise constant baseline hazards are reported in table 5.5 in the appendix.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Table 5.3: Duration Analysis
P iec ew ise  C o n st a n t  Cox
Va ria ble (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
E arn -0.145 •0.163 -0.130 - 0 .12 0
(-2.63) (-2.78) (-2.23) (-2.36)
E a r n t 0.107 0.095 0.080 0.092
(3.14) (2 .66) (2 .68) (2.23)
E arng 0.089 0.090 0.065 0.065
(2.17) (2.17) (1.61) (1.59)
E arns -0.050 -0.047 -0.047 -0.046
(-1.18) (-1.04) (-1.07) (-1 .02)
E arni 0.050 0.066 0.058 0.046
( 1 .22) (1.57) (1.13) (1.39)
Y sm -0.023 -0.023 -0.020 -0.0 21
(-2.92) (-2.78) (-2.58) (-2.48)
A ge 0.0 21 0.020 0.019 0.018
(5.57) (4.47) (5.12) (4.09)
M ale 0.084 0.067 0.062 0.048
(1.09) (0.83) (0.80) (0.59)
M a rr ied -0 .077 0.309 -0.084 0.25
(-0.82) (2 .10) (-0.90) (1.72)
E du -0.0 21 -0.017
(-0.18) (-0.14)
S chool 0.061 0.063
(0.49) (0.51)
G sp -0 .058 •0.062
(-0.83) (-0.90)
H sp -0.092 -0.067
(-0.71) (-0.51)
T r a n sf e r 0.139 0 .120
(2.06) (1.79)
P a r t n e r -0.361 -0.314
(-3.06) (-2 .68)
U n e m p IO 0.082 0.063
(1.07) (0.81)
U nem p 0.347 0.318
(2.83) (2.60)
N o .o fO b s . 1094 
Log — Likelihood -3008
1094
-2993
1094
-6728
1094
-6717
SOURCE: Socio-Economic Panel, wave 1, 1984. Note: t-ratios in 
parenthesis. Coefficients of earnings variables are multiplied by 1000.
144 CHAPTER 5. RETU RN DECISIONS
The coefficients of the earnings variables are all multiplied by 1000. Estimates 
of both the Cox- and the piecewise constant specifications indicate that an increase 
in earnings has a negative impact on the hazard for all nationalities. This impact is 
largest for Yugoslavian and Spanish workers. Remember that this may be due to the 
size of Xfc. It may as well be due to different effects of a given earnings differential on 
decisions of migrants with different nationalities, as denoted by /?*• The qualitative 
impact of earnings on the hazard is consistent with the theory.
The variable A G E is strongly significant in all specifications. Different from the 
logit results, AG E remains here significant when environmental variables are included. 
The coefficient may be interpreted as the impact of a change in the lifetime horizon on 
the migration decision. Referring to column (3), being 1 year older, which corresponds 
to a reduction of a fixed lifetime horizon by one year, increases the hazard by 1.9%. 
The size of this effect is similar in all specifications.
Turning to the environmental variables (column (2) and (4)), both a good or 
very good knowledge of the German language and the home country language do 
not influence the hazard significantly. Remember that these variables significantly 
influenced the return probability in the logit analysis above.
The coefficients on the variables SCHOOL and EDU are not significant as they 
were neither in the logit specification. Accordingly, visiting a school in Germany or 
getting a job specific education seems not to have an impact on the migrant’s duration 
decision or his return probability.
The coefficient on the variable PARTNER is negative and significant. Consequent­
ly, having a partner in Germany decreases the conditional probability of ending a spell 
at some t. On the other side, transferring money home increases this probability (see 
coefficients on TRA NSFER). As the coefficients on the variable YSM indicate, each 
additional year the migrant has been in Germany decreases the hazard by 2.3% (ex­
ponential) or 2.1% (Cox). The qualitative impact of all these variables corresponds to 
what the theoretical model suggested.
Being male (M a l e ) does not affect the hazard. This is in contrast to the findings 
of the logit specifications, where males had a lower return probability than females. 
The coefficient on the variable M ARRIED is negative, but insignificant in specifications 
(1) and (3). It is positive and significant when introducing environmental variables.
The fact that the migrant has been unemployed at least once during the past 10 
years (U N E M PlO ) has no significant effect on the hazard. However, being unemployed 
at the time o f the interview (U N EM P) increases the hazard. The effect is considerable: 
The conditional probability that an unemployed migrant wishes to return at some t
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is more than 30% higher than that of a comparable migrant who is employed at the 
time of the interview. Again, this result is contrary to the assertion that migrants take 
advantage of the benefit system. An unemployed migrant has a higher conditional 
probability to return at an early stage than a comparable employed colleague.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the survivor function for the Cox model and the hazard 
function for the piecewise constant exponential model (for male, turkish workers with 
age and earnings set to the sample mean and all dummies set to zero).
5.4 C onclusion
The subject of this study is the analysis of return decisions of migrant workers. Section
5.2 presents a theoretical analysis on the migrant’s savings- and return decisions. The 
model explains common features of return migration, like the accumulation of savings 
while being abroad. The time the migrant intends to remain further abroad (and, at 
the extreme, the decision to stay permanently) is shown to depend basically on 4 fac­
tors: the migrant’s earnings potential at home, relative to what he earns abroad, the 
migrant’s perception and evaluation of environmental factors, such as family, friend- 
s, social regulations etc., at home relative to those abroad, the migrant’s remaining 
lifetime horizon, and his stock of savings accumulated at the time of decision making.
The qualitative implications of the theory are empirically tested, using data from 
the first wave of the German Socio-Economic panel. The empirical analysis is based 
on the information about whether the migrant intends to return or not, and, in the 
case of intended return, on the number of years he still wishes to remain in Germany.
As a first step, and using the whole sample of those who want and who do 
not want to return, logit models are estimated, where the dependent variable is the 
decision of the migrant whether or not to return. As a second step, and considering 
only the subset of those who wish to return, a duration analysis is performed. The 
spell variable is the migrant’s intended further duration of stay in the host country. In 
both stages, the empirical results are found to be mostly consistent with predictions of 
the theoretical model.
The logit analysis reveals that the time of residence in Germany significantly 
reduces the return probability, as does the presence of the partner, and the ability 
to speak the German language well or very well. Males are less probable to return 
than females. The fact of being married increases the return probability. Results on 
the impact of variables that capture earnings differentials and the lifetime horizon are 
inconclusive. The reason may be that the decision to return is likely to have been
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taken some time before the interview. If those variables that capture characteristics 
which influenced the migrant’s decision in the past are measured with a considerable 
lag, as it may be the case here, and if, additionally, they change over time, they may 
not represent their impact on the past decision. Finally, being unemployed at the time 
of the interview has a positive effect on the return probability.
For the duration analysis, two specifications are chosen that do not impose strong 
restrictions on the baseline hazard: the Cox model and the piecewise constant expo­
nential model. The results support the hypothesis that higher earnings differentials 
are reducing the hazard. Furthermore, the coefficients of the variable A ge are here 
significant and have the expected sign. This indicates that a longer future lifetime 
horizon decreases the conditional probability to leave the country at some t.
Variables that represent the environmental factor have, should they be significant, 
the expected sign. Furthermore, those who are unemployed at the time of the interview 
have a higher conditional probability to return at an early stage than their employed 
colleagues.
The analysis provides some evidence that migrants return decisions are endoge­
nous outcomes of an intertemporal optimization of lifetime utility. The understanding 
of the structure of this decision procedure is important to develop efficient migration 
policies. This study is an attempt to provide some insight into these decision processes.
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5.5 A ppendix
Appendix 1: Potential Earnings of the Unemployed
Earnings are only observable for those migrants who are in the labor force. This group 
may be a selected subsample of the whole population of employed and unemployed workers. 
Therefore, predictions of earnings of unemployed migrants, based on simple o l s  estimates of 
coefficients of earnings equations for the employed, may not correctly tell what a currently 
unemployed worker with a given vector of characteristics would earn. To see this, define a 
variable /,•:
{
1 : migrant i employed
0 : migrant i unemployed
Consider further the following relation:
y, -  P'xi + Ui
The variable yi may denote earnings and x, are individual characteristics and human capital 
variables. /? is a parameter vector and «,• is a normally distributed error term. Earnings are 
only observed for those who are employed. It follows that for these cases:
E(yi) = 0,xi + E(ui\Ii = \) (5.26)
Only when the process which selects individuals into the unemployment pool is independent 
from ti,, no selection bias will arise. To account for possible selection bias and to correctly 
predict the potential earnings of those who are unemployed, a simple two step procedure as 
proposed by Heckman (1979) is used. This procedure basically introduces a further variable, 
call it A, in the regression equation so as to ensure that the last term in (5.26) vanishes.22 In 
the first step, a probit specification is estimated on the probability that a person is unem­
ployed. Estimation results are then used to calculate an estimate for A, which will be added 
to the regressors of the OLS specification.
22When the selection rule is described by a simple probit model, it can be shown that J?(uj|J,- =  
1) =  — o \f(z i  6 )/F (zi ¿)] =  —a  Aj, where / ( . )  and F (.) are the density function and the distribution 
function of a standardized normal random variable, z is a vector of variables which explains the 
selection process and 6 the corresponding parameter vector, a  is then the covariance between the OLS 
error term  and the standard normal random variable of the probit specification. It is now easy to see 
tha t the addition of the new variable Aj among the regressors implies a new error term  £* =  Uj +  a  Aj, 
with expected value equal to  zero.
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In  th e  second step , o l s  estim ation  yields p aram ete r estim ates th a t  are unbiased and 
consisten t.23
Coefficient estim ates are  given in  tab le  5.6. T he variables Sch  and T r a in  denote 
years of schooling and  job  specific education , respectively, b o th  m easured afte r th e  age of 
14. T h e  variables Y e m p  and Y e m p s q  are years of full em ploym ent and th e  square of years 
of full em ploym ent, respectively. T he variables Y sm  and Y s m s q  are years since m igration 
and  th e  square of years since m igration . T he dum m y variable P a r t  is equal to  one when a 
person is p a r t- tim e  em ployed, and T u r , J u g , I t a  and G r  are dum m y variables for T urkish, 
Jugoslav ian , I ta lian  and  G reek nationality , respectively. All o th er variables correspond to  the 
no ta tio n  used above.
Appendix 2: Discrete Time Complementary Log-Log Models
As ind icated  above, th e  estim ation  of a  continuous tim e Cox m odel is problem atic when 
survival tim es have ties. A lthough algorithm s exist (and are used above) to  approx im ate the 
p a rtia l likelihood when dealing w ith  tied  d a ta , it seem advisable to  check the  validity of the 
resu lts by reestim ating  some discrete versions o f the  Cox model.
Following Allison (1982), th e  d iscrete-tim e hazard  function th a t corresponds to  the 
continuous tim e p roportional hazard  function is given by
^  =  1 -  exp [ - e x p  (a« +  6 'X t )] (5.27)
T he set of constan ts  a t ( t= l ,2 , . . )  can be left unspecified. Following M antel and Hankey 
(1978), Of will here be expressed as a  polynom ial in t. T he m odel will then  b e  estim ated  by 
m axim um  likelihood .24 T he resu lts  for different degrees of th e  polynom ial are given in tab le  
5.7. T he significant coefficients are sim ilar in  size and  in sign to  those ob tained  from the 
continuous Cox m odel.
23Note that the error terms of the extended OLS regression are heteroscedastic. Furthermore, stan­
dard t-tests which are based on the OLS standard errors do not help to correctly assess the signifi­
cance of the results, since some of the explanatory variables are estimated (see, for example, Madalla 
(1983)). Reported t-statistics are based on the correct, asymptotic standard errors (for the derivation, 
see Greene (1981)).
24For a derivation of the appropriate ML-estimator, see Rohwer (1991).
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Appendix 3: Tables
Table 5.4: Intended Durations 
P er io d  Y ea r s  F r e q u e n c y
1 1 119
2 140
2 3 128
4 64
3 5 170
6 70
4 7 23
8 37
9 8
5 10 202
11 3
12 5
13 8
6 15 62
16 3
17 1
18 4
20 37
7 25 3
26 2
28 1
30 4
S um 1094
SOURCE: Socio-Economic Panel, 
wave 1, 1984.
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Table 5.5: Piecewise Constant Hazards
Variable (1) (2)
£i (P eriod 1) -2.55 -2.53
(-15.65) (-10.82)
£2 (P eriod  2) -2.28 -2.25
(-13.77) (-9.55)
(P eriod 3) -1.67 -1.63
(10.30) (7.01)
(P eriod 4) -2.75 -2.72
(14.02) (10.53)
i 5 (P e riod  5) -1.40 -1.35
(-8.65) (-5.81)
(P eriod 6) -2.11 -2.03
(-11.50) (-8.17)
£7 (P e riod  7) -1.42 -1.31
(7.01) (4.93)
No. of Obs. 1094 1094
SOURCE: Socio-Economic Panel, wave 1, 
1984. t-ratios in parenthesis. Piecewise 
constant hazards correspond to exp((,).
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Table 5.6: Earnings Equations
Va ria ble  P r o b it  Le a st  Squares
C onst -2.86 7.08
(-8.73) (160.94)
M ale -0.069 0.31
(-0.54) (19.86)
M a rried -0.23 0.076
(-1.50) (3.99)
Sch -0 .054 0.015
(-1.70) (5.12)
T rain -0.058 0.008
(-1.64) (2.51)
G sp -0.16 0.032
(-1.24) (2.30)
Y sm 0.058 0.018
(4.22) (3.52)
Y smsq * -0.00043
(-2.59)
T ur 0.296 0.0066
(1.63) (0.31)
J ug -0 .019 0.079
(-0.092) (3.49)
Ita -0.006 0.031
(-0.032) (1.37)
G r -0 .10 0.06
(-0.47) (2.62)
Y em p -0.018 0.019
(-2.36) (8.21)
Y em psq * -0.00041
(-7.94)
E du 0.31
(1.69)
*
School •0.038
(-0.20)
0
U n e m p IO 2.07
(13.10)
*
P art * -0.40
(-11.72)
A • 0.10
(3.21)
No. o f  Oba. 1734 1572
A dj.R 2 * 0.45
SOURCE: Socio-Economic Panel, wave 1, 
1984. t-ratios in parenthesis.
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Table 5.7: Discrete Time Complementary Log-Log Models
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Earn -0.133 -0.173 -0.170 -0.171 -0.171
(-2.29) (-2.94) (-2.89) (-2.91) (-2.90)
Earnt 0.086 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.097
(2.42) (2.70) (2.71) (2.72) (2.72)
Earng 0.069 0.091 0.092 0.091 0.091
(1.68) (2.20) (2.21) (2.19) (2.19)
Earns -0.033 -0.055 -0.055 -0.053 -0.053
(-0.74) (-1.22) (-1.21) (-1.15) (-1.16)
Earni 0.068 0.063 0.066 0.063 0.063
(1.63) (1.51) (1.57) (1.50) (1.49)
Ysm -0.021 -0.023 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024
(-2.49) (-2.75) (-2.81) (-2.91) (-2.82)
Age 0.016 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
(3.79) (4.50) (4.52) (4.55) (4.56)
Male 0.039 0.077 0.072 0.075 0.075
(0.49) (0.96) (0.90) (0.93) (0.93)
Married 0.26 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.32
(1.78) (2.20) (2.27) (2.18) (2.18)
Edu -0.020 •0.018 -0.015 -0.017 -0.016
(-0.17) (-0.15) (-0.13) (-0.14) (-0.13)
S chool 0.061 0.048 0.055 0.053 0.053
(0.49) (0.38) (0.44) (0.42) (0.42)
G sp -0.052 -0.062 -0.064 -0.061 -0.061
(-0.75) (-0.89) (-0.92) (-0.88) (-0.88)
Hsp -0.069 -0.092 -0.090 -0.093 -0.061
(-0.52) (-0.70) (-0.69) (-0.71) (-0.71)
T ransfer 0.120 0.151 0.149 0.150 0.150
(1.82) (2.22) (2.19) (2.20) (2.20)
Partner -0.31 -0.38 -0.38 -0.37 -0.37
(-2.65) (-3.21) (-3.23) (-3.19) (-3.19)
UnempIO 0.072 0.093 0.092 0.091 0.090
(0.93) (1.20) (1.18) (1.17) (1.16)
Unemp 0.31 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.36
(2.54) (3.02) (3.00) (2.99) (2.98)
«1 * 0.049 0.067 0.115 0.098
(8.18) (3.92) (3.11) (1.34)
o 2 * * -0.001 -0.006 -0.003
(-1.10) (-1.67) (-0.25)
£»3 ♦ * * 0.0001 -0.0000
(1.48) (0.06)
<*4 ♦ * * * 0.0000
(0.26)
No. o f  Obs. 1094 
Log — Likelihood -3023
1094
-2993
1094
-2992
1094
-2991
1094
-2991
SOURCE: Socio-Economic Panel, wave 1, 1984. t-ratios in
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F ig u re  1: Life Table Estimates
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F ig u re  2: Cox Model Estimate of Survivor Function
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F ig u re  3: Piecewise Constant Hazard Rate
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